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 This research project is motivated by the question of what type of relationship 
exists between threat and bias. Such a relationship has been demonstrated for racial 
bias and theorized for sexism and heterosexism; however the nature of the relationship 
is unknown. In particular, it is unclear whether threat functions at the individual level, 
group level, or both levels simultaneously. This is accomplished by considering three 
types of bias: sexism, racism, and heterosexism.  
 All three analyses utilize virtually identical background measures and employ 
ordered logistic and multinomial logistic regressions, with differing outcome measures 
and threats. Each paper begins by considering how the relevant literatures treat threat 
and bias. They then examine the same four hypotheses describing the possible 
relationships between individual threat, group threat, and biased attitudes.  
 The gender and race analyses utilize the General Social Survey. Attitudes 
towards policies aimed at promoting gender equity are the outcome measures for the 
gender study, while attitudes towards policies aimed at promoting racial equity are the 
outcome measures for the race analysis. Threat measures assess perceptions of the 
impact of the women’s movement on individuals and men (gender analysis) and 
perceptions of white job security and stability (race analysis).  
 The sexual orientation analysis relies on student data, because there are no 
available datasets with appropriate measures of individual and group threats. A 
questionnaire was developed and administered to undergraduate students at an elite 
Northeastern university. Unlike the other two analyses, the results from this study are 
  
not generalizable; however, they should provide an indication of whether the trends 
ident ified with gender and racial attitudes may carry over to opinions regarding sexual 
minorities. Outcomes are attitudes towards legalizing gay marriage and providing 
same-sex couples with job benefits 
 The results confirm the link between feelings of threat and negative views of 
the out-group. All three analyses demonstrate that individual threat and group threat 
are simultaneously associated with opposition to policies aiding the subordinate group. 
Furthermore, the results suggest the possibility of a proxy relationship between 
individual threat and group threat. 
 iv 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
 Judith Rosenstein is a graduate of the University of Michigan, with honors in 
both Mathematics and Sociology. She received her Masters degree in Sociology from 
Cornell in 2005. That same year she won the Sociology Department’s Robin Williams 
Jr. Best Graduate Paper Award. 
 Judith’s research focuses on inequality, and in particular, differential treatment 
of out-groups. The question motivating her research is why some people hate and 
mistreat others for no reason other than their group affiliation. 
 v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 This dissertation, as is the nature of such projects, spanned numerous years and 
benefited from the advice, input, and time of many individuals. Particularly deserving 
of my gratitude are my committee members Shelly Correll, David Harris, and my 
chair, David Grusky. They have my sincere thanks for all the time and effort they 
devoted to me and to my dissertation. I would also like to extend special thanks to 
Douglas Heckathorn, Sidney Tarrow, Kim Weeden, and Steve Morgan for their help 
along the way. This project was also aided by the advice, brainstorming, and 
reviewing, not to mention emotional support, of various Cornell sociology graduate 
students, most notably Young-Mi Kim, Steve Benard, and Erik Williams.  
 A project of this magnitude does not reside solely in the office. I am sincerely 
grateful to my family and friends who supported me throughout this process and 
beyond. In particular, I would like to thank my parents, Linda and Jim Rosenstein, my 
friends Sarena Fletcher, Anna Krouse, Jocelyn Martin, and Chinwe Onyekere. Finally, 
with love and immense gratitude, I want to thank my partner Alex Gladshtein for 
putting up with me during the entire process and supporting me every step of the way. 
 vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Biographical Sketch iv 
Acknowledgements v 
List of Figures vii 
List of Tables viii 
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Chapter 2: Threat and Sexism: Examining the Role of Threat in 
Attitudes towards Women’s Employment 
22 
Chapter 3: Individual Threat, Group Threat, and Racial Policy: 
Exploring the Relationship between Threat and Racial 
Attitudes 
50 
Chapter 4: Individual Threat, Group Threat, and Attitudes towards 
Legalizing Gay Marriage and Providing Job Benefits to 
Same-Sex Couples 
78 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 110 
Appendices  
Appendix A: Survey Instrument 127 
Appendix B: Recruitment Poster 150 
Appendix C: Attitudes Scale Questions and Factor Loadings 151 
References 152 
 
 vii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1. Possible Threat Combinations 16 
Figure 3.1. Individual Threat for Special Treatment Frame, Controlling for 
all Other Measures 
74 
Figure 3.2. Group Threat for Special Treatment Frame, Controlling for all 
Other Measures  
74 
Figure 5.1. Social Position of Women, Blacks, and Sexual Minorities 113 
 viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1.1. Threat Typology 8 
Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics 34 
Table 2.2. Ordered Logistic Regression of Men’s Attitudes towards 
Affirmative Action 
42 
Table 2.3. Ordered Logistic Regression of Women’s Attitudes towards 
Affirmative Action 
44 
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics 61 
Table 3.2. Multinomial Logistic Regressions of White’s Opposition to 
Reverse Discrimination Policies 
70 
Table 3.3. Multinomial Logistic Regression of White’s Opposition to 
Special Treatment Policies 
72 
Table 4.1. Sample Composition vs. University Composition 2006 88 
Table 4.2. Sample Descriptive Statistics 94 
Table 4.3. Support for LGB Civil Rights 96 
Table 4.4. Ordered Logistic Regression of Attitudes towards Gay 
Marriage 
103 
Table 4.5. Ordered Logistic Regression of Attitudes towards Job 
Benefits 
105 
Table 5.1. Theoretical Models’ Threat Type, Analysis, and Original 
Application 
118 
 
  1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Bias is a persistent and pervasive problem in the United States and around the 
world. The U.S.’s history of bias is long and sordid with its attempted exterminations, 
round-ups, and forced marches of Native Americans; slavery of Africans and African 
Americans; Jim Crow laws; internment of people of Japanese descent during the 
Second World War; profiling of Middle Easterners following the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001; restriction of voting rights to propertied white males; and 
criminalization of sodomy. Although many types of bigoted behavior have been 
banned, both legal and illegal forms remain pervasive. 
 Bias not only harms its direct victims, but also the victimized groups and the 
society as a whole. Individual victims face physical and psychological consequences 
ranging from depression, low self-esteem, anxiety, anger, and fear (Garnets, Herek, 
and Levy 1992; Herek et al. 1997, p.576) to posttraumatic stress (Rose and Mechanic 
2002), severe physical injury, and even death (Berrill 1992; Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 2003, 2004, 2005; Stovel 2001; Tolnay, Beck, and Massey 1989a). The 
impact on a victim’s group is no less severe, as many acts of bias are aimed less at a 
specific individual than at the group to which the individual belongs or appears to 
belong (Jenness and Grattet 2001; Perry 2001). These acts of bias may be geared 
towards keeping a group out of a community (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998), 
preventing occupational advancement (Heilman 2001), putting a group “in its place” 
(Glaser, Dixit, and Green 2002; Perry 2001, 2002), or outright extermination (Gilbert 
1985).  
 At its most severe, bias can lead to genocide and large scale ethnic conflict, 
such as those ongoing in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Sudan, and past conflicts in 
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Rwanda, Germany, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia (Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Horowitz 
1985; See 1986; Young 1986). On a less destructive level, bias can keep able-bodied 
workers out of professions (Heilman 2001), resulting in a loss of productivity and 
innovation. It can also foster the formation of homogeneous communities, such as the 
inner city ghettos that have developed in cities throughout the U.S., due in part to 
discrimination in the housing and lending markets (Massey and Denton 1993). These 
ghettos can in turn breed anger and resentment directed at the dominant group, further 
heightening intergroup hostility (Boskin 1976; Kelly and Isaac 1984; Wilson 1980). 
 The repercussions of bias and biased behavior touch everyone, regardless of 
whether or not they recognize it. It is a problem facing us all and one we need to fight. 
But, in order to do that, we must have a better understanding of bias, what it is, what 
causes it, and how it is manifest.  
 
BIAS: DEFINITION AND EXAMINATION 
 Intergroup bias, or simply bias, is “the systematic tendency to evaluate one’s 
own membership group (the in-group) or its members more favorably than a 
nonmembership group (the out-group) or its members” (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 
2002, p. 576). There is no specific profile that bias adopts; it can appear as prejudice, 
discrimination, ethnic cleansing, or a host of other forms of beliefs and actions 
(Hewstone et al. 2002). Furthermore, bias acts as both a motivator and a rationale for 
hostile behavior by members of one group directed at members of another group. 
 The pervasive, often destructive, nature of bias has made it an area of intense 
study for social scientists. Examinations of bias are generally conducted in one of two 
ways: either by concentrating on expressions of bias, such as prejudice (Allport 1958; 
Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999; Dovidio 2001; Firebaugh and Davis 1988; Pettigrew and 
Meertens 1995; Quillian 1995), discrimination (Blalock 1957; Blalock 1967; Feagin 
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1991; Feagin and Eckberg 1980; Fox 2000; Goldin 2002; Padavic and Reskin 1990), 
ethnic conflict (Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Horowitz 1985; Olzak 1992), lynching 
(Corzine, Creech, and Corzine 1983; Olzak 1990; Stovel 2001; Tolnay et al. 1989a), 
and civil disorders and urban violence (Berk and Aldrich 1972; Boskin 1976; Kelly 
and Isaac 1984; Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996); or by considering the target 
of bias, such as racism (Bobo 1983, 1988a, 1988b; Fredrickson 2002; Kinder and 
Sears 1981; Powell 1992), sexism (Glick et al. 2000; Swim et al. 1995), anti-Semitism 
(Brustein and King 2004; Zukier 1996), and heterosexism (Davies 2004; Haddock, 
Zanna, and Esses 1993; Herek 1992a, 1992b, 2000, 2002; Hinrichs and Rosenberg 
2002; Lim 2002; Steffens 2005; Yang 1997). Often, the focus is even narrower, so that 
examinations of forms of bias consider only one class of bias, such as gender 
discrimination, or concentrate on only one target, such as prejudice towards a single 
racial or ethnic group.  
 These simplifications are the products of both pragmatism and structural 
constraints. Bias is simply too overwhelming a topic to comprehensively examine in 
its entirety; books have been devoted to ethnic conflict (Horowitz 1985; Olzak 1992), 
prejudice (Allport 1958; Ehrlich 1973), racism (Fredrickson 2002; Powell 1992), and 
heterosexism (Blumenfeld 1992; Herek 1998), to name a few. Consequently, we must 
make due by examining bias piece by piece. Second, the social sciences, and 
sociology in particularly, have become “balkanized” to the extent that they are divided 
into distinct areas, many of which incorporate some form of bias – there are race 
scholars, gender scholars, religion scholars, students of inequality (which often results 
from bias), and so on. These scholars focus on the forms of bias relevant to their area 
of expertise, but rarely do they explore other kinds of bias. These studies provide vital 
information about how bias is manifest in the specified domain. The downside is that 
there are few analyses that cover multiple areas, which means that we have limited 
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information about the similarities and differences across types of bias. This leaves a 
gap in our understanding of bias. 
 A related weakness is our relative ignorance of the impact of the intersection of 
bias categories. People belong to multiple groups simultaneously, so a person can be a 
member of the dominant group in one area (e.g., white), but a member of a 
subordinate group in another (e.g., female), or belong to multiple subordinate groups 
(e.g., black and female). To date, relatively little has been done to explore the 
intersection of groups with respect to bias (exceptions include Browne and Misra 
2003; Collins 2001; Kane 2000; West and Fenstermaker 1995). Furthermore, the 
separation of subfields discourages the cross-pollination of ideas. Each subfield has a 
unique literature, often with a distinct vocabulary. Unless a study involves the 
intersection of subject areas, there is little reason for a scholar to leave her subfield to 
seek literature in another. Consequently, it is difficult to compare phenomena across 
areas.  
 The disparate literatures have found common themes in the manifestation of 
bias. The idea of threat is one of the most important. The specifics of threat vary by 
context, but at its core the idea is the same: when a person feels that either an 
individual or her group are endangered by an individual or group she will be hostile 
towards the perceived source of threat. Where literatures diverge is the type of threat, 
whether or not the threat must be real, the expression of bias, and the specific groups 
involved.  
 
Groups Examined 
 What groups are involved in a study of bias is not as self-evident as it seems. 
The simplistic answer is that the groups of interest are generally contingent on the 
field of study, with gender papers usually focusing on men and women, race analyses 
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considering blacks and whites (and sometimes others), and so forth. At a deeper level 
is the relationship between the groups (e.g., dominant vs. subordinate, subordinate vs. 
subordinate, etc.). The majority of studies focus on dominant-subordinate relations – 
race studies explore white’s attitudes towards blacks (Bobo 1983; Firebaugh and 
Davis 1988; Glaser et al. 2002; Quillian 1996; Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979; Sears 
et al. 1997), while sexual orientation papers examine heterosexual’s opinions of sexual 
minorities (Herek 2002; Herek and Capitanio 1999; Hinrichs and Rosenberg 2002). 
Gender studies are an exception, as most include men’s and women’s attitudes (Alwin, 
Braun, and Scott 1992; Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Cassidy and Warren 1996; 
Mason and Lu 1988). Dominant-subordinate relationships are particularly important 
for comprehending social relations, because by its nature, it is often the dominant 
group that plays the greatest role in shaping social interactions. But because our 
society is not monolithic, we also need to understand other relationships, even if they 
are not the most influential for the society as whole. Many race scholars appear to 
have recognized the importance of subordinate group opinions, and have begun to 
examine them more frequently (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; 
Charles 2001; Green and Waxman 1987; Kluegel and Bobo 2001). 
 
Expression of Bias 
 There are many different ways bias can be expressed, ranging from prejudice 
to ethnic conflict to genocide. In some cases, there are fields devoted entirely to one 
area of antagonism, such as ethnic conflict; in others a single field may cover the 
spectrum of bias (e.g., racism). Threat has been associated with the entire array of 
antagonistic forms, and appears in a manner appropriate to the relevant expression of 
bias (e.g., race based threat relates to racism). 
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Real vs. Perceived Threat 
 There is some debate as to whether threat must be real (Bobo 1988b; Quillian 
1995). The idea of real and perceived threats stems from the differentiation between 
realistic and nonrealistic conflicts. According to Coser (1956), realistic conflict relates 
to the attainment of a specific objective, such that the conflict fades once the situation 
has been satisfactorily resolved. A nonrealistic conflict has to do with a “response to 
frustration in which the object appears suitable for a release of aggressiveness” (Coser 
1956, pp. 49-50). Since the conflict does not relate to a specific objective, it will not 
dissipate as readily as a realistic conflict. Realistic and nonrealistic conflicts translate 
directly to real and unreal (or perceived) threats. Real threats are threats to actual 
group interests or resources, while perceived threats do not involve actual group 
interests (Quillian 1995). 
 The question of whether or not threats must be real for them to generate 
hostility is theoretically interesting, but empirically problematic. Because of 
theoretical concerns some scholars try to restrict their analysis to real threats. While it 
is sound research procedure to strictly adhere to theoretical claims, in this case those 
claims are difficult to translate into everyday life. Real threats are obviously a greater 
danger than unreal threats; however until a situation has been resolved, it is unknown 
if a threat will be realized and it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine if reactions 
to a real threat are due to the actual threat or to underlying hostilities towards the 
group posing the threat. As Bobo (1999) notes in reference to conflict, “there are both 
affect- laden identities and orientations that are bound up with differential positions 
and interests” (p. 457). 
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Type of Threat 
 The final issue is the type of threat. The various literatures on bias 
independently identify two forms of threat: individual threat and group threat. The two 
types of threat are discrete and therefore deserve to be considered independently. More 
importantly, the threats have distinct roots. Consequently, they behave differently and 
require their own unique responses. There are four forms of threat that have been 
identified: threats to status, goals and values, identity, and security and survival. 
Identity threats can be subdivided into threats to distinctiveness and sense of self. 
Distinctiveness applies more at the group level, while sense of self occurs at the 
individual level (table 1.1). 
 
 Individual threat. As the name implies, individual threat occurs when an 
individual faces harm. It is a threat to “personal lives” (Kinder and Sears 1981, p. 417) 
and occurs when there is the belief that some event will result in an individual being 
worse off than she was previously (Kane and Sanchez 1994). Some common examples 
include the loss of one’s job or a decline in the job’s prestige (Banton 1983; Bonacich 
1972; Olzak 1992; Ridgeway 1997), the concern that one’s behavior does not conform 
to prescribed gender roles (Connell 1995; Hopkins 1996; West and Zimmerman 
1987), and the belief that a family member will be contaminated because of an 
intermarriage with someone from an out-group (Glaser et al. 2002). Three forms of 
individual threat are readily identifiable in the literature: status threat, identity threat, 
and security/survival threat. Scholars do not consider threats to individual goals and 
values; although such threats are mentioned by nonacademics.  
 Status threats are threats to those resources that signal a person’s social 
position. One of the most commonly cited status threats is declining property values 
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Table 1.1. Threat Typology 
  Terminology/Examples† 
Threat Type Description Individual Threat Group Threat 
Status Threat to person/group’s social 
position  
Resources: symbol of status, prestige 
(Bonacich 1972; Charles 2003; 
Ridgeway 1997; Wilson 2001) 
Position (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999; 
Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996) 
Prestige (Goldin 2002) 
Legitimacy (Maass et al. 2003) 
Group value (Maass et al. 2003) 
Power threat (Blalock 1957) 
Competition (Bréchon and Mitra 1992; 
D'Alessio, Stolzenberg, and Eitle 
2002; Olzak 1990) 
 
Goals and Values Infringement on culture, values, or 
way of life 
 Conflicting objectives (Bobo 1988a; 
Hewstone et al. 2002) 
Cultural identity (Glaser et al. 2002) 
Preserving way of life (Green et al. 1998) 
Identity    
Sense of Self Threat to how individual perceives 
and values him/herself 
Contamination: cleanliness (Blee 2002; 
Glaser et al. 2002)  
Self-perception, self-worth, self-esteem 
(Connell 1995; Hopkins 1996; West 
and Zimmerman 1987) 
Acceptance/Prototypicality (Maass et al. 
2003) 
 
Distinctiveness Threat to the group’s uniqueness  Distinctiveness (Maass et al. 2003) 
Separateness (Glaser et al. 2002) 
Contamination: racial purity (Perry 2001) 
 
Security and 
Survival 
Threat to security, safety, or 
survival 
Resource threats: requirement for 
survival (Bonacich 1972) 
Crime and violence (Blee 2002; 
Fredrickson 2002; Perry 2001) 
Contamination: racial death (Ezekiel 
2002; Perry 2001) 
Crime/delinquency (Bréchon and Mitra 
1992) 
Race war (Blee 2002; Perry 2001) 
† The terminology examples provide a flavor of the ways each form of threat is expressed. The lists are in no way exhaustive 
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brought on by the influx of an out-group into a neighborhood (Charles 2003; Massey 
and Denton 1993). Another example is the loss of a high prestige job that confers 
status through association. 
 When a threat to resources impacts an actor’s ability to live, then it is a 
security of survival threat. For instance, the loss of a job could mean lack of income. 
Alternatively, people may express concerns about increasing crime. These beliefs are 
reinforced by stereotypes that out-group members are prone to violence or involved in 
violent activities such as drugs and gangs (Bréchon and Mitra 1992; Charles 2003; 
Massey and Denton 1993) and encourage fears about neighborhood safety, children 
playing in the streets, and women walking alone at night. There is also racist 
propaganda which portrays white women as victims of predatory black (and other 
nonwhite) males’ “hypersexuality” (Blee 2002; Fredrickson 2002; Perry 2001). 
 The third category is identity threats. These are threats to what it means for the 
actor to be who she is. Sense of self threats relate to how an actor views herself. Such 
threats occur when an actor is concerned that she does not sufficiently embody the 
characteristics of her group or she is somehow atypical for her group. People with 
strong group identities will feel threatened if they learn that they are not   enough or 
are not exemplars of group ideals, because being part of the group is a fundamental 
component of how they define themselves. To learn that they are less than what they 
thought threatens their self-esteem, their self-worth (they are not worthy to be part of 
the group), and their identity. This type of threat appears frequently with respect to 
gender and sexuality, and Maass et al. (2003) refer to it as an acceptance or 
prototypicality threat. One example is intergroup sexual relations which are often 
particularly problematic when they involve an in-group woman and an out-group man. 
Sexual contact, or potentially any type of physical contact, sullies the woman, making 
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her unclean and has potential negative implications for her family members (Blee 
2002). 
 Distinctiveness threats are akin to some individual sense of self threats, only 
applied at the group level. Distinctiveness refers to two groups having unique 
characteristics such that the groups are different and distinguishable from one another. 
This uniqueness is part of the group’s identity. As members and representatives of 
groups, individuals perceive distinctiveness threats; however the threats are to the 
group, not the individual, so they are group threats.  
 Can distinctiveness apply at the individual level? It is hard to see how. As 
unique entities individuals do not face the threat of losing their identities and their 
reason for existing because they closely resemble someone else. They are inherently 
distinct. This makes it difficult for a distinctiveness threat to apply. 
 The fourth type of threat, one to goals and values, does not appear in the 
academic literature; although it does appear elsewhere. This type of threat occurs 
when someone’s action infringes on an individual’s ability to live according to her 
culture and her values or restricts her attainment of her goals. Sprigg (2006) provides 
one example when he argues that legalizing same-sex marriages will encourage people 
to leave their opposite-sex spouses for ones of the same sex. Apparently the spouse 
leaving the marriage for a same-sex lover prevents the abandoned spouse from 
fulfilling her goals of a permanent heterosexual union. Such abandonment is also a 
blow to the values of the abandoned spouse, who believes that same-sex relationships 
are morally wrong. (This is presumably why same-sex marriage is problematic at the 
individual level, since is it not uncommon for a heterosexual marriage to dissolve 
because of one partner’s involvement with someone else, regardless of gender. Of 
course, is it unclear from this argument why the actual legalization of gay marriage is 
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so problematic, since there is no current legal barrier to leaving a spouse for a same-
sex lover.) 
 
 Group Threat. Group threat, in contrast, occurs when a social group is 
perceived to be threatened by an out-group. For instance, group threats include the fear 
that economic competition will lead to a decline in the dominant group’s status 
(Blalock 1957; Goldin 2002; Kimmel 2004), concern that acceptance of nontraditional 
types of masculinity (e.g., effeminate males) will cause men to lose their position of 
dominance (Hopkins 1996), and the belief that intermarriage will pollute the gene pool 
(Blee 2002; Ezekiel 2002; Fredrickson 2002; Glaser et al. 2002).  
 The study of group threat generally focuses on the large social salient groups 
within a society, such as ethnic and racial groups, tribes, genders, and religions; 
however, it can theoretically occur among smaller groups such as families, provided 
that the conditions pertaining to group threat are met. There are two preconditions for 
group threats. First, for there to be a group threat, the threat must be to the group and 
not to individual group members. This means that the group must have a distinct 
identity that exists independently from the identities of individual group members; 
otherwise the group could not be threatened. The condition is easily met for large 
groups such as racial and ethnic groups, because group membership is socially salient 
and reified independently from group members. Group affiliation influences actors’ 
lives and life chances, regardless of whether actors want them to or not. This condition 
is harder to meet for smaller groups, because it requires that a group is an entity in its 
own right, not solely a collection of its members. For instance, for kinship groups this 
is a distinction between the family and The Family. 
 The second characteristic of group threat is that it is inherently relational, 
meaning that it involves the comparison of the in-group with an out-group. A group 
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cannot be threatened unless another group is posing a threat. In the context of race 
relations the most frequently considered threat relationship is blacks threatening 
whites. Whether it is the entire group posing the threat or only one or two group 
members is irrelevant. What matters is the perception that “they” are threatening “us.” 
If one or two out-group members are seen as group representatives, then it is the entire 
group posing the threat, not the individuals per se. 
 All four classes of group threat are discussed in the literature (table 1.1). The 
most frequently discussed threats are those to a group’s social position. These include 
all situations where a group is concerned about its place in the social hierarchy 
(Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999; Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996), as well as competition for 
political, social, and economic resources (Beck and Tolnay 1990; Blalock 1967; 
Bréchon and Mitra 1992; D'Alessio et al. 2002; Olzak 1990). Competition is 
categorized with threats to social position because they both relate to status. Resources 
are symbols of status and group competition is generally viewed as a zero-sum game 
for resources – the in-group loses if the out-group wins (Bobo 1998; Bobo 1999; Bobo 
and Hutchings 1996). The in-group wants to maintain it access to resources, material 
or otherwise, so it will fight off any out-group that attempts to encroach on its 
territory.  
 Threats to goals and values occur when groups have conflicting objectives 
(Bobo 1988a) or when there are cultural clashes (Green, Abelson, and Garnett 1999). 
The former occurs when groups in the same arena have differing goals or agendas, 
even when the groups share the same values (Bobo 1988a). For instance, Democrats 
and Republicans both want what is best for the country, but they disagree on what that 
is and how to accomplish it. Cultural clashes occur when the in-group’s perceived way 
of life is threatened, particularly when this way of life is an aspect of the group’s 
identity. Green and his colleagues (1999) argue that this transpires “when an outgroup 
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acts, or threats to act, in a way that restricts the scope of the group’s life space or 
makes the exercise of options within it difficult” (p. 453). For instance, they report that 
white supremacists are less comfortable than others around people who want to ban 
the confederate flag. Similarly the French conflict over the headscarf and other overt 
religious symbols centers around what it means to be French (Bréchon and Mitra 
1992; Wyatt 2003), while the Klu Klux Klan of the early 20th century targeted those 
who represented moral degradation (Chalmers 1965). 
 The third type of threat relates to a group’s need to be distinct from other 
groups. It occurs when the boundaries between groups begin to fade (or they are 
believed to be fading), so that it becomes difficult to differentiate the groups. Groups 
that want to maintain a unique identity will be threatened if they believe they are 
losing their distinctiveness. These groups need to be able to distinguish “us” from 
“them.” It is this distinctiveness that helps define who they are and without it they 
“lose their raison d’être” (Jetten, Spears, and Manstead 1998, p. 1481). This situation 
is unique from the previous types of threat, because here threatened groups will strive 
to differentiate themselves in any way possible, even if it results in a negative 
differentiation (Maass et al. 2003).  
 Security and survival, the final form of group threat, is related to 
distinctiveness. Groups will be threatened if they fear for their existence or their 
safety. The former may occur because they face annihilation or the merging with 
another group. (It is the merging or blending of two groups that relates to group 
distinctiveness.) When two groups merge one of two things happens: either one group 
subsumes the other (and the identity with it) or the joint group has a unique identity of 
its own. Regardless, one or both groups lose their original identity and, for all intents 
and purposes, cease to exist. The other possibility is direct annihilation. Outright 
extermination is the most straight forward way to eliminate a group, but there are 
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others. One is the fear of “mongrolization” expressed by supremacists groups. The 
believed end result of “race-mixing” is the “pollution” of the gene pool to the extent 
that there are no remaining “pure bloods” and results in the death of the race (Ezekiel 
2002; Perry 2001). 
 Along with survival are concerns about safety and security. The influx of a 
new group is often concomitant with fears about a spike in crime, especially when the 
newcomers are of lower status. The fear of crime is the same as described for 
individual threat, except that the danger is broader, including a “breakdown of law and 
order” (Bréchon and Mitra 1992, p. 70). This is a fear frequently expressed by anti-
immigration activists and rightwing political groups (Rydgren 2002) who strive to 
maintain community homogeneity. 
 All four of these scenarios demand that the group be salient and that group 
members have a strong sense of group identity. The group must be meaningful, 
otherwise actors would not identify with it, nor would there be a need to defend it. It is 
only meaningful groups for which actors perceive a threat and consider the group 
worth defending. Moreover, perception and reaction to group threat relate to strength 
of group identity. As Maass and her colleagues (2003) note, “threat to an in-group 
should mainly affect those who are highly identified with that particular group” (p. 
855). If an actor does not have a strong group identity then even if she perceives a 
threat, she has little incentive to react to it. 
 
 Importance of Differentiating Individual Threat and Group Threat. Individual 
and group threats are similar and sometimes difficult to differentiate, but they are 
fundamentally distinct. The threats are different because they are born out of different 
circumstances. Perception of an individua l threat emerges from an actor’s personal 
experiences and make-up, such as her “disposition,” “personality,” and “social 
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experiences” (Blumer 1958, p. 3). Group threat, in contrast, deve lops out of group 
relations. The relationships between groups and their social positioning involve a 
collective process (Blumer 1958), not an individual one. This distinction is the core 
reason why individual threat and group threat are fundamentally different and why it is 
important to distinguish between them. 
 The need to differentiate the threats goes beyond their origin; because 
individual threat and group threat have different roots, their resolution may require 
very different strategies. To use an inequality analogy, the factors causing the poverty 
of an individual family may be very different from the large scale poverty of a group. 
Individuals can be helped by aid packages and outreach programs, but addressing 
group level poverty is likely to require structural change. The same is true with threat 
and bias. Bias related to individual factors may be moderated through reeducation 
programs such as those discussed by Levin and McDevitt (1993) for some hate crime 
perpetrators. However, such tactics are insufficient for eliminating group level bias; 
different strategies are required. 
 Although the literatures identify two types of threat, actual studies tend to 
focus on only one of the two. For instance, within the gender and sexuality literature 
gender identity arguments concentrate on individual threat (Toller, Suter, and 
Trautman 2004), while in the race literature individual threat is the focus of economic 
deprivation approaches (Bonacich 1972) and pollution arguments (Glaser et al. 2002), 
and group threat is the focus of arguments such as Blumer’s group position model 
(Blumer 1958) and Blalock’s power threat hypothesis (Blalock 1957). There are a 
couple of perspectives in the gender and sexuality literatures that consider both types 
of threat simultaneously (Connell 1987). However, although these discussions 
postulate the existence of both threats, there are no discussions of the relationship 
between the threats or whether the threats occur jointly or singly. 
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 With two possible threats and two options for each threat (not threatened and 
threatened), there are four potential threat combinations (see figure 1.1). The first 
scenario is that neither threat is relevant. In other words, the actor perceives neither an 
individual threat nor a group threat. The second option is that the actor perceives an 
individual threat, but not a group threat. One way this might occur is if cheaper 
immigrant labor enters a market and native workers fear they might lose their jobs, but 
they are not anxious about the jobs of native workers in general. However, if the 
native manager is concerned about the native workers losing their jobs, even though 
her own job is not at risk, then there is a group threat without an individual threat. 
When native actors fear for their own jobs (or those of specific individuals) as wells as 
the jobs of native workers generally, then the two threats are operating simultaneously. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Possible threat combinations 
 
RESEARCH MOTIVATION 
 This research project is motivated by the question of how threat is related to 
bias. That such an association exists is evident for racial bias and theorized in the 
gender and sexuality literatures; however the nature of the relationship between threat 
and bias is less apparent. In particular, it is unclear whether threat functions at the 
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individual level, group level, or both levels simultaneously. Furthermore, if both 
threats are associated with bias, it is important to know if there is a relationship 
between the two threats.  
 These issues are pertinent for both scholars of bias and policy makers 
interested in promoting equality. The goal of bias research is to understand the 
mechanisms associated with bigotry. Furthermore, scholars need to know what 
covariates to include in their analyses, since model misspecification can lead to faulty 
results that overstate (or understate) the effects of certain measures and lead to 
erroneous conclusions. For policy makers, more accurate information about the factors 
associated with bias will help them better draft and pass legislation promoting 
equality. By knowing whether one or both threats are associated with bias, legislators 
can anticipate the concerns of their constituents and opponents, which should improve 
the odds that the legislation is passed. Furthermore, properly identifying associated 
forms of threat may be key to successfully reducing bias. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
 The primary objective of this research is to examine individual threat and 
group threat in concert to determine if one or both threats are associated with group 
specific policy attitudes. Also of interest is whether there is a relationship between the 
two threats. Finally, the project aims to help bridge the gap between various 
sociological subfields, by considering the same question in three contexts. These three 
goals are accomplished by considering three types of bias: sexism, racism, and 
heterosexism. Each is examined individually and the separate results are later 
considered together. Within each analysis the relationship between policy attitudes and 
threat are assessed for the threats individually and jointly. 
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APPROACH 
 The three cases of sexism, racism, and heterosexism were selected because of 
their unique position in U.S. social relations and the American sociological tradition. 
The ugly history of U.S. race relations has deservedly led race to be one of the 
foremost research subjects for U.S. sociologists. No study of bias in the United States 
is complete without a discussion of race. Gender, like race, is a major area of research 
for students of inequality. Moreover, gender inequality is of international interest 
(Charles and Grusky 2004; Grusky and Charles 2001; Vrugt and Nauta 1995). 
Heterosexism has not received the same level of attention as either racism or sexism. 
However, equal treatment of minorities is the current civil rights battleground, 
following in the footsteps of the women’s suffrage movement, the civil rights 
movement, and the new feminist movement. These three types of bias were selected 
because of their current and historical significance, but this in no way implies that they 
are the only forms of bias worth studying. (The possibility of extending this analysis 
to other types of bias is discussed in the final chapter.) 
 
Research Method 
 The relationship between policy attitudes and threat is assessed using survey 
data. There is a rich history of using survey data to assess attitudes (Alwin et al. 1992; 
Huber and Spitze 1981; Huddy, Neely, and Lafay 2000; Lewis 2003; Schuman, Steeh, 
and Bobo 1985; Schuman et al. 1997; Spitze and Waite 1981; Steeh and Krysan 1996; 
Stouffer 1955; Thornton, Alwin, and Camburn 1983; Yang 1997). Surveys are 
commonly used in the racial prejudice literature to examine threat and attitudes (Bobo 
1983, 1988a, 1998; Kluegel and Bobo 2001; Quillian 1996) and not infrequently used 
in other areas of attitudinal research (Konrad and Hartmann 2001; Semyonov et al. 
2004; Wilson 2001), due at least in part to the quality of data available on racial 
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attitudes and the length of time these questions have been asked. Moreover, the 
surveys frequently utilized have large nationally representative samples, so the results 
are generalizable. These reasons, along with the availability of measures for two of the 
three analyses, motivated the decision to use survey data for this project. 
 Where the survey approach poses problems is for the heterosexism analysis, 
because there are no existing surveys with all of the necessary measures, and for 
assessments of causality. The absence of existing data means that the heterosexism 
analysis can employ any methodological approach. However, because the race and 
gender analyses use survey data it makes sense to also use survey data for the 
heterosexism analysis. 
 The nature of the available survey data makes it impossible to infer whether 
threat leads to policy opposition or if policy opposition increases perceptions of threat. 
Consequently, the most this analysis can do is indicate whether there is an association 
between threat and policy opposition. An ideal way to address causality would be to 
employ an experimental design. With an experiment the researcher could manipulate 
scenarios to explore the directionality of the policy attitudes-threat relationship. 
Moreover, an experiment could assess the impact of group identity on perceptions of 
threat and policy views (although this could have been done with a survey had the 
appropriate questions been asked). However, experiments could not offer the 
generalizability of a national survey, nor do they have the same historical foundation 
as surveys in the study of threat and attitudes. 
 
Analysis 
 This research considers attitudes towards women, blacks, and sexual 
minorities. Blacks were chosen as the racial group of interest because they are the 
lowest status and least popular racial group (Charles 2001) and therefore the racial 
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group likely to generate the strongest threat. The three analyses are as similar as 
possible to enable comparisons across the groups. All three studies utilize virtually 
identical background measures and employ ordered logistic and multinomial logistic 
regressions, with differing outcome measures and threats. The greatest difference 
among the three portions of the project is that the gender and race assessments utilize 
the same large nationally representative survey (albeit different years), while the 
sexual orientation study relies on a convenience sample of college students. Each 
analysis uses attitudes towards relevant policies as outcome measures, measures of 
both individual threat and group threat, and a range of background controls. The 
general procedure is based on studies of the relationship between threat and racial 
attitudes (Bobo 1988a; Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Kluegel and Bobo 2001; Quillian 
1996).  
 The gender and race analyses are conducted using the General Social Survey 
(GSS), a nationally representative survey of English speaking U.S. residents, at least 
18 years old. Attitudes towards policies aimed at promoting gender equity are the 
outcome measures for the gender study, while attitudes towards policies aimed at 
promoting racial equity are the outcome measures for the race analysis. Threat 
measures assess perceptions of the impact of the women’s movement on individuals 
and men (for the gender paper) and perceptions of white job security and stability (for 
the race paper).  
 The sexual orientation analysis relies on a different dataset, because neither the 
GSS nor any other available dataset includes appropriate measures of individual and 
group threats. Furthermore, there is no known questionnaire that includes the 
necessary threat measures as well as attitudinal measures vis-à-vis sexual minorities. 
Consequently, a questionnaire was developed and administered to undergraduate 
students at an elite Northeastern university. Unlike the other two analyses, the results 
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from this study are not generalizable; however, they should provide an indication of 
whether the trends identified with gender and racial attitudes may carry over to college 
students’ opinions regarding sexual minorities.  
 Each paper begins by considering how the relevant literatures treat threat and 
bias. They then each examine the same four hypotheses that describe the possible 
relationships between individual threat, group threat, and biased attitudes. The race 
analysis employs the same approach as the gender and sexual orientation analyses, 
because although the association between threat and racial/ethnic bias is well 
documented (Bobo 1983; Bobo 1999; Quillian 1995, 1996; Semyonov et al. 2004; 
Verberk, Scheepers, and Felling 2002), none of the studies reporting this result 
included both types of threat. 
 The results confirm the link between feelings of threat and negative views of 
the out-group. Although an association between threat and attitudes has been 
demonstrated for race, it has only begun to be verified for gender (Maass et al. 2003), 
and to my knowledge, this is the first confirmation for sexual orientation. All three 
analyses further demonstrate that individual threat and group threat are both associated 
with opposition to policies aiding the subordinate group. 
 In the final chapter the analyses are reconsidered to see what trends emerge 
across all three scenarios. Possible explanations are presented for some of the findings. 
The implications for the theoretical models are also considered. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of future research directions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THREAT AND SEXISM: EXAMINING THE ROLE OF THREAT IN ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT 
 
 Fear of losing access to privileges is a key component in explaining opposition 
to gender equalizing policies. For centuries men and women have held different and 
distinct roles. Men were full participants in society – they held jobs; owned property; 
controlled financial resources; and participated in the political process, from voting, to 
holding office, to writing and enacting legislation. Even beyond their rights, men had 
freedom. Women, in contrast, were not only secondary to men, but belonged to them. 
Women were relegated to the home and appropriate social functions (Jackson 1998). 
Prior to marriage, some women worked outside the home. After marriage, the only 
women in the labor force were those “unfortunate enough” to be in situations where 
their men could not adequately provide for the family (Ferree and Hess 1994). These 
women, like most working women, were relegated to specific female “appropriate” 
jobs and paid accordingly (i.e., significantly less than men) (Ferree and Hess 1994; 
Rosen 2000). This male dominated world likely led many men (and probably some 
women) to believe that men were entitled to certain privileges, whether those 
privileges were specific occupations, political power, or control over women.  
 The women’s movement helped alter the situation. Women fought for and won 
the vote, eating into the complete political power of men. Women also began entering 
the labor force in larger numbers and many who would previously have left upon 
marriage opted to stay (Ferree and Hess 1994). With increasing credentials and 
legislation barring discrimination on the basis of gender, the job options available to 
women expanded (Goldin 2002), further eroding the system of male domination and 
privilege. 
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 Women’s gains in social and political freedom meant that men were losing 
their exclusive privileges. Men who felt entitled to unlimited access to occupations, 
political power, and other advantages now had to endure the encroachment of women. 
Men seeking to protect their privileges routinely employed such tactics as barring 
women from entering certain professions, restricting women’s opportunities for 
professional advancement, and discouraging women from remaining in an 
organization (Goldin 2002). Although many of these practices have been banned, 
practices intended to exclude women remain pervasive, even if less blatant (Ferree and 
Hess 1994; Padavic and Reskin 1990; Ridgeway 1997; Uggen and Blackstone 2004). 
 One explanation as to why antagonism towards women remains prevalent is 
threat. A changing sociopolitical environment is threatening to those who feel the 
changes will have negative consequences for them or a group to which they belong. 
When people feel threatened they have a tendency to try and protect themselves, and 
they do so by attacking the perceived source of the threat (Maass et al. 2003). In the 
case of changing gender roles, women, particularly feminist women, are likely viewed 
as a source of threat to men. 
 Drawing on the masculinity and gender role identity literatures, this paper 
systematically examines the relationship between gender based threat and opposition 
to policies promoting gender equity in the workplace. The expectation is that people 
who perceive a threat directed at them or a group to which they belong will oppose 
any policy aimed at helping the group believed to be posing the threat. Such a 
relationship has been theorized, but it has yet to be fully tested empirically. 
 The paper also decomposes threat into its components of individual threat and 
group threat. The analysis considers the threats individually and together to see 
whether one or both threats are associated with racial policy attitudes. As the name 
implies, individual threat occurs when a person feels that he or she is being personally 
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threatened, such as the fear that economic competition will lead to loss of one’s job or 
a decline in the job’s prestige (e.g., Banton 1983; Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1992; 
Ridgeway 1997) or the concern that one’s behavior does not conform to prescribed 
gender roles (e.g., Connell 1995; Hopkins 1996; West and Zimmerman 1987) and may 
lead to harassment (Uggen and Blackstone 2004). In contrast, group threat occurs 
when someone feels that a group to which he or she belongs is being threatened, even 
if the individual him or herself will not be harmed. For instance, the fear that 
economic competition will lead to a decline in the dominant group’s status (e.g., 
Blalock 1957; Goldin 2002; Kimmel 2004), or the concern that acceptance of 
nontraditional types of masculinity (e.g., effeminate males) will cause men to lose 
their position of dominance (Hopkins 1996). The decomposition of threat and the 
focus on attitudes towards gender equalizing policies distinguish this paper from 
others in the field. 
 The analysis is conducted using the General Social Survey (Davis, Smith, and 
Marsden 2003), a nationally representative sample, with attitudes towards policies 
aimed at promoting gender equity as the outcome measures. Threat measures assess 
perceptions of the impact of the women’s movement on individuals and men as a 
whole. This procedure of using policy attitudes as outcome measures and threat as 
independent measures is similar to that often used to examine the relationship between 
threat and racial attitudes (Bobo 1988a; Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Kluegel and Bobo 
2001; Quillian 1996). The paper begins by determining if there is a relationship 
between threat and attitudes towards women. Once such an association has been 
established, the components of individual and group threat are examined in depth to 
explore which threat has the stronger affiliation with attitudes and whether there is a 
connection between the two types of threat. 
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BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 The gender literature contains two sets of arguments that discuss the impact of 
threat on attitudes and behavior. Masculinity arguments focus primarily on the 
behavior and attitudes of men. In contrast, gender role identity arguments are 
concerned with explaining why some people espouse traditional gender roles, while 
others do not. Interest arguments present a nonthreat based alternative, asserting that 
people makes decisions based on what is in their best interest. While differing in many 
respects, these accounts suggest that feelings of threat are often associated with 
negative feelings towards the group posing the threat. 
 One of the core concepts of the current Western approach to masculinity is the 
differentiation of the masculine and the feminine. In logical terms, to be male is to be 
not female (Connell 1995; Hopkins 1996). If a man embodies feminine traits, then his 
manhood is in doubt (an individual level threat). Furthermore, when a man does not 
embody all of the prescribed traits of masculinity, his masculinity will similarly be 
questioned (Connell 1987). For this reason, some men are particularly sensitive to any 
behavior that does not exemplify the masculine ideal. When these men find 
themselves in a situation in which their masculinity is questioned, they will fight to 
protect their manhood. Similarly, men concerned about their masculinity must be 
careful not to express views of women that might be interpreted as “siding with the 
enemy” and betraying their own gender. 
 The concept of group threat appears primarily in connection to threats to the 
gender power structure and in particular, what Connell (1987; 1995) terms 
“hegemonic masculinity.” The prevailing power structure has men atop the hierarchy; 
if the power structure is threatened, men risk losing their privileged position and all 
the benefits inherent in it. Two of the most notable instances of threats to men as a 
group are first, women vying for equal rights and equal treatment, thereby eroding 
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men’s dominance over women, the economy, and political power (Connell 1995; 
Kimmel 1996) and second, greater acceptance of nontraditional forms of masculinity, 
making it harder to identify the “real men” and ascertain who deserves the privileges 
of masculinity (Connell 1987; Hopkins 1996). In one of the few tests of the relevance 
of group threat to men’s behavior, Maass and her colleagues (2003) conclude that men 
exposed to a threat to the system of male dominance are more likely to respond with 
hostility than men not exposed to the threat.  
 One of the limitations of masculinity arguments is that they offer few 
predictions for women’s reactions. What they do offer suggests that women who 
embody the traditional ideal of femininity, what Connell (1987) terms “emphasized 
femininity,” may resent women whose actions diminish the position of the traditional 
woman. Being in the presence of nontraditional forms of femininity may make 
traditional women feel that their individual lifestyle choice is under attack or that the 
“proper role” of women as mothers and wives is being subverted. This tension is 
especially evident in the conflict appropriately called the “Mommy Wars.” 
 A similar but potentially more intuitive way to predict women’s attitudes is by 
using a nonthreat based interest model.  This approach is akin to threat based 
arguments, but considers the question from the opposite direction.  Instead of 
following the threat based paradigm where people oppose policies benefiting group 
they believe pose a threat, interest based models assert that people support policies 
from which they will benefit (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Kane 1995) and, 
conversely, oppose policies which will be detrimental (Kane and Sanchez 1994).  
Using this logic, employed women should support policies to improve the position of 
women in the labor force, while unemployed women with working husbands should 
oppose such policies. 
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 While interest and threat based models yield similar conclusions, the threat 
based approach has a couple of advantages for this particular project.  First, 
masculinity scholars highlight group level factors as vital to opinions about out-
groups, which suggests that group level factors deserve consideration. Second, for 
interest based arguments group interests are closely tied to individual interests. An 
actor may advocate her group’s interests when those interests are in accord with her 
personal interests. This approach does not accommodate the separation of group 
interests from individual interests, and it does not consider groups in their own right. 
 The argument espoused by Toller and her colleagues (2004) is similar to the 
masculinity and interest based perspectives. They contend that people’s views on 
women’s behavior conform to their own gender identity. So “masculine” men and 
“feminine” women support traditional gender roles and oppose nontraditional ones, as 
nontraditional roles threaten what it means for them to be men or women. For 
instance, women are traditionally considered to be meek and subservient (Rudman and 
Glick 2001). An assertive woman embodies masculine traits, not feminine ones, thus 
threatening a masculine man’s sense of masculinity and a feminine woman’s sense of 
femininity. In contrast, feminine men and masculine women should support 
nontraditional gender roles so that their behavior and ideology are in accord.  
 These arguments agree that a threat to an individual may lead to hostility 
towards women (in masculinity and interest arguments) or women who are different 
(in the case of Toller et al.’s argument). This leads to the first set of hypotheses: 
 H1: There is an association between feelings of threat and holding negative 
views of women. 
More precisely, all three arguments discuss the relevance of individual level threat. 
 H1iM: Men who feel personally threatened will express negative views of 
women. 
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 H1iW : Women who feel personally threatened will express negative views of 
the women posing the threat. 
 The hypotheses with respect to group threat are not as obvious, since the 
gender role identity argument does not incorporate group threat and masculinity 
arguments focus primarily only on men. According to masculinity arguments, men 
who experience a sense of group threat should be hostile towards women, but what 
about women? Connell’s (1987) argument suggests that women who display 
emphasized femininity will be antagonistic towards women embodying other forms 
female behavior. When considered with the individual level gender role identity 
argument, the arguments yield the following predictions: 
 HigM: Men who experience a sense of group threat will be hostile towards 
women. 
 H1gW: Women who feel that the status of women is changing in a negative 
way will be hostile to those women posing the threat (i.e., pushing for 
change). 
 The next obvious question is which threat is stronger? In other words, if 
someone feels that both he (or she) as an individual is being threatened and that men 
(or women) as a group are being threatened which threat will have the stronger 
association with his (or her) views of women. This is not a question that can be 
directly addressed by either the masculinity or gender role literatures. However, the 
racial threat literature can provide some insight. For instance, Blumer (1958) argues 
that “race prejudice exists basically in a sense of group position rather than in a set of 
feelings which members of one racial group have towards members of another racial 
group” (p. 3). Moreover, when group identification is strong, group perspectives will 
dominate individual ones, because “to act contrary to [the group position] is to risk a 
feeling of self-alienation and to face the possibility of ostracism” (Blumer 1958, p. 5). 
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In other words, when dealing with prejudice, group level feelings are often more 
powerful than individual level ones. If this holds true for gender related attitudes, then:  
 H2: Feelings of group threat will have a stronger association with negative 
views of women than will feelings of individual level threat.  
This should apply equally to men and women. 
 
Threat and Gender 
 The hypotheses discussed deal with threat in the abstract, but they do not 
identify the domains where gender threats are most likely to emerge. One domain 
where the hypotheses should hold is the labor force, which is a traditionally male 
bastion forced to absorb an influx of female workers.1 For the past century, women’s 
labor force participation has been increasing, but where once the majority of middle-
class working women left upon marriage rarely to return, many are now opting to 
remain employed (Ferree and Hess 1994; Jackson 1998). Consequently, the range of 
jobs available to women has widened, especially in areas requiring extensive training. 
For men, the result is not only greater job competition, but also the potential 
discomfort of working with women presumed to be their equals (Kanter 1993). 
Concurrently, there is also the possibility that the influx of women into an occupation 
will result in a drop in the occupation’s prestige, and consequently the prestige of men 
in that occupation (Goldin 2002). 
 The increase in women’s labor force participation means that fewer women are 
devoting themselves to full- time childrearing. Those women who opt to stay home 
may feel that their work is being devalued by employed women who believe that 
                                                 
1 A similar argument can be applied to the realm of higher education, where women now outnumber 
men (Peter, Horn, and Carroll 2005) and there are policies in place to ensure equal treatment (e.g., Title 
IX). However, as the measures available for this analysis relate to employment, I will leave the subject 
of education for a future discussion. (I thank Shelley Correll for raising this point.) 
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homemakers are lazy, because they are not living up to their potential (Hirshman 
2006; Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee 1996; Rosen 2000). Alternatively, nonemployed 
women may feel that they are looked down upon by employed women for adopting a 
traditional role and not advancing women’s social position (Hirshman 2006). 
 Given women’s increasing participation in the paid labor market, it is 
reasonable for some people to be concerned about how all of the changes will impact 
their status and that of their gender as a whole. The anxiety that these people feel may 
be narrowly focused, such as personal fear of job loss, or may be broader, such as a 
reaction to an event that is believed to have altered or be altering the labor market. 
One example of just such an event is the women’s movement. The women’s 
movement is often credited with opening up the labor market to women (Rosen 2000). 
Women (particularly those in the middle-class) are now increasingly encouraged to 
enter and remain in the labor force, obtain necessary credentialing, and pursue 
professions not previously open to them. The women’s movement has also increased 
awareness of gender inequality and spurred programs to rectify the inequities (e.g., 
Rosen 2000). Although some people question the extent of the impact of the women’s 
movement on the expansion of women’s economic opportunities (Jackson 1998), 
many nonetheless perceive the women’s movement to be largely responsible for 
women’s greater participation in the labor force. Therefore, many people may believe 
that the women’s movement posed or continues to pose a threat to their individual 
welfare or that of their gender. 
 
Data and Methods 
 This paper relies on data from the General Social Survey (GSS) (Davis et al. 
2003). Using a national probability sample of households the GSS provides 
information generalizable to the non- institutionalized U.S. population (residing in 
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country) 18 years old and older. In order to address a wide range of topics, the GSS 
does not ask all questions every year and within a year not all respondents are asked 
the same questions. The questions relevant to this analysis were only asked in 1996 
(the response rate was 76%). In this year, the sample was divided into two panels, 
which were then divided into thirds (for a total of six sets of respondents) (Davis et al. 
2003). Both of the relevant outcome variables for this analysis were asked to one panel 
and two thirds of the panel received both outcome measures. The sample used here is 
restricted to these respondents (N = 725). (The third of the pane l that received only 
one of the questions is excluded from the analysis.) This ensures that any differences 
emerging from the models are due to the measures included in the models, and not a 
function of different respondents. 
 
Policy Questions (Outcome Variables) 
 Today, many consider it socially unacceptable to voice opinions deemed 
prejudicial. In the context of gender relations, this means that people can no longer say 
that women are inferior or that the workplace belongs to men, even if they personally 
hold such beliefs. A socially acceptable way to circumvent this normative pressure is 
to express opposition to policies aimed at promoting gender equality. In other words, 
people with negative views about women should oppose policies aimed at helping 
women in the labor force.  
 However, it is not only those who hold negative views towards women who 
reject gender equalizing policies, but also those who believe that the government 
should not be involved or that the policies are inherently unfair (either because they 
advantage one group over another or because they violate ideals of equality). 
However, Kinder and Sanders (1996) found that these factors had only a modest 
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association with attitudes towards employment policies targeting blacks.2 Even though 
the group of people opposed to policies aimed at gender equity is larger than the group 
of interest here, attitudes towards these policies are still good starting points for 
assessing gender hostility. Furthermore, there is precedent for this approach as studies 
in both the sexism and racism literatures have used attitudes towards policies as 
outcome measures (Bobo 1983; Sears et al. 1979; Sears et al. 1997; Swim et al. 1995). 
 In 1996 two questions were asked about opinions towards gender based 
affirmative action. The first is in a reverse discrimination frame and says, “Some 
people say that because of past discrimination, women should be given preference in 
hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion is 
wrong because it discriminates against men. What about your opinion – are you for or 
against preferential hiring and promotion of women?” The second question asks 
whether the respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement: “Because of past 
discrimination, employers should make special efforts to hire and promote qualified 
women” (special efforts). The question in the reverse discrimination frame was 
reverse coded so that it has responses ranging from 1 to 4, with higher numbers 
representing support; it has a mean of 1.88 and a standard deviation of 1.07. In 
contrast, the latter question is on a five point scale (again it was reverse coded so that 
higher numbers indicate policy support), with a mean of 3.19 and a standard deviation 
of 1.27 (table 2.1). In both cases, men express greater opposition to the policies than 
do women. Although in the reverse discrimination context the greatest number of 
respondents (50%) express strong opposition to gender based affirmative action, men 
                                                 
2 Kinder and Sanders (1996) examined equality rather than fairness per se, the idea being that people 
who believe in equality should support policies aimed at promoting equality. The converse is that 
people who are comfortable with inequality should oppose such policies, because they give the targeted 
group an unfair advantage in getting positions. Alternatively, one could argue that people who support 
the idea of equality should oppose preferential policies because they give one group an unfair 
advantage.  
  33 
are particularly opposed, (the majority of men not only oppose, but strongly oppose, 
53%). Reaction to affirmative action when presented as special efforts is more 
dispersed, with the greatest proportion of men evenly split between supporting (agree) 
and opposing (disagree) affirmative action. In contrast, women are more inclined to 
support affirmative action. It is apparent, even without further analyses, that the 
reverse discrimination frame garners more opposition than the special efforts frame. 
 These preliminary findings are consistent with expectations based on the 
literature on affirmative action frames. Although the majority of work on affirmative 
action has been devoted to race based policies, research has consistently found that the 
level of support for these programs, as well as gender based ones, varies significantly 
depending on the way in which the questions are phrased (Fine 1992; Kinder and 
Sanders 1996; Swain 2001; Terkildsen and Schnell 1997). A question’s frame 3 
highlights specific factors while downplaying others, influencing how the audience 
perceives the situation. Slight differences in wording can have dramatic effects on 
both the overall level of policy support and on who supports it (Kinder and Sanders 
1996).  
 The two frames employed by the questions of interest are a reverse 
discrimination frame and a special efforts frame. The first question is in a reverse 
discrimination frame, which has respondents decide whether it is acceptable to reduce 
gender inequality by preferentially hiring and promoting women, possibly leading to 
discrimination against men. In other words, it asks if past discrimination should be 
rectified if reverse discrimination might result. The question’s targeting of men (they 
would be the victims of reverse discrimination) and Fine’s (1992) research on race  
                                                 
3 Gamson and Modigliani (1987) define a frame as “a cultural organizing idea or story line that provides 
meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them” (p. 143). 
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Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics (Weighted) for Variables Used in the Analysis, by Sex 
 Total Male Female 
 (N=725) (N=319) (N=406) 
Reverse discrimination 1.88 (1.07) 1.81 (1.04) 1.93c (1.09) 
Strongly oppose (%) 49.77  52.59  47.31  
Oppose (%) 27.19  25.73  28.47  
For (%) 8.69  9.39  8.07  
Strongly for (%) 14.35  12.30  16.15  
Special efforts 3.19 (1.27) 3.01 (1.28) 3.35e (1.25) 
Strongly disagree (%) 10.12  11.97  8.50  
Disagree (%) 27.42  31.88  23.51  
Neither (%) 10.73  11.49  10.06  
Agree (%) 36.56  32.04  40.51  
Strongly agree (%) 15.18  12.62  17.42  
Sense of individual threat (mean) 0.06 (0.24) 0.08a (0.27) 0.04 (0.20) 
Sense of threat to men (mean) 0.34 (0.48) 0.31 (0.46) 0.38d (0.49) 
Female (%) 53.32  0.00  100.00  
Age (mean) 43.73 (16.21) 43.21 (16.42) 44.18 (16.03) 
Political views (mean) 4.27 (1.38) 4.30a (1.40) 4.23 (1.36) 
Educational attainment  (mean) 13.48 (2.73) 13.49 (2.88) 13.48 (2.60) 
None or some high school (%) 16.16  17.80  14.73  
High school graduate (%) 29.15  27.18  30.88  
Some college (%) 27.95  27.99  27.90  
College graduate (%) 13.52  11.97  14.87  
Graduate school (%) 13.22  15.05  11.61  
Income (mean in thousands $US) 12.64 (10.62) 15.35b (10.47) 10.28 (10.19) 
Region of residence       
South (%) 34.89  32.69  36.83  
Midwest (%) 25.91  26.86  25.07  
Other (%) 39.20  40.45  38.10  
Race       
White (%) 83.01  85.44a  80.88  
Black (%) 12.39  10.19  14.31  
Latino (%) 4.61  4.37  4.82  
Religion       
Black Protestant (%) 9.21  6.63  11.47c  
Mainline Protestant (%) 20.32  21.20  19.55  
Evangelical Protestant (%) 25.98  23.46  28.19  
Catholic (%) 25.98  25.89  26.06  
Jewish (%) 2.27  2.10  2.41  
Other religion (%) 6.87  8.90  5.10  
No religion (%) 9.37  11.81a  7.22  
Attendance weekly (%) 26.74  23.79  29.32c  
Marital status       
Married (%) 57.93  59.22  56.80  
Never married (%) 21.22  25.73a  17.28  
Previously married (%) 20.85  15.05  25.92e  
Employment       
Employed (%) 68.13  76.70b  60.62  
Spouse employed (%) 40.79  33.50  47.17d  
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. All t-tests are one-tailed. 
a. Men significantly greater than women at p < .05 
b. Men significantly greater than women at p < 001 
c. Women significantly greater than men at p < .05 
d. Women significantly greater than men at p < .01 
e. Women significantly greater than men at p <  
 .001 
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leads us to expect that men will express greater opposition to this question than will 
women. The second question does not have a commonly utilized frame. It asks if an 
employer should make a special effort to hire and promote women. Through this 
phrasing it avoids the suggestion of giving women preferential treatment or harming 
men. Given the relative innocuousness of the question, it is reasonable to expect that it 
will garner greater support than the former question and that it will activate fewer 
feelings of threat. In other words, threat is less likely to be associated with responses 
to this question than the question on reverse discrimination. 
 
Methods 
 Given the categorical nature of the outcome variables, ordered logistical 
regression is employed. The analyses are restricted to respondents answering all of the 
relevant questions; other respondents are dropped from the sample (i.e., listwise 
deletion). The questions included have response rates of greater than or equal to 93%. 
As the analyses are conducted at the individual level, all of the models presented are 
weighted to adjust for the sampling design which was conducted at the household 
level (using the “adults” measure). The coefficients for the independent variables are 
standardized, in order to compare the relative impact of the measures. 
 
Independent Variables 
 Threat. The threat questions for the 1996 survey relate to reactions to the 
women’s movement.4 The first question asks about the impact of the women’s 
movement on the respondent’s life: “We'd like your views on how the women's 
                                                 
4 The GSS includes an alternative set of measures that appears to better assess employment based 
gender threat.  However, the number of respondents to these questions is dramatically lower (N = 137 
for men and N = 192 for women), resulting in a sample size less than half as large as that available with 
the measures used and with a significantly different sample composition. 
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movement has affected certain groups. For each group I name, please tell me whether 
you think the women's movement has improved their lives, made their lives worse, or 
had no effect on their lives: You, yourself.” When a respondent, male or female, 
reveals that the women’s movement has hurt them, it is indicative of an individual 
level threat, which would provide support for a self- interest motivated model. In 
contrast, the second question asks if respondents feel that the women’s movement has 
hurt men as a whole. This question is identical to the first question, with the exception 
that “you, yourself” is replaced with “men.” It thus implies a threat to men’s group 
position. Because this question identifies men as victims of the women’s movement, 
people who perceive a threat to men may be more likely to oppose helping women 
when doing so would further harm men. Unfortunately, there is no question asking if 
the women’s movement hurt women as a whole. The absence of a group threat 
measure for women is not ideal; however, even a preliminary understanding of 
women’s reactions may yield insights into how to better craft gender related policies 
and foster support for those policies.  
 The two variables are recoded so that 1 represents those who feel that the 
women’s movement hurt them or hurt men (“made life worse”), while 0 includes all 
other responses (“improved life” and “had no effect”). The levels are collapsed in this 
way because the study’s aim is to understand whether people who feel threatened have 
different attitudes than people who do not identify a threat. In other words, do people 
who perceive a negative impact of the women’s movement have different attitudes 
than people who feel that the women’s movement either improved their life or had no 
impact on it? Overall, slightly less than a third of men perceive the women’s 
movement to be harmful to men (31%), while less than a tenth feel that they have been 
personally harmed (8%) (table 2.1). Furthermore, of those men who see a threat, 20% 
see a threat to both themselves and men generally. Of those who identify a threat, 
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almost all (95%) identify a group threat. For men, the two types of threat have a strong 
association (odds ratio = 12.53), which suggests that they might operate similarly. 
More precisely, of the 8% of men who feel personally threatened, 82% also identify a 
threat to men as a whole. In the reverse situation, of the 31% of men who identify a 
group threat, only 21% also feel personally threatened. The association is weaker for 
women (odds ratio = 3.00). The descriptive statistics indicate that although few 
respondents feel that the women’s movement has had a negative impact on them 
personally, more believe that men are negatively impacted. It is interesting to note that 
women are significantly more likely than men to see the women’s movement as 
having a negative impact on men.  
 
 Background Measures. The analyses include a wide variety of background and 
social controls that have been routinely employed in studies of gender attitudes. These 
measures cover the spectrum of factors that scholars have found to be associated with 
attitudes towards gender roles and which therefore may impact the association 
between the threat and policy measures. The measures include: age, education, 
income, political conservatism, region, race, religious affiliation and frequency of 
religious attendance, marital status, gender, and own and spouse’s employment status 
(table 2.1).  
 Age and education are measured continuously, along with their squared terms 
to account for possible threshold effects (Harris and Firestone 1998). Contrary to what 
one might guess, age is not correlated with reactions to the women’s movement (i.e., 
age is not correlated with either individual or group threat).  
 Income is the respondent’s income and is right censored at $25,000. People 
who are unemployed or who report a negative income are recoded as having an 
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income of $500, the lowest income level in the analysis. The natural logarithm of 
income is used in the models.  
 Political views are on a seven point scale from extremely liberal (1) to 
extremely conservative (7). The mean is slightly above 4, indicating that the sample 
contains a fairly even balance of political viewpoints. Political conservatism is 
generally expected to correspond with traditionalism, which is anticipated to occur 
here. However, initial indications are that this may not be the case, as political 
conservatism is only weakly correlated with opinions about affirmative action in either 
frame (r = .21 for the reverse discrimination frame and r = .19 for the special efforts 
frame). The associations between political conservatism and individual and group 
threat are similarly weak (point biserial correlations of .18 and .16 for individual and 
group threat, respectively).  
 Race is restricted to black non-Latino, white non-Latino, and Latino 
respondents (12%, 83%, and 5% respectively), with each recoded as a dummy 
variable. Whites are used as the reference group.  
 Both religious affiliation and frequent attendance at religious services are 
believed to be associated with traditional views (Thornton et al. 1983) and might 
interact with perceptions of threat. Following Steensland et al. (2000), religion is 
divided into seven categories: Black Protestants5 (9%), mainline Protestants (20%), 
evangelical Protestants (26%), Catholics (26%), Jews (2%), other (7%), and none 
(9%). Mainline Protestants are used as the reference group. Attendance at religious 
services is dichotomized into those who attend religious services once a week or more 
(27%) versus those who attend less frequently (Brewster and Padavic 2000).  
                                                 
5 Steensland et al. (2000) discuss the impact of including both black and black Protestants in the same 
model and determine that collinearity is not a problem. 
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 Southerners6 (35%) are often thought more likely than others to adhere to 
conservative viewpoints (Sears et al. 1997; Smith 1981; Stouffer 1955), but in 
someone instances living in the Midwest7 (26%) may have an even greater impact 
(Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). Region is divided into these three categories (South, 
Midwest, and other), with other used as the reference category.  
 Marital status is broken down into three categories: never married, married, 
and previously married. For the majority of tests run, the attitudes of people who are 
widowed more closely resemble the attitudes of divorced or separated individuals than 
married people. 
 The final two measures are whether the respondent is employed outside the 
home (77% of men and 61% of women) and whether the respondent’s spouse is 
employed outside the home (41%).8 Men’s attitudes may be influenced by their 
spouse’s employment (Cassidy and Warren 1996). Men with working wives (34%) 
may appreciate the benefits afforded by a second income and thus favor increased 
occupational opportunities for women (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). Alternatively, 
these men may be more influenced by the negative consequences that are concurrent 
with having a wife employed outside the home, such as fewer home cooked meals, a 
dirtier house, increased demands for his participation in household chores, and a less 
attentive spouse.  
 Although it would be ideal to include measures of fairness and perceptions of 
the government’s appropriate role, it is not feasible. There is no indicator of fairness 
available for this survey year, and while there are indicators of government role, the 
                                                 
6 South consists of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, and West Virginia. 
7 Midwest is defined as Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. 
8 Unmarried respondents are coded as not having an employed spouse (0). This follows the procedure of 
Peek and his colleagues (1991). 
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sample sizes are too small (n < 210 for both men and women) to permit a detailed 
analysis. 
 
RESULTS 
 Table 2.2 contains the results from ordered logistic regressions of men’s 
attitudes towards gender equalizing policies. Models 1 and 5 are baseline models that 
include all control measures and no threats; models 2 and 6 add individual threat; 
models 3 and 7 are the same as models 2 and 6, except that men’s threat replaces 
individual threat; and tables 4 and 8 include both types of threat. Table 2.3 presents the 
same analyses for women. Interaction terms are only included when significant. 
 For men, the importance of threat is context specific – the framing of the 
question matters. Men exhibit both senses of group threat and personal threat when 
asked about affirmative action in the reverse discrimination frame (table 2, models 2 
and 3). In other words, men who feel that the women’s movement has hurt men as a 
whole are opposed to gender based affirmative action, as are men who feel that the 
women’s movement has had a negative impact on their lives. The same does not hold 
true when the context is change to special efforts. In this situation, both men who 
believe that men are hurt by the women’s movement (model 7) and men who believe 
they themselves are hurt (model 6) hold the same opinions as other men about aiding 
women in the workplace. The relative unimportance of the threats is further evidenced 
by the value of the coefficients, which are approaching zero. 
 The findings from the reverse discrimination models are as predicted by 
hypotheses H1iM and H1gM, but the results from the special efforts models do not 
support the hypotheses. This disparity in the association between threat and attitudes 
towards the two response measures is dramatic, but not surprising given the threat 
questions and findings from previous research on affirmative action frames (e.g., Fine 
  41 
1992; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Swain 2001; Terkildsen and Schnell 1997). Men who 
perceive a group threat may be primed to oppose helping women achieve greater 
success in the labor market. (It is also possible that the priming may work in the 
reverse direction. Unfortunately there is no way to determine the order in which the 
questions were asked.) Earlier studies have shown that “both the frequency of 
responses and choice of response options are affected by question wording” (Fine 
1992, p. 323). 
 Results for women are not as clear cut (table 2.3). There is no indication that 
individual threat has any association with women’s attitudes, in either scenario 
(models 2 and 6). This is contrary to hypothesis H1iW. Threat to men generates a 
somewhat different response. In the reverse discrimination context there is no 
association between believing that the women’s movement hurt men and attitudes 
towards gender equalizing policies (model 3); however, under the special efforts frame 
these women are more supportive of gender based affirmative action (model 7). It 
appears as though women who believe the women’s movement hurt men support 
policies to continue helping women, without directly hurting men. Overall, hypothesis 
1 that there is an association between feelings of threat and holding negative views of 
women, receives support. 
 When the two threats are together, those threats that were significant in earlier 
models remain significant. For women in the special efforts scenario there is virtually 
no change in either the magnitude of the group threat measure or its level of 
significance (table 3, model 8). In contrast, for men under reverse discrimination, the 
magnitude of both threats declines (although the difference is not significant). 
Furthermore, the level of significance of both threats declines, such that they are only 
just significant at the p < .05 level. 
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Table 2.2. Standardized Coefficients from Ordered Logistic Regression of Men’s 
Attitudes towards Affirmative Action 
  Reverse Discrimination (N = 319) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Threat         
 Individual   -0.24** (0.09)   -0.19* (0.09) 
 Men     -0.26** (0.09) -0.20* (0.10) 
Controls         
 Political 
conservative -0.58*** (0.10) -0.56*** (0.10) -0.55*** (0.10) -0.54*** (0.10) 
 Age 0.17 (0.10) 0.15 (0.10) 0.17 (0.10) 0.16 (0.10) 
 Education -2.09** (0.61) -2.08** (0.61) -1.84** (0.61) -1.89** (0.61) 
 Education2 1.77** (0.60) 1.78** (0.59) 1.52* (0.60) 1.58** (0.60) 
 Income (ln) -0.25 (0.23) -0.41 (0.24) -0.35 (0.23) -0.45 (0.24) 
 South -0.10 (0.11) -0.11 (0.11) -0.06 (0.11) -0.07 (0.11) 
 Midwest -0.01 (0.10) -0.01 (0.10) -0.01 (0.10) -0.01 (0.10) 
 Black 0.82*** (0.13) 0.87*** (0.13) 0.81*** (0.13) 0.85*** (0.13) 
 Latino 0.26** (0.09) 0.23* (0.09) 0.23* (0.09) 0.22* (0.09) 
 Black Prot. -0.03 (0.13) -0.06 (0.13) 0.00 (0.14) -0.03 (0.14) 
 Evangel. Prot. -0.27* (0.11) -0.24* (0.12) -0.26* (0.12) -0.24* (0.12) 
 Catholic 0.08 (0.10) 0.10 (0.10) 0.08 (0.10) 0.09 (0.10) 
 Jewish -0.09 (0.10) -0.08 (0.11) -0.09 (0.11) -0.08 (0.11) 
 Other religion -0.01 (0.09) 0.00 (0.09) 0.00 (0.09) 0.00 (0.09) 
 No religion -0.02 (0.10) -0.03 (0.10) -0.03 (0.10) -0.04 (0.10) 
 Weekly attend. -0.01 (0.09) -0.04 (0.10) -0.03 (0.10) -0.05 (0.10) 
 Previously 
married -0.31* (0.13) -0.33** (0.13) -0.31* (0.13) -0.33** (0.13) 
 Never married -0.37** (0.11) -0.41*** (0.11) -0.39*** (0.11) -0.42*** (0.11) 
 Employed 0.17 (0.23) 0.30 (0.24) 0.26 (0.24) 0.34 (0.24) 
 Spouse empld. -0.35** (0.11) -0.37** (0.11) -0.34** (0.11) -0.35** (0.11) 
Cuts†         
 so vs. o, f, sf -0.05 (0.11) -0.07 (0.11) -0.04 (0.11) -0.06 (0.11) 
 so, o, vs. f, sf 1.54 (0.13) 1.54 (0.13) 1.56 (0.13) 1.56 (0.13) 
 so, o, sf 2.44 (0.15) 2.45 (0.16) 2.47 (0.16) 2.47 (0.16) 
Log likelihood -611  -607  -607  -605  
df 20  21  21  22  
Pseudo R2 .15  .16  .16  .16  
BIC -2601  -2602  -2602  -2600  
Notes: Positive values indicate support for the policy, negative values indicate opposit ion. Comparison 
groups are whites, other region, mainline Protestants, and married, for race, region, religion, and 
marital status, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
† so = strongly oppose, o = oppose, f = for, sf = strongly for 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001  
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Table 2.2. Standardized Coefficients from Ordered Logistic Regression of Men’s 
Attitudes towards Affirmative Action (continued) 
  Special Efforts (N = 319) 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model  
Threat         
 Individual   0.00 (0.07)   0.01 (0.07) 
 Men     -0.07 (0.08) -0.07 (0.08) 
Controls         
 Political 
conservative -0.40*** (0.08) -0.40*** (0.09) -0.39*** (0.09) -0.39*** (0.09) 
 Age 0.14 (0.09) 0.14 (0.09) 0.14 (0.09) 0.14 (0.09) 
 Education -0.06 (0.08) -0.06 (0.08) -0.06 (0.08) -0.06 (0.08) 
 Income (ln) -0.61** (0.23) -0.61** (0.24) -0.63** (0.23) -0.62** (0.24) 
 South -0.08 (0.09) -0.08 (0.09) -0.07 (0.09) -0.07 (0.09) 
 Midwest 0.02 (0.09) 0.02 (0.09) 0.02 (0.09) 0.02 (0.09) 
 Black 0.32** (0.12) 0.32** (0.12) 0.31** (0.12) 0.31* (0.12) 
 Latino 0.03 (0.08) 0.03 (0.08) 0.02 (0.08) 0.02 (0.08) 
 Black Prot. 0.10 (0.13) 0.10 (0.13) 0.11 (0.13) 0.11 (0.13) 
 Evangel. Prot. 0.08 (0.10) 0.08 (0.10) 0.08 (0.10) 0.07 (0.10) 
 Catholic -0.07 (0.09) -0.07 (0.09) -0.07 (0.09) -0.07 (0.09) 
 Jewish -0.12 (0.10) -0.12 (0.10) -0.12 (0.10) -0.12 (0.10) 
 Other religion 0.03 (0.07) 0.03 (0.07) 0.03 (0.07) 0.03 (0.07) 
 No religion -0.03 (0.09) -0.03 (0.09) -0.03 (0.09) -0.03 (0.09) 
 Weekly attend. -0.19* (0.08) -0.19* (0.08) -0.19* (0.08) -0.20* (0.08) 
 Previously 
married -0.11 (0.11) -0.11 (0.11) -0.11 (0.11) -0.11 (0.11) 
 Never married -0.08 (0.10) -0.08 (0.10) -0.08 (0.10) -0.08 (0.10) 
 Employed 0.40 (0.23) 0.41 (0.24) 0.42 (0.23) 0.41 (0.24) 
 Spouse empld. -0.05 (0.10) -0.05 (0.10) -0.05 (0.10) -0.04 (0.10) 
Cuts†         
 sd vs. d, n, a, sa -2.30 (0.14) -2.30 (0.14) -2.29 (0.14) -2.29 (0.14) 
 sd, d, vs. n, a, sa -0.42 (0.10) -0.42 (0.10) -0.41 (0.10) -0.41 (0.10) 
 sd, d, n, vs. a, sa 0.10 (0.10) 0.10 (0.10) 0.10 (0.10) 0.10 (0.10) 
 sd, d, n, a vs. sa 1.99 (0.13) 1.99 (0.13) 1.99 (0.13) 1.99 (0.13) 
Log likelihood -882  -882  -881  -881  
df 19  20  20  21  
Pseudo R2 .04  .04  .05  .05  
BIC -2061  -2054  -2055  -2049  
Notes: Positive values indicate support for the policy, negative values indicate opposition. Comparison 
groups are whites, other region, mainline Protestants, and married, for race, region, religion, and marital 
status, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
† sd = strongly disagree, d = disagree, n = neither, a = agree, sa = strongly agree;  
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 2.3. Standardized Coefficients from Ordered Logistic Regression of Women’s 
Attitudes towards Affirmative Action 
  Reverse Discrimination (N = 406) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Threat         
 Individual   -0.05 (0.09)   -0.04 (0.09) 
 Men     -0.08 (0.08) -0.08 (0.08) 
Controls         
 Political 
conservative -0.37*** (0.08) -0.37*** (0.08) -0.36*** (0.08) -0.36*** (0.08) 
 Age 0.09 (0.10) 0.08 (0.10) 0.09 (0.10) 0.09 (0.10) 
 Education -2.08** (0.65) -2.17** (0.67) -2.02** (0.66) -2.09** (0.68) 
 Education2 1.90** (0.64) 1.98** (0.65) 1.85** (0.64) 1.92** (0.65) 
 Income (ln) -0.45* (0.22) -0.45* (0.22) -0.46* (0.22) -0.46* (0.22) 
 South 0.08 (0.09) 0.08 (0.09) 0.08 (0.09) 0.08 (0.09) 
 Midwest -0.13 (0.09) -0.13 (0.09) -0.12 (0.09) -0.13 (0.09) 
 Black 0.24* (0.12) 0.24* (0.12) 0.24* (0.12) 0.24* (0.12) 
 Latino 0.14 (0.08) 0.14 (0.08) 0.13 (0.08) 0.13 (0.08) 
 Black Prot. 0.26* (0.12) 0.26* (0.12) 0.26* (0.12) 0.25* (0.12) 
 Evangel. Prot. 0.16 (0.10) 0.16 (0.10) 0.16 (0.10) 0.16 (0.10) 
 Catholic 0.14 (0.10) 0.14 (0.10) 0.15 (0.10) 0.15 (0.10) 
 Jewish -0.06 (0.08) -0.06 (0.08) -0.06 (0.08) -0.06 (0.08) 
 Other religion -0.14 (0.10) -0.14 (0.10) -0.15 (0.10) -0.15 (0.10) 
 No religion -0.04 (0.10) -0.04 (0.10) -0.04 (0.10) -0.04 (0.10) 
 Weekly attend. -0.36*** (0.08) -0.36*** (0.08) -0.36*** (0.08) -0.36*** (0.08) 
 Previously 
married 0.63*** (0.14) 0.62*** (0.14) 0.63*** (0.14) 0.62*** (0.14) 
 Never married 0.49** (0.15) 0.49** (0.15) 0.49** (0.15) 0.48** (0.15) 
 Employed 0.47* (0.20) 0.48* (0.20) 0.48* (0.20) 0.48* (0.20) 
 Spouse empld. 0.35* (0.15) 0.35* (0.15) 0.35* (0.15) 0.34* (0.15) 
Cutsb         
 so vs. o, f, sf -0.19 (0.09) -0.19 (0.09) -0.20 (0.09) -0.20 (0.09) 
 so, o, vs. f, sf 1.29 (0.10) 1.29 (0.10) 1.29 (0.10) 1.29 (0.10) 
 so, o, sf 1.88 (0.12) 1.88 (0.12) 1.88 (0.12) 1.88 (0.12) 
Log likelihood -773  -773  -772  -772  
df 20  21  21  22  
Pseudo R2 .09  .10  .10  .10  
BIC -2935  -2928  -2929  -2923  
Notes: Positive values indicate support for the policy, negative values indicate opposition. Comparison 
groups are whites, other region, mainline Protestants, and married, for race, region, religion, and marital 
status, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
† so = strongly oppose, o = oppose, f = for, sf = strongly for 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001  
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Table 2.3. Standardized Coefficients from Ordered Logistic Regression of Women’s 
Attitudes towards Affirmative Action (continued) 
  Special Efforts (N = 406) 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Threat         
 Individual   -0.06 (0.08)   -0.08 (0.08) 
 Men     0.16* (0.07) 0.16* (0.07) 
Controls         
 Political 
conservative -0.16 (0.08) -0.15 (0.08) -0.17* (0.08) -0.17* (0.08) 
 Age -0.99* (0.47) -0.97* (0.47) -1.10* (0.47) -1.08* (0.47) 
 Age2 1.00* (0.47) 0.98* (0.47) 1.11* (0.48) 1.09* (0.48) 
 Education -0.23* (0.09) -0.23** (0.09) -0.25** (0.09) -0.25** (0.09) 
 Income (ln) -0.25 (0.20) -0.26 (0.21) -0.22 (0.21) -0.24 (0.21) 
 South -0.15 (0.08) -0.15 (0.08)  -0.16 (0.08) -0.16 (0.08) 
 Midwest -0.19* (0.08) -0.19* (0.08) -0.22** (0.08)  -0.22** (0.08)  
 Black 0.21 (0.12) 0.21 (0.12) 0.22 (0.12) 0.22 (0.12) 
 Latino -0.01 (0.07) -0.02 (0.07) 0.00 (0.07) 0.00 (0.07) 
 Black Prot. 0.21 (0.12) 0.21 (0.12) 0.22 (0.12) 0.22 (0.12) 
 Evangel. Prot. -0.12 (0.09) -0.12 (0.09) -0.12 (0.09) -0.12 (0.09) 
 Catholic -0.24* (0.09) -0.24* (0.09) -0.25** (0.10) -0.25** (0.10) 
 Jewish 0.02 (0.07) 0.02 (0.07) 0.03 (0.07) 0.03 (0.07) 
 Other religion -0.21* (0.09) -0.21* (0.09) -0.19* (0.09) -0.19* (0.09) 
 No religion -0.16 (0.10) -0.15 (0.10) -0.15 (0.10) -0.15 (0.10) 
 Weekly attend. -0.16* (0.07) -0.16* (0.07) -0.16* (0.07) -0.16* (0.07) 
 Previously 
married 0.45*** (0.13) 0.45*** (0.13) 0.46*** (0.13) 0.46*** (0.13) 
 Never married 0.13 (0.14) 0.13 (0.14) 0.15 (0.14) 0.14 (0.14) 
 Employed 0.26 (0.19) 0.27 (0.19) 0.25 (0.19) 0.26 (0.19) 
 Spouse empld. 0.16 (0.13) 0.15 (0.13) 0.17 (0.13) 0.17 (0.13) 
Cuts†        -0.17) 
 sd vs. d, n, a, sa -2.64 (0.14) -2.64 (0.14) -2.64 (0.14) -1.08 (0.47) 
 sd, d, vs. n, a, sa -0.90 (0.09) -0.89 (0.09) -0.88 (0.09) -0.25 (0.09) 
 sd, d, n, vs. a, sa -0.41 (0.09) -0.41 (0.09) -0.40 (0.09) -0.24 (0.21) 
 sd, d, n, a vs. sa 1.74 (0.11) 1.74 (0.11) 1.76 (0.11) -0.16 (0.08) 
Log likelihood -961.40  -961.16  -958.95  -958.53  
df 20  21  21  22  
Pseudo R2 .06  .06  .06  .06  
BIC -2551  -2545  -2549  -2543  
Notes: Positive values indicate support for the policy, negative values indicate opposition. Comparison 
groups are whites, other region, mainline Protestants, and married, for race, region, religion, and marital 
status, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
† sd = strongly disagree, d = disagree, n = neither, a = agree, sa = strongly agree;  
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001  
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 Hypothesis 2, that group threat has a stronger association with policy attitudes 
than individual threat, can be neither accepted nor rejected, as there is too little 
information from which to draw a conclusion. The results for men are uninformative. 
The threat measures have the same association with attitudes, whether they are in the 
models singularly or together. The analyses for women also provide no insight into 
this question as there is no measure of threat to women as a whole. 
 The results for the men’s reverse discrimination model with both threats are 
suggestive of a possible relationship between individual and group threat. When 
considered in separate models, each threat has roughly the same association with 
attitudes (-.24 for individual threat and -.26 for group threat) and the same level of 
statistical significance. However, when they are combined in a single model (model 4) 
the magnitude and significance of both threats drop to the extent that they are only just 
significant at the p < .05 level. This suggests the possibility that when only one threat 
is in a model it acts as a proxy for the omitted threat (an instance of omitted variable 
bias). This is important both theoretically and practically. For theorists whose goal is 
to craft explanations and to understand the unique factors associated with attitudes 
towards gender related issues, a potential relationship between individual and group 
threat implies that models (either theoretical or analytic) should incorporate both types 
of threat. The implications for policy makers are different. The results suggest that if 
policy makers base their assumptions on models containing a single type of threat, 
their policies may address the wrong issue. 
 The trends for men’s and women’s background characteristics are fairly 
similar and in the expected directions. In both frameworks, male and female political 
conservatives are more opposed to gender based affirmative action than are liberals; 
however, it appears as though political conservatism has a greater association with 
men’s attitudes than women’s (Wald ?2 = 4.50 and 4.31, p < .05 for special efforts 
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models 5 and 6 respectively; models 7 and 8 just miss significance at the p < .05 level; 
and the difference is not significant for reverse discrimination). Whites are generally 
less supportive of these policies than either blacks or Latinos, with blacks being more 
supportive than Latinos. 
 Gender differences include the greater importance of being black for men 
(Wald ?2 = 10.38, p < .001 for all four reverse discrimination models, the difference is 
not significant for special efforts) and religion for women. Perhaps the most 
interesting difference is the direction of effects for marital status and employment in 
the reverse discrimination frame. Married men are more supportive of policies to help 
women than are never married or previously married men, and married women are 
less supportive than their nonmarried counterparts. In contrast, men with an employed 
spouse are less supportive of these policies than men without working wives, and 
women with employed husbands are more supportive of the policies than women with 
unemployed spouses. The finding for men holds true when the model is restricted to 
married men only, ruling out the possibility that the result is due to the construction of 
the measure where unmarried men are coded as having a non-employed spouse. 
 One surprise is that education functions differently in the two frames. In the 
special efforts context, education has only a minor impact, at most, on views towards 
women. In contrast, in the context of reverse discrimination, both the linear and 
nonlinear terms are important (i.e., the impact of education is not constant across all 
levels of education) and they have a strong association with attitudes. Furthermore, 
while education has the expected liberalizing effect in the reverse discrimination 
context, it appears to have the reverse effect in the special efforts frame. This provides 
some support for Kane’s (1995) finding that education is not always a liberalizing 
force. 
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 One final point of interest is the relative unimportance of region of residence. 
In the eight models, region is only relevant for women in the special efforts frame, 
where women in the Midwest express somewhat greater opposition to affirmative 
action than women in other regions. The unimportance of living in the South is 
surprising, as Southern residence is often associated with more traditional 
perspectives. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The most important conclusion from this research is that gender based threat is 
associated with attitudes towards women and must be taken seriously. The models 
provide no indication which threat is the stronger of the two, but both appear to be 
important. This is an area that warrants further study. Until we have more information, 
analysts should be cognizant that threat is not monolithic and that the two identified 
types of threat (individual and group) are each important in their own right. Policy 
makers, in contrast, may want to consider how people facing different types of threat 
may react to legislation, as their responses may differ. This is particularly true for 
those policies targeting women, as the results here illustrate that not all women equally 
support policies designed to help their gender. 
 The findings from this study bear out previous results that the framing of a 
question can dramatically influence outcomes. The question that arises is why the 
threat measures are significant under different frames for men and women. Men’s 
feelings of threat were expected to have a stronger association with attitudes under the 
reverse discrimination frame than the special efforts frame, which they do. Women, in 
contrast, only have a significant threat in the special efforts models and that threat is a 
threat to men. One possible explanation is that those women who believe that men 
may have been hurt by the women’s movement are also more aware of how the 
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movement helped women. These women may desire continued advances in gender 
equity, but do not want to hurt men in the process, so the women support special 
efforts to hire and promote women, as long as men will not face the possibility of 
reverse discrimination. The disparity by question frame is worth further exploration. 
 One unexpected finding is the hint that there may be a relationship between 
individual and group threat. The results seem to indicate that when only one threat 
measure is included in a model, that measure might act as a proxy for the omitted 
threat measure. What this suggests for theorists is that until there is more information 
about the relationship between individual threat and group threat, both measures 
should be included in threat based models to ensure that any conclusions drawn about 
individual threat are truly attributable to individual threat and vice versa. The potential 
association between individual and group threat also means that policy makers need to 
be aware that when they assess support (or opposition) to legislation they need to 
gauge reactions from people facing both types of threat, as their opinions may differ. 
 The association between threat and attitudes towards gender based attitudes 
suggests a few lines of future research. First, is to ascertain what role threat plays in 
other aspects of anti- female sentiment and behavior. Relevant questions include: Are 
threatened men more likely to abuse women, beyond the sexual harassment found by 
Maass et al. (2003)? and How does such threat influence men’s views of women? To 
what extent are women aware of the threat they pose? How do they address it? And 
when women address the possibility they pose a threat, how do threatened men 
respond? Another point worthy of further exploration is the joint importance of 
individual and group threat. Although the results here indicate that individual and 
group threat should both be included in gender models, no such assessment has been 
done with respect to race.
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CHAPTER 3 
INDIVIDUAL THREAT, GROUP THREAT, AND RACIAL POLICY: 
EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THREAT AND RACIAL 
ATTITUDES 
 
 Fear of losing privileges is a key component in explanations of white’s 
hostility towards blacks. Since colonial times, whites have held a position of 
sociopolitical privilege. This position often brought with it advantages unavailable to 
people with darker skin (e.g., participation in the political process, the right to own 
property, etc.). Even those whites so “unfortunate” that they could not take advantage 
of the privileges available to their wealthier brethren could always comfort themselves 
with the knowledge that they were inherently superior (Banton 1983; Fredrickson 
2002). 
 This set of beliefs and its attending entitlements began crumbling with the civil 
rights movement (Fredrickson 2002). However, white privilege remains, as does the 
desire of some to maintain these advantages. One consequence of the historic nature of 
these prerogatives is that all whites benefit, regardless of whether they support the 
racial hierarchy. Thus, there are some people who do not hold negative views of 
blacks, but want to preserve the privileges provided by white hegemony. The anxiety 
about losing privileges is one reason why some whites express hostility towards blacks 
(Wellman 1993). In response to a loss of privileges or other forms of threat, people 
have a tendency to try and protect themselves – often with hostility towards the 
perceived source of the threat (Blumer 1955; Perry 2001). 
 Drawing on the racial prejudice literature, this paper examines the relationship 
between race based threat and attitudes towards policies promoting racial equity. 
Numerous studies have determined that there is an association between threat and both 
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negative views of the out-group (Quillian 1995, 1996; Verberk et al. 2002) and 
opposition to policies aimed at helping the out-group (Bobo 1988a; Smith 1981). 
What this paper does differently is examine two types of threat – individual threat and 
group threat – in concert, in order to determine if both threats, or only one, are 
associated with attitudes, and if there is a relationship between the two threats. 
Although scholars have identified these two types of threat, no theory considers them 
simultaneously, nor are both incorporated in any empirical assessments (with one 
exception – a 1996 paper by Bobo and Hutchings, discussed later). It is of both 
theoretical and practical importance to examine both threats together. 
 Without a study incorporating both individual and group threats, we cannot 
claim that one threat is relevant while the other is not. This is exactly what existing 
theories do by focusing on only one threat. Thus to validate or invalidate any threat 
based argument we must incorporate both threats simultaneously (at least until we 
determine that only one threat is relevant). Such an assessment is also of substantive 
importance because it can help guide policy makers to better position legislation and 
address their constituents’ concerns. This is particularly relevant for policies aimed at 
decreasing inequality. 
 This analysis is conducted using the General Social Survey (GSS), a nationally 
representative survey. The outcome measures are attitudes towards policies aimed at 
promoting racial equity, while threat measures assess perceptions of white job security 
and stability. The approach is based on past studies examining the relationship 
between threat and racial attitudes (Bobo 1988a; Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Kluegel 
and Bobo 2001; Quillian 1996).  
 The paper does three things. First, the paper empirically tests if both threats are 
individually related to views on racial policies. Second, it explores the association 
between threats and policy attitudes. Finally, it examines if there is a relationship 
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between the two types of threat. There is no reason to anticipate a relationship between 
individual threat and group threat based on past research; however such a relationship 
is reasonable since the threats are similar. 
 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Background 
 The concept of threat is well developed in the racial prejudice literature, where 
there are two types of threat based arguments: those focusing on individual threat and 
those focusing on group threat. As the name implies, individual threat occurs when a 
person feels that he or she is being personally threatened, such as the fear that 
economic competition will lead to loss of one’s job or a decline in the job’s prestige 
(Banton 1983; Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1992; Ridgeway 1997) or the belief that the 
marriage of a close family member to someone from an out-group will result in the 
contamination of oneself and members of one’s family (Glaser et al. 2002). In 
contrast, group threat occurs when someone feels that a group to which he or she 
belongs is being threatened, even if the individual him or herself will not be harmed. 
For instance, the fear that economic competition will lead to a decline in the dominant 
group’s status (Blalock 1957; Goldin 2002; Kimmel 2004) or the belief that 
intermarriage will pollute the gene pool (Blee 2002; Ezekiel 2002; Fredrickson 2002; 
Glaser et al. 2002). 
 Individual and group threats are similar but theoretically distinct concepts. It is 
possible for an individual threat to develop from a group threat and vice versa. For 
example, a group threat can spawn a personal threat if a person believes that his 
neighborhood will deteriorate with the influx of blacks and he extrapolates that his 
own house will consequently lose value. 
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 The role of threat is virtually the same within racial threat arguments. The 
primary differences are who gets hurt (the individual or the group) and the 
mechanisms connecting threat and attitudes. Among individual level threat arguments, 
perhaps the best known is Bonacich’s discussion of split labor markets (1972). The 
group threat contingent is larger and includes such approaches as Blumer’s group 
position model (1958) and Blalock’s power threat hypothesis (1967). The fundamental 
idea behind all of these arguments is that when threatened, people will express 
negative feelings (i.e., prejudice) towards those perceived to be posing the threat. 
 Individual level threat arguments focus on how individuals respond to threats 
to themselves. For example, Bonacich (1972) argues that when cheaper labor enters a 
market, conflict can emerge between the cheaper labor, higher priced labor, and 
business. Each group is a potential threat to the other groups. This tension fosters 
intergroup hostility. Although the antagonism develops through group interaction, the 
threat occurs at the individual level, as individual workers fear the possibility of job 
loss or wage reduction for themselves. 
 Not all individual threat arguments focus on economic deprivations. Two 
alternatives are threats that are politically or socially motivated (Bobo and Hutchings 
1996). For instance, William Julius Wilson (1980) describes how a black mayor’s 
political decisions led to a decline in the perceived quality of life for some white 
residents. While an example of a social threat is the fear that a close family member 
will marry someone from another group, particularly a different racial or religious 
group. The threat is that the family member and, by diffusion, others close to him or 
her will be polluted or otherwise corrupted by the marriage (Glaser et al. 2002). Of 
particular concern are any children that may result from the relationship (Ezekiel 
2002; Green et al. 1999). 
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 Group threat arguments shift the focus from the individual to the group – 
instead of being concerned about their personal situation, people are apprehensive 
about their group’s status. Frequently, these models examine only threats to the 
dominant group posed by subordinate groups. Two such arguments are Blumer’s 
group position model (1958) and Blalock’s power threat hypothesis (1967). One 
exception is Bobo and Hutchings’ paper (1996) where the authors extend Blumer’s 
model to incorporate hostility of subordinate groups towards both the dominant group 
and other subordinate groups.9 
 Blumer’s group position model (1958) was one of the first to focus on group 
threat. He argues that an essential element for the emergence of racial prejudice is the 
fear that the out-group is or will threaten the sociopolitical position of the in-group. 
Whether the threat is real does not matter theoretically (Bobo 1999; Quillian 1995) 
(although, Semyonov and colleagues (2004) report that the distinction is of practical 
importance). What matters is that the actor perceives a threat. By explicitly stating that 
a sense of group threat is a necessary condition for the emergence of prejudice, the 
model presupposes that individuals have a sense of group membership; otherwise any 
antagonism would be directed at the individual, not his or her racial group. This 
recognition of group membership is different from individual threat where an actor 
need only identify himself as a target. 
 Blalock (1967) adopts a different approach. He argues that as the percent of the 
population that is non-white grows so do whites’ fears of a threat to their political and 
economic power. Furthermore, the relationship between minority group size and threat 
is nonlinear, such that the larger the minority group is relative to the majority, the 
greater the threat, and thus, the greater the prejudice. This approach has been applied 
                                                 
9 Bobo and Hutchings’ paper (1996) incorporates both types of threat to examine the factors associated 
with perceptions of group threat. Group threat is the outcome measure and individual threat is an 
independent measure. Their question is very different from the one posed here. 
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extensively to lynchings (Corzine et al. 1983; Tolnay, Beck, and Massey 1989b), 
racial conflict (Blalock 1957; D'Alessio et al. 2002), prejudice (Kunovich 2004), 
church burnings (Soule and Van Dyke 1999), and more recently private police size 
(D'Alessio, Eitle, and Stolzenberg 2005). 
 The arguments are seemingly very different, but they share some important 
similarities. The most notable point of agreement between Blumer and Blalock’s 
models is that the minority group poses a threat to the dominant group’s sociopolitical 
position. A second likeness, and one that applies to all three models, is the focus on 
only one type of threat, either individual threat or group threat. The arguments are 
cohesive as constructed, so there is no obvious rationale for why both threats should 
be included. Not surprisingly, tests of these and similar arguments generally include 
only the relevant threat (Beck and Tolnay 1990; Bobo 1998; Corzine et al. 1983; 
D'Alessio et al. 2002; Olzak 1990; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995; Quillian 1996; Soule 
and Van Dyke 1999). Consequently, although the models may be appropriate for 
assessing the relevant theory, they provide little insight into any possible relationship 
between individual threat and group threat or even if both threats matter.  
 
Hypotheses 
 There are intriguing questions about what occurs when both threats are 
analyzed together. First, are both threats associated with attitudes, or only one as the 
accounts suggest? If both are relevant, then which is stronger and what does this say 
about the arguments? Second, is there a relationship between the two threats, and if so, 
what is it? Finally, does the relationship vary based on the circumstance (i.e., the 
outcome measures)? The answers to these questions are not only important to race 
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scholars, but also to policy makers, because issue framing10 can have a large impact on 
policy support and opposition (Fine 1992; Nelson and Kinder 1996; Terkildsen and 
Schnell 1997). 
 With two types of threat identified, there are four possible scenarios: first, only 
individual threat is important; second, only group threat is important; third, both 
threats are important; and finally, neither threat is important: 
 H1: Individual threat alone is associated with racial attitudes. 
 H2: Group threat alone is associated with racial attitudes. 
 H3: Both individual and group threats are associated with racia l attitudes. 
 H4: Neither individual threat nor group threat are associated with racial 
attitudes. 
The question now is what explanations might yield each of the four scenarios and how 
they might impact existing models. 
 The situation when only individual threat is relevant (H1) occurs in Bonacich’s 
split labor markets argument (1972) and can be explained by a self- interest model 
(Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears et al. 1979). The self-
interest approach contends that people care only about themselves and their loved 
ones. These individuals either do not identify with a group or the identification is 
sufficiently weak so as to render it meaningless; however, they still identify others as 
part of the out-group. The only time a threat is associated with attitudes towards an 
out-group is when that threat has a direct impact on the actor’s life.  
 The split labor market model meets these criteria. For Bonacich (1972), 
individual outcomes are paramount. Group membership matters only because it 
dictates individual outcomes. Under this formulation a group threat measure could 
                                                 
10 Gamson and Modigliani (1987) define a frame as “a cultural organizing idea or story line that 
provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them” (p. 143). 
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have an effect if it is the only threat in a model, but such an effect would be spuriously 
capturing the potential for individual harm, and should therefore disappear if an 
individual threat measure is added to the model. Since most people are probably aware 
of their group membership, even if they do not strongly identify with their group, it is 
not unreasonable to expect group threat to act as a proxy for individual threat when 
individual threat is omitted from an analysis. In other words, if a test of the split labor 
market thesis included a measure for group threat, but none for individual threat, then 
group threat could be significant even though the argument contends otherwise. 
 The second scenario (H2), that only group threat is relevant, could occur for 
people with a strong attachment to their group. As Blumer argues (1958), a strong 
group affiliation may shape individua l level views. This means that individual threat 
could be significant in a model without group threat, but not significant when group 
threat is in the model. The same results could also occur for people in a sufficiently 
secure position such that they are immune to personal threats or those who have such a 
strong sense of group identity that group membership supersedes personal factors. We 
see potential examples of this situation with suicide bombers who are willing to die for 
a cause. It is unlikely that this level of group identification is realistic at a broad level 
outside of certain select communities. 
 The third hypothesis asserts that both threats are associated with attitudes. In 
other words, neither of the scenarios presented is right, but neither is wrong. Instead, it 
is a combination of the two. This position contends that actors have personal interests, 
but also identify with their group. For the split labor market argument this would mean 
that individuals still want to protect their jobs and wages, but also care about the 
welfare of their group as a whole. So, even if an actor is in a secure position where he 
does not have to worry about his job or salary, he would still want his group to 
maintain its position vis-à-vis subordinate groups.  
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 For Blumer’s model this change would add individual threat as a distinct 
element associated with racial prejudice. Individual threat can be incorporated fairly 
easily, with only a slight weakening of the group as the primary source of prejudice. 
The group position model contends that four factors are associated with racial 
prejudice: the perception that the out-group poses a threat to the in-group, the 
conviction that the in-group is superior to the out-group, the feeling that the out-group 
is fundamentally different or alien, and the belief that the in-group is entitled to certain 
privileges (Blumer 1958). The addition of individual threat has no impact on the four 
original components. Furthermore, the three non-threat factors help explain why an 
individual threat might lead to group prejudice, instead of anger directed solely at the 
specific source of the threat. 
 The inclusion of individual threat would be problematic for Blalock’s 
argument (1967). The model focuses on how prejudice relates to the size of the 
minority population relative to the majority. Individual actors are not considered. To 
incorporate individual level threat the model would first have to recognize individuals. 
Then the model could propose that increases in the relative size of the out-group 
increases the probability that individuals will face harm by a member of the out-
group.11 This would require either a complete overhaul of the model or the recognition 
that the model accounts for only one aspect of racial prejudice. 
 The final possibility is that neither threat is associated with racial attitudes 
(H4). In other words, people who feel threatened and people who feel no threat hold 
similar views of the out-group. This is contrary to the models discussed and to the 
evidence indicating that threat, in one form or the other, is associated with racial 
attitudes (Bobo 1998; Pettigrew 1998; Quillian 1995, 1996; Verberk et al. 2002). 
                                                 
11 My thanks to David Harris for pointing out this possibility. 
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Clearly, previous evidence indicates that this scenario is unlikely; although it could 
result from undetected reverse causality. 12 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 This paper relies on data from the General Social Survey (GSS) (Davis et al. 
2003). Using a national probability sample of households the GSS provides 
information generalizable to the non- institutionalized, English speaking, adult U.S. 
population (residing in country). In order to address a wide range of topics, the GSS 
does not ask all questions every year, and within a year, not all respondents are asked 
the same questions. The questions relevant to this analysis were only asked in 1994 
(the response rate was 78%). In this year, there were nine versions of the 
questionnaire. The policy questions were asked on three of these questionnaires. One 
version of the questionnaire contained both policy questions, one version contained 
one of the questions, and the third version contained the second question. In order to 
maximize the sample sizes, each model includes all respondents who answered the 
relevant outcome measure and all the independent measures. This means that the 
number of respondents varies by outcome measure (i.e., the sample is not identical 
across outcome measures). Even so, both of the samples are fairly small (N = 272 for 
one sample and N = 299 for the other). The samples are virtually statistically 
indistinguishable (see table 3.1). 
 
Sample 
 The analyses are restricted to members of the dominant group (i.e., whites) 
who answered all of the relevant questions. Respondents who did not answer all of the 
questions for a given outcome measures are dropped from analyses of that measure 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
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(i.e., listwise deletion). The analyses are restricted to whites, because the sample size 
for blacks is too small for analysis (n < 62). All of the models presented are weighted 
(using the GSS weight “adults”) to adjust for the sampling design, which was 
conducted at the household level while the analyses are conducted at the individual 
level. To maximize sample size, the samples for the outcome measures are not 
identical. Approximately 45% to 50% of each sample is unique to that question, while 
the remaining 50% to 55% are the same across the samples. The two samples are 
statistically indistinguishable, with two exceptions (see table 3.1): there are more 
women in the reverse discrimination sample than the special treatment sample and the 
special treatment sample contains more employed people than the reverse 
discrimination sample. 
 
Policy Questions (Outcome Variables) 
 Today, voicing prejudicial opinions is generally deemed socially unacceptable. 
In the context of race relations, this means that regardless of what they actually 
believe, many people are no longer comfortable saying that blacks are inferior or that 
whites should be entitled to certain positions (Schuman et al. 1997). A socially 
acceptable way to circumvent this normative pressure is to express opposition to 
policies aimed at promoting racial equity (Wellman 1993). So, people with negative 
views about blacks should oppose policies aimed at helping blacks. However, people 
who hold negative views of blacks are not the only ones who oppose race equalizing 
policies. Some people will reject race equalizing policies not because they are hostile 
towards blacks, but because they believe that the policies are inherently unfair or that 
the government should not be involved. However, Kinder and Sanders (1996) report 
that these factors have only a modest association with attitudes towards the type of 
racial policies assessed here. Even though the sample of people opposed to policies  
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics (weighted) for variables used in the analysis  
 Reverse Discrimination Special Treatment 
 (N = 272) (N = 299) 
Reverse discrimination (mean) 1.46 (0.77)   
Strongly oppose (%) 65.07    
Oppose (%) 26.10    
For (%) 5.15    
Strongly for (%) 3.68    
Special treatment (mean)   2.19 (1.07) 
Strongly oppose(%)   33.44  
Oppose (%)   30.77  
No opinion (%)   25.42  
Support (%)   7.36  
Strongly support (%)   3.01  
Individual threat (mean) 2.26 (0.98) 2.31 (1.00) 
Very unlikely (%)  28.68  27.76  
Somewhat unlikely (%) 26.84  24.08  
Somewhat likely (%) 34.19  36.45  
Very likely (%) 10.29  11.71  
Group threat (mean) 2.16 (0.71) 2.09 (0.73) 
Not likely (%) 18.01  22.07  
Somewhat likely (%) 49.26  46.49  
Likely (%) 32.72  31.44  
Government should help poor (mean) -- -- 3.16 (1.07) 
Blacks lazy (mean) 4.60 (1.24) 4.43 (1.26) 
Resentment (mean) 3.57 (1.06) 3.58 (1.04) 
Political views (mean) 4.27 (1.42) 4.36 (1.37) 
Age (mean) 44.11 (16.41) 43.87 (15.11) 
Income (ln) (mean) 9.88 (0.53) 9.91 (0.53) 
Educational attainment (mean) 13.42 (2.92) 13.52 (2.95) 
Region of residence     
South (%) 31.75  32.32  
Midwest (%) 25.20  23.93  
Other (%) 43.06  43.75  
Women (%) 53.37a  48.93  
Religion     
Mainline Protestant (%) 19.84  24.46  
Evangelical Protestant (%) 30.56  32.14  
Catholic (%) 31.15  27.32  
Jewish (%) 2.78  3.57  
Other (%) 5.36  5.89  
None (%) 10.32  6.61  
Marital status     
Married (%) 66.27  68.93  
Never married (%) 18.06  15.18  
Previously married (%) 15.67  15.89  
Employment     
Employed (%) 64.48  71.43b  
Spouse employed (%) 41.87  50.00  
a. Reverse discrimination greater than special treatment at p < .01 
b. Special threatment greater than reverse discrimination at p < .01 
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aimed at racial equity is larger than those hostile to blacks, attitudes towards these 
policies are still good starting points for assessing racial hostility. Furthermore, there 
is precedent for this approach, as studies in the racism literature have used attitudes 
towards policies as outcome measures (Bobo 1983; Sears et al. 1979; Sears et al. 
1997). 
 The 1994 GSS includes two questions on race based equalizing policies. The 
first says, “Some people say that because of past discrimination, blacks should be 
given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring 
and promotion of blacks is wrong because it discriminates against whites. What about 
your opinion – are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?” 
Responses are on a four point scale ranging from “strongly favor” to “strongly 
oppose” affirmative action. This question will be referred to as reverse discrimination, 
because it has respondents decide whether it is acceptable to reduce inequality by 
preferentially hiring and promoting blacks, possibly leading to discrimination against 
whites. In other words, the question is if past discrimination should be rectified if 
reverse discrimination might result. 
 The second question asks whether the government has an obligation to help 
blacks improve their living standards or if such “special treatment” is appropriate: 
“Some people think that (Blacks/Negroes/African-Americans) have been 
discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help 
improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be 
giving special treatment to (Blacks/Negroes/African-Americans). Where would you 
place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?” Responses 
are on a five point scale ranging from “government should help” to “government 
should give no special treatment,” with “agree to both” as the midpoint. These 
categories, while clear to the respondent, are somewhat confusing when presented, so 
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the labels have been changed to “strongly support special treatment,” “support special 
treatment,” “no opinion,” “oppose special treatment,” and “strongly oppose special 
treatment.” 
 Responses to both questions were reverse coded to ensure that higher values 
indicate more policy support, while lower numbers indicate opposition. In both 
contexts, most whites express opposition to the policy (table 3.1). The negative 
response is strongest for the reverse discrimination frame, where 65% of respondents 
are strongly opposed to the policy, as compared to 33% for the special treatment 
frame. Overall, more than 90% of respondents oppose affirmative action (“oppose” or 
“strongly oppose”) when presented with the possibility of reverse discrimination, 
while 64% oppose the possibility of special treatment. 
 These preliminary findings are in line with expectations based on the 
affirmative action frames literature. Research consistently reports that support for race 
based programs varies by how questions are phrased (Fine 1992; Kinder and Sanders 
1996; Swain 2001). A question’s frame highlights specific factors while downplaying 
others, influencing how the audience perceives the situation. Slight differences in 
wording can have dramatic effects on both the overall level of policy support and on 
who supports it (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Because wording is so important, it is 
worth examining the relationship between threat and attitudes with both of the 
available outcome measures.  
 
Independent Variables 
 Threat. The threat measures focus on the impact of labor market integration. 
The individual level threat measure asks, “What do you think the chances are these 
days that you or anyone in your family won't get a job or promotion while an equally 
or less qualified Black/African-American employee receives one instead? Would you 
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say the chances of this happening are very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat 
unlikely, or very unlikely?” The group threat measure says, “What do you think the 
chances are these days that a white person won't get a job or promotion while an 
equally or less qualified black person gets one instead? Is this very likely, somewhat 
likely, or not very likely to happen these days?” This question measures group threat 
because it assesses perceptions of threat facing the group as a whole, not individual 
group members. In both cases, the variables were converted into dummy variables, 
with one dummy for each level of threat. 
 Respondents indicate that they feel a greater sense of group threat than 
individual threat. Less than half of respondents believe that it is very likely or 
somewhat likely that they will lose a job or promotion to an equally or less qualified 
black applicant. In contrast, more than three quarters of respondents believe that a 
white person is at risk of losing a job or a promotion to an equally or less qualified 
black person. There is a moderate correlation between individual threat and group 
threat (r = .38 and r = .47 for the reverse discrimination and special treatment frames 
respectively). 
 Threat interaction terms are also assessed to explore a possible relationship 
between individual threat and group threat. An interaction might occur if people who 
identify one type of threat are more likely to also perceive the other type of threat. One 
explanation is that once people acknowledge one threat they may be primed to 
recognize other threats. At this point it is unclear whether an interaction would occur 
for only those people feeling strongly threatened or anyone perceiving a threat. 
Consequently, two interaction terms are considered: a strong threat (individual threat 
very likely and group threat very likely) and any threat (individual threat somewhat 
likely or very likely and group threat somewhat likely or very likely). 
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 Background Controls. The analyses include a wide variety of background and 
social controls that are routinely employed in studies of racial attitudes. The measures 
are those found to be associated with racial attitudes, and therefore may influence the 
relationship between attitudes and threat. The measures include: age, education, 
gender, income, political conservatism, religious affiliation, region, marital status, own 
and spouse’s employment status, opinions of blacks, and resentment of blacks (table 
3.1).  
 Age and education are measured continuously. Contrary to what one might 
guess, age is not correlated with either individual or group threat. This is not entirely 
surprising given previous work which finds little to moderate association between age 
and threat (Bobo 1988a; Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996).  
 Gender is one of the few factors on which the samples differ. The reverse 
discrimination sample has more women than men, while the special treatment sample 
has more men than women. 
 Income is the respondent’s household income. People who are unemployed or 
who report a negative income are recoded as having an income of $500, the lowest 
income level in the analysis. The highest level of income is $25,000. The natural 
logarithm of income is used in the models. It is worth noting that the inclusion of 
income reduces both sample sizes by about ten percent. The impact of this reduction 
on sample size is discussed later. 
 Political views are on a seven point scale from extremely liberal (1) to 
extremely conservative (7). The mean is slightly above 4, indicating that the sample 
contains a fairly even balance of political viewpoints. Political conservatism is 
generally expected to correspond with opposition to policies aimed at racial equity, 
which is anticipated to occur here. However, initial indications are that this may not be 
the case, as political conservatism is weakly to moderately correlated with opinions 
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about the policies (r = .12 for the reverse discrimination frame and r = .29 for the 
special treatment frame). The associations between political conservatism and the two 
threats are similarly weak (rindividual threat  = .09 and rgroup threat  = .16 for the reverse 
discrimination frame and rindividual threat = -.01 and rgroup threat  = .20 for the special 
treatment frame).  
 Religious affiliation also tends to be associated with policy attitudes (Thornton 
et al. 1983). Following Steensland et al. (2000), religion is divided into six categories: 
mainline Protestants (20% and 24%), evangelical Protestants (31% and 32%), 
Catholics (31% and 27%), Jews (3% and 4%), other (5% and 6%), and none (10% and 
7%). Mainline Protestants are used as the reference group.  
 Southerners13 (32%) are more likely than others to adhere to conservative 
viewpoints (Quillian 1996; Sears et al. 1997; Smith 1981; Stouffer 1955), but in some 
instances living in the Midwest14 (25% and 24%) may have an even greater impact 
(Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). Region is divided into the three categories of South, 
Midwest, and other, with other used as the reference category.  
 Marital status is also broken down into three categories: never married, 
married, and previously married. For the majority of tests run, the attitudes of people 
who are widowed more closely resemble the attitudes of divorced or separated 
individuals than married people, so widows and widowers are included in the 
previously married category. 
 Two additional measures are whether the respondent is employed outside the 
home (64% and 71%) (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Quillian 1996) and whether the 
respondent’s spouse is employed outside the home (42% and 50%). 
                                                 
13 South consists of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, and West Virginia. 
14 Midwest is defined as Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. 
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 A traditional measure of racism is employed to assess beliefs about the extent 
to which blacks tend to be hard-working or lazy. This is an appropriate measure to 
include since it is a classic indicator of racial prejudice. Furthermore, some scholars 
argue that negative stereotypes may lead to feelings of threat (see Stephan et al. 2002). 
Responses are on a seven point scale, with 1 being hard-working and 7 being lazy. The 
mean falls slightly above the midpoint. Other measures of traditional racism were 
considered and rejected because of high non-response rates. 
 Proponents of symbolic racism and similar arguments assert that resentment 
towards blacks is a key factor explaining opposition to race equalizing policies 
(Kinder and Sanders 1996; Krysan 2000; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995; Sears et al. 
1997). Including a measure of symbolic racism ensures that any results attributable to 
threat are due to threat and not symbolic racism. The measure used here asks if 
“blacks get more attention then they deserve.” Answers are on a five point scale 
ranging from “much less attention than deserved” to “much more attention than 
deserved.” Responses are reverse coded so that higher values indicate greater 
resentment (i.e., more attention than deserved). The means fall just above the 
midpoint. 
 Also included in the special treatment analysis is perceptions of the 
government’s responsibility to reduce poverty. (See the next section for a discussion 
about why this measure is excluded from the reverse discrimination analysis.) This 
measure accounts for people who oppose race based policies not out of negative 
feelings towards blacks, but because they believe that the government should not be 
addressing the issue. The question says, “Some people think that the government in 
Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all 
poor Americans; they are at Point 1 on this card. Other people think it is not the 
government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself; they are 
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at Point 5. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you have up your 
mind on this?” The mean is 3.16. 
 
 Background Measures Considered. A number of additional background 
measures were considered, but excluded from the analysis for various reasons. These 
measures include anti-black prejudice based on biological principles, views on 
fairness, and perceptions of the government’s role (excluded from the reverse 
discrimination analysis only). 
 The GSS includes a number of measures of racism rationalized on biological 
premises; however, all of the measures have substantial missing data and would 
dramatically reduce sample sizes. To determine the potential impact of excluding such 
measures, the measure with the least missing data was included in preliminary models. 
This dichotomous measure assesses beliefs about the innate ability of blacks. The 
question says, “On the average (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) have worse jobs, 
income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are . . . 
Because most (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) have less in-born ability to 
learn?” (1 indicates that differences are innate). The vast majority of respondents 
(89%) do not feel that blacks have less ability to learn. The inclusion of this measure 
had no significant impact on any of the other variables and is therefore excluded from 
subsequent analyses. However, there is some indication that such a measure may be 
associated with policy attitudes, so if possible it should be included in future 
assessments. 
 Although it would also be ideal to include a measure of fairness, it is not 
feasible as there is no measure of fairness available for this survey year. 
 As noted previously, there is an indicator of government role; however, the 
sample size for the reverse discrimination sample is too small (N < 150) to enable a 
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strong analysis. Preliminary results indicate that government role has no significant 
impact on the results for the reverse discrimination models.  
 
Method 
 The models are run with multinomial logits. Ideally, ordered logit would have 
been used for analysis. However, neither set of models satisfied the parallel regression 
assumption (although it could be satisfied for the reverse discrimination models by 
dropping age and religion, without loss of information). Multinomial logit yields 
substantively similar results to order logits for the reverse discrimination sample. 
Multinomial logit consists of sets of binary logistic regressions, where each level of 
the outcome measure is compared with the reference category (Long 1997). The 
reference category here is the strongest level of policy opposition. 
 
RESULTS 
Reverse Discrimination 
 Table 3.2 presents results for the reverse discrimination multinomial logits. 
Model 1 is the baseline model with all control measures, but no threat measures; 
model 2 incorporates individual threat measures; model 3 is the same as model 2 
except that the individual threat measures are replaced by group threat measures; and 
model 4 includes both individual and group threats. The panels are levels of policy 
support, with strongly oppose as the reference category. Support and strongly support 
were collapsed into a single outcome level to increase cell sizes. This had no impact 
on results. Correlates are included in all models. Results are available upon request. 
 Individual threat and group threat are each associated with policy attitudes, 
when included in the models individually (models 2 and 3, respectively) and together 
(model 4). Someone who feels a strong individual threat is more likely to oppose 
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affirmative action than someone who feels less of a threat. The same is generally true 
for people feeling a strong group threat. This provides support for hypothesis 3 that 
individual threat and group threat are both associated with racial policy attitudes.  
 
Table 3.2. Odds From Multinomial Logistic Regressions of White’s Opposition to 
Reverse Discrimination Policies (N = 272) 
 1 2 3 4 
Oppose          
Individual Threat         
Very unlikely   7.45* (5.82)   6.30* (5.00) 
Unlikely   15.75*** (12.24)   13.42** (10.59) 
Somewhat 
likely 
  
5.50* (4.22)   4.76* (3.70) 
Group Threat         
Not likely     2.05 (0.79) 1.41 (0.58) 
Somewhat 
likely 
    
1.93* (0.57) 1.44 (0.45) 
Support or 
Strongly Support  
        
Individual Threat         
Very unlikely   13.09* (15.38)   8.45 (10.34) 
Unlikely   6.29 (7.48)   4.73 (5.81) 
Somewhat 
likely 
  
11.05* (12.72)   13.17* (15.64) 
Group Threat         
Not likely     8.95*** (5.13) 8.01** (4.80) 
Somewhat 
likely 
    
2.09 (1.10) 1.36 (0.74) 
Log likelihood -380  -362  -368  -351  
df 32  38  36  42  
Pseudo R2 0.09  0.13  0.12  0.16  
BIC -2165  -2164  -2164  -2161  
Notes: Comparison groups are strongly oppose for the outcome, and very likely for individual and 
group threats. 
* p < .05        
** p < .01        
*** p < .001        
 
 Both threat measures decrease in magnitude with the addition of the other 
threat, while the level of significance stays the same or decreases slightly. The one 
exception is in the second panel, where the magnitude for one level of individual 
threat (somewhat likely) increases with the inclusion of group threat. This may suggest 
a relationship between individual threat and group threat; although the results do not 
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appear to be due to an interaction between individual threat and group threat, as no 
interaction is significant. However, the lack of effect may be due to small sample size. 
The small sample size may also account for the nonmonotonicity observed for 
individual threat. 
 
Special Treatment 
 The results for the special treatment multinomial logits are presented in table 
3.3. The reference category is strongly oppose special treatment, the greatest level of 
policy opposition. The panels show results for each level of policy support, beginning 
with the second-most level of opposition and ending with the greatest level of support. 
Models are the same as for reverse discrimination, with model 1 the baseline, model 2 
control variables plus individual threat, model 3 control variables with group threat, 
and model 4 control variables with both individual and group threats. The table 
presents only the threat outcomes. Background measures are included in all of the 
models, but are omitted from the tables. Complete results are available upon request. 
 The results for the special treatment models have a similar pattern to the results 
from the reverse discrimination models. Both threats are associated with policy 
opposition when included in the models individually (models 2 and 3). The magnitude 
and significance of the odds also decline with the addition of the other threat (model 
4). 
 The findings for individual threat, however, are different from the reverse 
discrimination models and are not as predicted. As expected, after controlling for all 
other variables (model 4) people who do not feel a strong individual threat are more 
likely to oppose than strongly oppose giving blacks special treatment. This is as 
predicted by hypotheses 1 and 3. Similarly, those who do not feel strongly threatened 
are significantly more likely to have no opinion about providing special treatment than  
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Table 3.3. Odds from multinomial logistic regression of white’s opposition to special 
treatment policies (N = 299) 
 1 2 3 4 
Oppose          
Individual Threat         
Very unlikely   5.60** (3.01)   4.87** (2.81) 
Unlikely   4.88** (2.67)   3.52* (2.03) 
Somewhat 
likely 
  
5.32** (2.70)   3.66* (1.93) 
Group Threat         
Not likely     1.24 (0.53) 0.80 (0.38) 
Somewhat 
likely 
  
 
 
3.18*** (1.02) 2.33* (0.79) 
No Opinion         
Individual Threat         
Very unlikely   8.18** (5.80)   7.99** (5.93) 
Unlikely   8.36** (5.99)   8.17** (6.00) 
Somewhat 
likely 
  
6.97** (4.73)   6.97** (4.83) 
Group Threat         
Not likely     1.54 (0.65) 1.04 (0.48) 
Somewhat 
likely 
    
1.58 (0.54) 1.13 (0.40) 
Support          
Individual Threat         
Very unlikely   0.95 (0.79)   0.53 (0.49) 
Unlikely   1.83 (1.45)   1.28 (1.08) 
Somewhat 
likely 
  
0.95 (0.70)   0.76 (0.59) 
Group Threat         
Not likely     2.72 (1.86) 3.16 (2.32) 
Somewhat 
likely 
    
2.03 (1.18) 2.11 (1.30) 
Strongly Support          
Individual Threat         
Very unlikely   1.85 (3.30)   0.36 (0.95) 
Unlikely   0.01 (0.03)   0.01 (0.04) 
Somewhat 
likely 
  
0.07 (0.13)   0.12 (0.28) 
Group Threat         
Not likely     95.48* (190.28) 46.15 (128.64) 
Somewhat 
likely 
    
0.75 (1.13) 1.20 (2.58) 
Log likelihood -579  -558  -557  -544  
df 68  80  76  88  
Pseudo R2 0.25  0.28  0.28  0.30  
BIC -1931  -1896  -1923  -1874  
Notes: Comparison groups are strongly oppose for the outcome, and very likely for individual and 
group threats. 
* p < .05        
** p < .01        
*** p < .001        
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people who identify a strong threat (panel 2). The surprise is with policy support. The 
prediction was that people who felt strongly threatened would be more likely to 
oppose giving blacks’ special treatment. This does not seem to be the case. First 
differences in individual threat are not associated with whether people strongly oppose 
or support special treatment (panels 3 and 4). Second, people who feel a strong 
individual threat appear more likely to support and strongly support special treatment, 
than people who feel a threat is unlikely (the odds are less than 1); although these 
results are not significant. The most probable explanation for these results is the small 
cell sizes (for support and strongly support special treatment). 
 This pattern is more clearly illustrated in figure 3.1. The x-axis represents 
levels of threat, with very likely as the reference category. The y-axis is the logits for 
the results presented in table 3.3. The data points are levels of threat. Positive results 
indicate that respondents are more likely to hold that opinion than to strongly oppose 
the policy, while negative results imply that respondents are less likely to hold that 
opinion than to strongly oppose the policy. So, people who feel strongly threatened are 
more likely to strongly oppose the policy than to oppose it or have no opinion on it 
(results are positive), while these same people are more likely to support or strongly 
support the policy than to strongly oppose it (results are negative). 
 The pattern for group threat is different (figure 3.2). Most people who identify 
a strong group threat are more likely than others to strongly oppose special treatment 
(results are positive). Although these results are not all significant, they are almost all 
in the expected direction. 
 
Role of Sample Size 
 As previously noted, including income in the analysis reduces both the reverse 
discrimination and special treatment samples by about ten percent. Because the  
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samples considered are so small, it is possible that some results are not significant that 
would be significant in a larger sample. To examine this possibility, the models were 
re-run first with the same sample as presented but excluding the income variable (i.e., 
the samples are exactly the same, the only difference is whether income is included in 
the analyses), the models were then run with the sample plus those previously omitted 
because they lacked income data (N = 272 for the reverse discrimination sample and N 
= 299 for the special treatment sample). (All results are available upon request.) The 
original models were first compared to the models with the sample excluding missing 
income data. This was done to see what results were due to income. Next examined 
were the two samples without income (one including those with missing income data 
and the other excluding those respondents), to see how the results differed based on 
sample size. 
 The comparisons indicate that the association between threat and policy 
attitudes is stronger (as measured by significance) with increased sample sizes. For 
reverse discrimination this is particularly noticeable for individual threat where all 
significant factors in model 2 retain their significance after controlling for group threat 
(model 4). Group threat also shows a stronger association with attitudes before 
controlling for individual threat (model 3); although, group threat remains 
insignificant after controlling for individual threat (model 4). For special treatment the 
larger samples again show generally stronger associations between policy attitudes 
and both threats. (There are, however, a couple instances where the strength of the 
association decreases.) These comparisons strengthen the conclusion that both 
individual threat and group threat are associated with policy attitudes.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The results from the reverse discrimination models (table 3.2) and special 
treatment models (table 3.3) are similar. The odds of strongly opposing the policy are 
greater for people feeling either a strong individual threat or a strong group threat. 
Results from the two sets of models provide support for hypothesis 3, that both 
individual threat and group threat are associated with policy opposition. This 
conclusion is apparent in the reverse discrimination frame panel 2, where the threats 
are significant simultaneously (table 3.2 model 4). This is also seen in the special 
treatment analysis, where both threats are significant in the first panel (table 3.3 model 
4). Alone, this may seem somewhat weak evidence to conclude that both threats are 
related to policy attitudes; however, the four panels should be considered as one, 
because they represent levels of the same variable. When they are examined together, 
it is apparent that individual threat and group threat are both associated with opinions 
on giving blacks special treatment. Furthermore, the analysis conducted to examine 
the effect of sample size demonstrates that a stronger association between threat and 
policy attitudes is likely with a larger sample. 
 The most important conclusion from this research is that individual threat and 
group threat are both associated with attitudes towards racial policies. The relevance 
of this finding is twofold. First, the majority of racial prejudice theories focus on only 
one type of threat. This is fine if only that threat is significant, but when both threats 
are pertinent the arguments lose some of their validity. The findings here do not 
necessarily indicate that single threat theories should be discarded, especially since 
there are times when only one threat appears relevant, but instead suggest that the 
theories be reevaluated to determine if the excluded threat can be incorporated without 
altering the theory’s fundamental premise. 
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 Second, since most theories consider only one threat, most analyses do as well. 
If both threats are important, then these analyses omit a potentially relevant measure. 
One consequence is misleading results that may overstate the significance of the 
included threat. This is particularly problematic for students of racial bias and policy 
makers hoping to reduce racial inequality. Improper model specification could lead 
policy makers to misframe a policy, incorrectly believing that one threat is the cause 
of opposition, when in fact the omitted threat might play a key role. This could lead to 
public rejection of a policy that would otherwise have received widespread support. 
 The results from this analysis suggest that the relationship between individual 
threat and group threat needs further exploration. First and foremost, we must 
determine the circumstances under which only one threat, and similarly both threats, 
are related to policy attitudes. We must also ascertain why each of the threats is 
important when it is, but not otherwise. Finally, whenever possible, we need to include 
both individual and group threats in assessments of racial policy attitudes 
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CHAPTER 4 
INDIVIDUAL THREAT, GROUP THREAT, AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
LEGALIZING GAY MARRIAGE AND PROVIDING JOB BENEFITS TO SAME-
SEX COUPLES 
 
 The visibility of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals has increased in 
recent years with the brutal attacks on Matthew Shephard and Billy Jack Gaither 
(Herek 2000); the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision overturning antisodomy laws (Hull 
2006); the recent publicity surrounding the debate on the legalization (or prohibition) 
of gay marriage; and greater media exposure through productions such as “Ellen,” 
“Will and Grace,” and “Brokeback Mountain.” With increased visibility has come 
increased debate about the proper place for LGB persons in American society. At 
times, the discussion has become vitriolic, which is not surprising given evidence 
indicating that even with generally increasing tolerance (Bobo 2001; Schuman et al. 
1997; Yang 1997), homosexuals15 are second only to atheists as the most disliked of 
group in the U.S. (Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006).16 
 Sexual minorities are one of the last groups to receive legal protections. The 
lack of legal protection means that LGB persons routinely face the possibility of 
discrimination, verbal harassment, abuse at the hands of law enforcement, and 
violence motivated by their sexuality17 (Berrill and Herek 1992; Connell 1995; 
                                                 
15 The term “homosexual” was used in the cited analysis, which is why it is used here. Many people 
avoid the word “homosexual” because it “has been associated in the past with deviance, mental illness, 
and criminal behavior” (Committee on Lesbian and Gay Concerns 1991) and it is often interpreted as 
incorporating only men (Simon 1998). 
16 The groups examined include atheists, Muslims, homosexuals, conservative Christians, recent 
immigrants, Hispanics, Jews, Asian Americans, African Americans, and White Americans. 
17 Only 29 states, plus the District of Columbia, have sexual orientation as a protected status under hate 
crime legislation (National Gay and Lesbian Task Force 2005-2006a). 
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National Gay and Lesbian Task Force 2005-2006b). To effectively combat this 
hostility more must be known about why LGB persons are targeted. 
 Explanations for the opposition to same-sex sexuality depend on the speaker. 
Religious conservatives decry same-sex behavior as immoral, unnatural, and a threat 
to the moral framework of society (Catholic Answers 2004; CNN 2006; Dallas 2005; 
NPR 2006). Gay men, in particular, are often considered dangerous because they are 
believed by some to molest children (Herek 2002; Vitagliano 2001) and endeavor to 
“convert” children to the “gay lifestyle” (Simon 1998; Traditional Values Coalition 
2005). Gender scholars contend that hostility emerges because LGB persons are 
perceived to be violating gender norms (Franklin 1998; Lim 2002), with masculinity 
theorists, like Connell, arguing that alternatives to heterosexual norms pose a threat to 
the system of hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1987). These conflicting positions 
share the idea that nonheterosexual sexuality is a threat to the gender hierarchy. 
 The arguments allude to two types of threat: individual threat and group threat. 
As the name implies, individual threat occurs when a person feels that he or she is 
being personally threatened, such as the fear that economic competition will lead to 
loss of one’s job or a decline in the job’s prestige (Banton 1983; Bonacich 1972; 
Olzak 1992; Ridgeway 1997) or the concern that one’s behavior does not conform to 
prescribed gender roles (Connell 1995; Hopkins 1996; West and Zimmerman 1987) 
and may lead to harassment (Uggen and Blackstone 2004). In contrast, group threat 
occurs when someone feels that a group to which he belongs is being threatened, even 
if the individual himself will not be harmed. For instance, the fear that economic 
competition will lead to a decline in the dominant group’s status (Blalock 1957; 
Goldin 2002; Kimmel 2004) or the concern that acceptance of nontraditional types of 
masculinity (e.g., effeminate males) will cause men to lose their position of dominance 
(Hopkins 1996). 
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 Determining whether one or both threats are associated with attitudes towards 
policies legitimating LGB relationships is important for both scholarly and practical 
reasons. Any empirical assessment of theoretical models advances our understanding 
of social relations. This research goes further because it will hopefully enable not just 
theory substantiation, but hopefully also theory refinement. 
 Ascertaining if individual threat is related to policy opposition is particularly 
important. Opponents of providing LGB persons equality frequently argue that 
heterosexual marriage and society will be irrevocably harmed if same-sex couples are 
granted the same rights as opposite-sex couples (Dobson 2004; Sprigg 2004, 2006). 
Rarely do discussions of LGB equality mention how policies benefiting same-sex 
couples would have a detrimental effect on other individuals. (In other words, 
individual threat is not a common factor in these discussions.) If individual threat 
proves to be associated with opposition to LGB related policies then we will have a 
new front on which to confront opponents of LGB equality. 
 Drawing on the gender, masculinity, and sexual orientation literatures, this 
paper examines the relationship between feelings of threat and attitudes towards 
policies legitimating same-sex relationships. Numerous studies of racial prejudice 
have found an association between feelings of threat and both negative views of the 
out-group (Quillian 1995, 1996; Verberk et al. 2002) and attitudes towards policies 
promoting equality (Bobo 1988a; Smith 1981). No such assessment has been 
conducted with respect to threat and heterosexism. This paper provides such an 
assessment. The paper also goes one step further by dividing threat into its 
components of individual threat and group threat. Scholars have identified these two 
types of threat, but no empirical assessment of heterosexism has incorporated both. It 
is of both theoretical and substantive importance to examine both threats together, 
because if we examine them separately we cannot claim that one threat is relevant 
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while the other is not. This is important for understanding the factors associated with 
heterosexism. Furthermore, we must examine the threats together to determine that 
there is no relationship between them. A relationship would imply that both threats 
associated with attitudes and that the threats need to both be included in analyses to 
ensure that the results attributable to a given threat are not a function of the omitted 
threat. 
 The analysis is conducted using data from a survey of undergraduate students 
at an elite, midsized university in the Northeastern United States. Such a convenience 
sample is clearly not ideal, as it does not produce representative data. Consequently, 
this research is primarily exploratory. The analysis may, however, provide insight into 
the association between threat and LGB related policy attitudes among college 
students, because the sample structurally represents the population composition. 
Moreover, there is a precedent for research using convenience samples in the area of 
sexual orientation analyses (Davies 2004; Haddock et al. 1993; Steffens 2005; 
Wilkinson and Roys 2005).  
 For outcome measures the analysis uses attitudes towards policies legalizing 
gay marriage and providing same-sex couples equal benefits. Threat measures assess 
personal and societal implications of same-sex relationships. This approach of using 
policy attitudes as outcome measures and feelings of threat as independent measures is 
similar to that often used to examine the relationship between threat and racial 
attitudes (Bobo 1988a; Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Kluegel and Bobo 2001; Quillian 
1996). 
 The paper does three things. First, it examines if individual and group threats 
are individually associated with policy opposition. Second, it investigates the 
relationship between individual threat, group threat, and policy attitudes. Finally, the 
paper explores whether there is a relationship between individual and group threat. 
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BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 Gender and sexuality scholars have identified two key theoretical accounts of 
heterosexism. The first views same-sex sexuality in the context of gender norms, 
while the second focuses on hegemonic masculinity. These two perspectives are 
highly similar. 
 
Gender Norms 
 The gender norms argument contends that there are socially understood 
gendered norms of behavior. These norms delineate appropriate (and conversely, 
inappropriate) forms of conduct, and more importantly, differentiate men from 
women. Men have one set of rules, women another. For instance, men are “supposed” 
to be assertive and dominant, whereas women are “expected” to be meek and 
subservient (Heilman 2001). The rules provide guidance for an actor’s behavior, 
interaction with others, and sense of self. For those who adhere strictly to these gender 
roles beliefs someone else’s gender role deviation can cause confusion (Kite and 
Whitley 1998). Deviation signals a rejection of traditional gender norms and may also 
be seen as an invasion into the territory of the other gender. Traditional gender role 
supporters may feel the need to protect the “gender line” by punishing anyone who 
crosses it (Franklin 1998). For instance, women who assert themselves in the 
workplace may be punished by not receiving promotions or being labeled a bitch 
(Heilman 2001), while women who do not behave “properly” in the home may be on 
the receiving end of domestic abuse (Perry 2001). 
 LGB persons are a potentially greater threat to the gender line than 
“misbehaving” heterosexual women. The women are problematic because they try to 
overstep their bounds while still maintaining their own gender; LGB persons, in 
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contrast, may not only try to cross gender lines, but may be perceived as attempting to 
become the other gender. One of the most fundamental beliefs about the distinctions 
between men and women is that men have sex with women and women have sex with 
men. For gender line police, when a man has sex with another man, he rejects the 
“proper” male role and becomes “feminized” – neither a “real” man, nor a woman 
(Connell 1995; Hopkins 1996). He is a traitor to his gender (Hopkins 1996). In sum, 
same-sex sexuality threatens not only the existence of the gender line, but also the 
meaning of gender. 
 An alternative explanation relates to the need some men feel to actively prove 
their manhood (Kimmel 1996) when an actor believes that he does not sufficiently 
embody appropriate gender roles, he may express negative opinions about LGB 
persons (Franklin 1998; Herek 1992a, 2000, 2002). By denigrating LGB persons he 
reinforces his own adherence to traditional gendered behavior by announcing “I am 
not like them, I am a real man” (Herek 1986, 1992a; Kimmel 1996; Perry 2001). This 
argument is particularly applicable to men, because men’s gender roles are more rigid 
than women’s (Kite and Whitley 1998). 
 
Masculinity Arguments 
 Masculinity arguments build on the idea of the gender line by stressing the 
importance of the hierarchical relationship between the genders. Men are in the 
dominant position; women are in the subordinate one. According to this logic, 
although men are believed to be inherently superior to women, not all men are equal – 
those who embody the ideals of masculinity are superior to those who do not. This 
system of male power and privilege, what Connell (1987) terms “hegemonic 
masculinity,” is fragile and requires constant protecting (Hopkins 1996); if the system 
topples, men risk losing their long held privileges. 
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 Heterosexuality is one of the core components of the current version of 
hegemonic masculinity, just as it is for the gender norms argument. Gay men threaten 
to undermine the system of hegemonic masculinity by offering an alternative approach 
to masculinity that does not conform to the hegemonic ideal. Specifically, 
“homosexuality threatens the credibility of a naturalized ideology of gender and a 
dichotomized sexual world” (Connell 1987, p. 248). The very existence of 
nonhegemonic masculinities is problematic because they imply a wider range of male 
behavior than the hegemonic ideal allows and less distinction between men and 
women, or even worse, some overlap of the two (Perry 2001).  
 Acceptance of nonhegemonic masculinity is awkward for some heterosexual 
men for two reasons. First, they may be mistakenly identified as gay, thereby losing 
the privileges inherent in their status as heterosexual men (Kimmel 1996). Second, 
gender overlap would mean that some women are superior to some men, and it is 
therefore possible that a heterosexual man currently at the top of the gender hierarchy 
could be surpassed by a woman. Put differently, if men are at the top of the hierarchy 
and women are at the bottom with no overlap between the two, then even if a man is at 
the very bottom of the men’s hierarchy he will still be superior to all women. But, if 
there is an overlap of the hierarchical boundaries, then it is theoretically possible for a 
man to be below a woman. It also allows for the possibility that gender boundaries 
will blur to such an extent that a man could fall to the absolute bottom and be superior 
to no one or, worse yet, the groups could switch positions and women could be at the 
top of the hierarchy and men at the bottom. 
 There is another and possibly more fundamental problem with same-sex 
sexuality under the hegemonic masculinity thesis, that of gay men “choosing” to 
renounce their “natural” socially dominant position (Hopkins 1996). Because the 
current system of hegemonic masculinity assumes heterosexuality, anyone who lives 
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as a gay man essentially abdicates his position of power. The troubling question for 
proponents of hegemonic masculinity is why would anyone do this? One logical 
answer is that “life on the other side” is preferable (i.e., women have it better than 
men); another is that the gender hierarchy is a myth. Neither presents a positive 
assessment of hegemonic masculinity. 
 
Threat 
 These arguments imply two types of threat. First is a threat to the groups that 
will be harmed by a change in the gender structure (e.g., heterosexual men and women 
who support traditional gender roles). Second is a threat to an individual, where the 
individual faces personal harm. This latter instance includes young men who fear 
ridicule or worse if they are not perceived as appropriately masculine; while the 
former includes men fearful of hegemonic masculinity’s collapse, even if their own 
status would remain unchanged. Although the connection between threat and sexuality 
is apparent in these arguments, it has yet to be examined empirically. 
 
Hypotheses 
 The identification of threat as a factor associated with negative views of sexual 
minorities raises important theoretical and substantive issues. First, although the 
models utilize individual and group threat they are not always precise about 
delineating the circumstances under which each threat is relevant. This lack of 
specificity leads to the second problem of whether both threats may be applicable 
simultaneously. These issues are important because in order to effectively combat 
heterosexism we must first know the factors with which it is associated. Very different 
strategies are needed if people oppose legalizing gay marriage because they fear some 
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harm to themselves versus if their opposition stems from fear of harm to heterosexuals 
in general. 
 There are thus four relevant hypotheses: 
 H1: Feelings of individual threat alone are associated with negative views 
of LGB persons. 
 H2: Feelings of group threat alone are associated with negative views of 
LGB persons. 
 H3: Both individual and group threats are associated with attitudes towards 
LGB persons. 
 H4: Neither individual threat nor group threat are associated with attitudes 
towards LGB persons. 
 For hypothesis 1 to be true, there must be an association between personal 
threat and attitudes towards LGB persons, but no relationship between group threat 
and attitudes. If this is the case, then the most obvious implication is that individuals 
are paramount and focus on themselves to the exclusion of their group. This would 
mean that people have no desire to preserve the system of hegemonic masculinity (or 
the system does not exist). Similarly, the gender line would be either meaningless or 
nonexistent. Neither set of scenarios seems likely given the results of prior research. 
 Evidence for hypothesis 2, in contrast, would indicate that actors put group 
welfare before personal well-being, to the extent that personal well-being is irrelevant. 
It is hard to imagine that many people are sufficiently group-centric so as to entirely 
ignore detrimental personal outcomes. 
 The third hypothesis that both individual threat and group threat are associated 
with attitudes towards LGB related policies is best predicted by the theoretical 
arguments. Here, people’s opinions would be associated with not only what is best for 
them, but also with what benefits their group as a whole. 
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 Hypothesis 4 would occur if the theoretical arguments are wrong and there is 
no association between either threat and attitudes towards sexual minorities. This 
seems unlikely. 
 
METHOD 
Survey Instrument 
 The investigator developed a survey instrument to assess attitudes towards 
LGB persons (Appendix A). Questions were drawn from pre-existing surveys 
whenever possible. The survey was pretested with members of the survey population 
and adjusted accordingly. The instrument was retested after each set of modifications. 
No change was made when it might have impacted comparability with earlier studies. 
The survey took approximately ten minutes to complete. 
 
Recruitment and Sample 
 The survey was open to all undergraduates eighteen years old and older at a 
midsized university in the Northeastern U.S. The age restriction reduced the pool of 
eligible students, particularly freshman, but was necessary to ensure all participants 
were of legal age. It is unclear how many people wished to take the survey but stopped 
after learning of the age requirement, although first year students are underrepresented 
(see table 4.1). 
 Survey participants were recruited in two ways. First, posters advertising the 
study were distributed in academic and social buildings around campus (Append ix B). 
No posters were hung in dormitories. The poster informed students that they could 
receive a free drink from a local coffee shop by completing a brief sociology survey. 
The poster also contained the URL for accessing the survey and contact information 
for the lead investigator. The posters alone did not generate a strong response and the
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Table 4.1. Sample Composition vs. University Composition 2006 
 Sample University 
 (N=278) (N=13,562) 
Sex   
Male (%) 38.48 50.9 
Female  (%) 61.51 49.1 
Year in school    
Freshman (%) 7.19 23.9 
Sophomore (%) 18.35 24.6 
Junior (%) 29.50 24.4 
Senior (%) 43.17 26.8 
Other (%) 1.80 <0.01 
College†   
Arts and Sciences (%) 26.62 31.45 
Human Ecology (%) 5.76 8.89 
Engineering (%) 30.22 19.83 
Other (%) 37.39 39.82 
Race   
White (%) 63.24 53.2 
Black (%) 2.57 5.0 
Asian (%) 26.84 16.1 
Latino (%) 1.84 5.5 
Multiracial (%) 5.15 3.5 
Other/unknown (%) 0.37 16.2 
Regional origin   
Mid Atlantic (%) 18.35 19.6 
Midwest (%) 7.20 7.0 
New England (%) 9.71 10.1 
New York (%) 31.29 35.4 
Southeast (%) 8.27 6.5 
Southwest (%) 4.32 2.7 
West (%) 11.51 10.5 
Other (%) 9.35 8.2 
Political conservatism (mean) †, †† 3.22 2.60 
Note: Whenever possible institutional data are from 2006. Non-2006 data are noted. 
†Data are from 2005 
†† Institutional data on a 5 point scale. Survey data converted to a 5 point scale for comparability 
Source: Cornell University 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d  
 
response was particularly weak for certain subpopulations (e.g., younger students and 
blacks). To increase the sample size, e-mails were sent to the heads of virtually all 
student organizations on campus. (Graduate student organizations were excluded.) The 
e-mail asked the organization leaders to distribute an e-mail advertising the study to 
their group members. The message contained the same information as the poster. No 
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information is available on the rate at which organization leaders distributed the 
message. 
 The resulting sample is neither unbiased nor representative of the student body. 
The first recruitment method could theoretically have produced an unbiased 
representative sample (although it would have been unlikely), because any student on 
campus could have seen a poster. The e-mail approach is unlikely to have resulted in 
an unbiased representative sample, because e-mail recipients are self-selected into 
clubs and club leaders decided whether or not to distribute the message. 
 The absence of an unbiased representative sample is less than ideal and it 
severely limits what can be concluded from the analysis. As a result, the research 
primarily explores the possible relationship between threat and anti-LGB policy 
attitudes among college students. The sample composition is structurally similar to 
that of the undergraduate student body at this institution (table 4.1). There is an 
oversample of women, older students, and engineers, but neither year nor enrollment 
in the engineering program had any impact on the results. Asians also appear to be 
overrepresented; however the university classifies many of these students as “other” as 
they are foreign nationals. As with academic program and year in school, there are no 
statistically significant racial differences. Gender is the only one of these measures 
that proves significant. 
 
Survey Administration 
 The survey was administered electronically using a commercially available 
web survey product. This web tool allowed participants to access the survey at their 
convenience (both time and location) and in large numbers. It did, however, have 
some drawbacks. The product does not permit randomization of question order and it 
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cannot produce unique codes during the survey process (each survey is given a unique 
identification number, but this number is only available to the researcher). 
 Participants accessed the survey through an address (URL) provided in the 
recruitment materials. Upon entering the survey respondents were given a standard 
consent form indicating that they understood the nature of the survey, were at least 18 
years old, and agreed to participate in the study. Following the consent page was a set 
of screener questions verifying a respondent’s status as undergraduate student at the 
institution and at least 18 years old. 
 At the end of the survey respondents were asked to enter a code which they 
used to obtain a certificate for a free drink.18 The code consisted of information from a 
respondent’s student id (first letter of their first name, last letter of their last name, and 
last three digits of their student id number), as well as some unverifiable information 
(day of birth and first letter of place of birth). This information produced unique codes 
that could not be used to identify the respondent without already knowing the relevant 
information. 
 The code was necessary for three reasons. First, respondents needed a unique 
number to prove they had participated in the survey and were eligible for the 
incentive. Since the survey tool did not have the capability of generating unique codes, 
respondents needed to enter them. Second, being able to compare a code to a student 
id ensured that no one received multiple incentives (because there was only one code 
per id). Finally, the code helped eliminate replication (i.e., a person who took the 
survey multiple times), both because they could only receive one incentive and 
because the code enabled identification of multiple surveys by the same person 
(assuming they entered the code twice). 
                                                 
18 The person distributing the certificates had no contact with the survey data. 
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 The code was designed such that a respondent’s identity could not be 
determined from the code. However, it is possible that some participants were not 
comfortable providing this information. 53 respondents completed the survey, but did 
not enter a code or entered an obviously invalid code (e.g., “bleah”).  
 
DATA 
Data Cleaning 
 Over the course of three months, 483 people attempted to take the survey. Of 
these, three people did not consent to participate and another 59 did not complete or 
did not satisfy the sample criteria (undergraduate at institution and at least 18 years 
old). An additional case is excluded because the respondent attempted to take the 
survey twice (the first survey is included, the duplicate is dropped). Also excluded are 
cases where respondents failed to complete the survey (N = 35). Analysis is further 
restricted to people answering all of the relevant questions (i.e., listwise deletion) and 
identifying as primarily heterosexual (1 or 2 “on a scale from one to ten, where one is 
heterosexual or straight and ten is gay or lesbian”). This was done so that results gauge 
reactions of the dominant group towards the subordinate group. Also excluded are 
those who entered an invalid code (N = 7). These individuals are omitted out of 
concern that they did not take the survey seriously and thus their answers could not be 
trusted. Their omission has no substantive impact on the results. The resulting sample 
size is 278. 
 
Policy Questions (Outcome Variables) 
 Two policy measures are included in the analysis. The first outcome measure 
asks about support for “gay marriage” while the second asks about providing same-sex 
couples with the same job benefits given to married couples. The job benefits question 
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is likely to receive greater support, because it does not include the idea of gay 
marriage. These two subjects were selected because the debate over the status of 
same-sex couples has received regular media attention with various court cases and 
legal battles attempting to ensure that marriage is restricted to heterosexual unions. 
Consequently this is a familiar topic for many people. 
 The question about legalizing gay marriage was based on a similar question in 
the GSS.19 However, the GSS asks about homosexual couples. The phrase “people of 
the same sex” was used to avoid any stigma associated with the word homosexual 
(Committee on Lesbian and Gay Concerns 1991). The marriage question says, “Please 
indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement ‘people of the same sex 
should have the right to marry.’” Responses are on a five point scale ranging from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree with neither agree nor disagree as the midpoint. 
Responses were reverse coded so that higher values indicate greater policy support. 
The mean of 3.85 indicates that respondents tend to be supportive of legalizing same-
sex marriage (see table 4.2). 
 The job benefits question is drawn from Herek (2002) and asks respondents 
“Do you favor or oppose same-sex couples getting the same job benefits as are now 
given to married couples, such as insurance and pension benefits?” Responses are on a 
four point scale ranging from strongly favor to strongly oppose. This question wording 
was adopted for two reasons. First, the question implies that same-sex relationships 
are marriage- like without actually being marriages. This allows leeway for 
respondents who want to support same-sex relationships, but not same-sex marriages. 
Second, the question avoids the term “civil unions,” which although it may be the best 
way to describe these relationships, may not be fully understood by respondents. As 
                                                 
19 The text of the GSS question is “Do you agree or disagree that homosexual couples should have the 
right to marry one another.” 
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with the legalizing gay marriage measure, the responses were reverse coded so higher 
values indicate greater policy support. Additionally, the disagree and strongly disagree 
categories were collapsed to increase cell size. The resulting measure has a mean of 
1.65 with a standard deviation of .72 (see table 4.2). 
 Both questions gauge reactions to legal recognition of same-sex couples. 
People who support a gender hierarchy or adhere to a traditional gender ideology are 
likely to find both scenarios disturbing. The problem is that the policies reward people 
who violate “appropriate” gendered behavior. 
 The policy legalizing gay marriage is likely to generate stronger negative 
responses than the policy providing job benefits. First, same-sex marriage defies not 
only the traditional gender roles of men and women, but also the gendered roles of 
husband and wife. If a couple is of the same sex, who is the husband? Who is the 
wife? It brings into question the very meaning of marriage, because how can there be a 
marriage without either a husband or a wife? Nonmarital same-sex partnerships do not 
have this issue. Second, marriage is as much a religious institution as it is a secular 
one. So people whose religious doctrines oppose same-sex sexuality are likely to 
oppose same-sex marriage because it violates their religious beliefs. Finally, legalizing 
gay marriage implies that same-sex relationships are equivalent to opposite-sex 
relationships, something that religious conservatives harshly deny (Catholic Answers 
2004; Sprigg 2006). Providing same-sex couples with job benefits should be easier for  
many people to accept, because while it affords same-sex couples legal recognition, it 
does not elevate their relationships to the same status as opposite-sex couples 
(McLeod and Crawford 1998). 
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Table 4.2. Sample Descriptive Statistics  
 Total (N=278) 
Legalize gay marriage (mean) 3.85 (1.31) 
Strongly agree (%) 43.17  
Agree (%) 25.90  
Neither (%) 11.87  
Disagree (%) 10.79  
Strongly disagree (%) 8.27  
Job benefits (mean) 1.65 (0.72) 
Strongly agree (%) 49.28  
Agree (%) 36.33  
Disagree & strongly disagree (%) 14.39  
Individual Threat (mean) 2.03 (0.61) 
Unlikely (%) 16.91  
None (%) 62.95  
Likely (%) 20.15  
Group Threat (mean) 1.90 (0.92) 
Strongly disagree (%) 41.37  
Disagree (%) 33.45  
Agree (%) 19.06  
Strongly agree (%) 6.12  
Feelings for gay brother (mean) 2.23 (1.15) 
Support (%) 71.22  
Neither (%) 13.31  
Oppose (%) 15.47  
Political conservatism (mean) 3.22 (1.39) 
Attitude scale (mean) 14.48 (1.76) 
Sex   
Male (%) 38.48  
Female (%) 61.51  
Age (mean) 20.36 (1.29) 
Year in school (mean) 3.15 (1.00) 
College – Human Ecology (%) 5.76  
Living arrangements   
Alone (%) 14.39  
Parents, spouse, or partner (%) 1.08  
Boyfriend/girlfriend (%) 2.52  
Roommate (%) 82.01  
Religion   
Protestant (%) 20.14  
Catholic (%) 15.47  
Jewish (%) 11.87  
Other (%) 15.11  
None (%) 37.41  
Religious attendance   
Never (%) 24.82  
Rarely (%) 33.09  
Sometimes (%) 21.58  
Often (%) 10.07  
Weekly (%) 10.43  
Legitimate code (%) 19.08  
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
  95 
 National and Collegiate Support for LGB Civil Rights. One downside of using 
a convenience sample is that the sample is rarely comparable to the general 
population. This is clearly true here, as the sample is restricted to college students. 
Based on student characteristics and findings from previous research, it is reasonable 
to expect this sample to be more accepting of sexual minorities than the population at 
large. To assess this prediction table 4.3 compares responses to the questions from this 
study about legalizing gay marriage and providing job benefits to responses from 
several institutional and national surveys and of both college students and the general 
public. 
 The students in this sample are highly similar to freshman entering the 
university in 2003 and 2004 with regards to their level of support for legalizing gay 
marriage.20 The students at this institution are more supportive than students nationally 
of legalizing gay marriage, but students in general are more pro gay marriage than the 
general population. 
 Less than one third of people nationally support legalizing marriage for same-
sex couples, in contrast to over two thirds of the students from this analysis. When job 
benefits and civil unions are considered, almost 90% of students support legal 
recognition of same-sex couples, as compared to 50 to 60% of the general population. 
This supports the assumption that the student sample is more accepting of sexual 
minorities than the population as a whole. 
 
Independent Variables 
 Threat. The threat measures examine the impact of same-sex partnerships on 
social institutions and the respondent’s life. The individual threat measure considers 
how the respondent would feel about a hypothetical brother’s gay relationship, while 
                                                 
20 Unfortunately there surveys for students entering in 2005 and 2006 are not yet available. 
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Table 4.3. Support for LGB Civil Rights  
  College Students  General Population 
 
Current 
analysis† This university National 
 
Newsweek 
Fox News/ 
Opinions Dynamics 
CBS/New 
York Times Newsweek 
 10/06-1/07, 
N=356 
2003 
Freshman 
2004 
Freshman 
2006 
Freshman 
2005 
Freshman 
 3/07 
N=1,001 
11/06 
N=900 likely voters 
10/06 
N=1,084 
10/06 
N=1,002 
Marriage 69% 75% 73% 61% 58%  26% 30% 28% 24% 
Civil unions/ Legal 
partnerships 
      24% 30% 29% 26% 
Job benefits 18%          
† People who support legalizing gay marriage agree or strongly agree that same-sex couples should be able to marry. People who support job benefits are 
restricted to those who favor or strongly favor providing job benefits job benefits to same-sex couples, but do not support legalizing gay marriage. 
 
University, National survey of freshman,  2003 and 2004: “Same -sex couples should have the right to legal marital status” 
Newsweek, 3/07 and 10/06: "There has been much talk recently about whether gays and lesbians should have the legal right to marry someone of the same 
sex. Which of the following comes closest to your position on this issue? Do you support FULL marriage rights for same-sex couples, support civil unions or 
partnerships for same-sex couples BUT NOT full marriage rights, or do you oppose ANY legal recognition for same -sex couples?" 
FOX News/Opinion Dynamics Poll, 11/06: "Do you believe gays and lesbians should be allowed to get legally married, allowed a legal partnership similar 
to but not called marriage, or should there be no legal recognition given to gay and lesbian relationships?" 
CBS News/New York Times Poll, 10/06: "There has been much talk recently about whether gays and lesbians should have the legal right to marry someone 
of the same sex. Which of the following comes closest to your position on this issue? Do you support FULL marriage rights for gay and lesbian couples; do 
you support gay civil unions or partnerships, BUT NOT gay marriage; or, do you oppose ANY legal recognition for gay and lesbian couples?" 
Source: Cornell University 2003, 2004; Pryor 2006; PollingReport.com, 2007 
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the group threat measure explores how legalizing same-sex marriage would impact the 
“American family.” The advantage of considering a sibling relationship versus a 
different relationship is that it may be harder to avoid contact or sever the relationship 
than a nonblood tie. This means that that the announcement is likely to have a greater 
impact than it would for a more easily dissolved relationship. A brother was chosen as 
the kinship tie, because gay men have often been found to elicit stronger negative 
reactions than lesbians (Herek 2002). 
 The individual threat question gauges how a committed same-sex relationship 
might impact the respondent’s own life. The question says, “It is the end of November 
and you gather with the rest of your family for Thanksgiving dinner. Your older 
brother Sam, with whom you are very close, has brought home a male friend Mike. 
While everyone is seated around the table, Sam announces that he and Mike are in 
love and plan to spend their lives together and raise a family. When you think of 
Sam’s announcement, what impact do you think it would have on your relationship 
with him?”21 Question responses are on a five point scale ranging from very positive 
impact to very negative impact, with no change as the midpoint. The response 
categories were collapsed into threat unlikely (“very positive” or “positive” – 17%), 
no threat (“no change” – 63%), and threat likely (“negative” or “very negative” – 
20%). 
 The aim of the group threat measure is to determine if respondents believe that 
legalizing same-sex marriage will have a detrimental impact on the “American 
family.” Since marriage is an institution open only to mixed-sex couples, legalizing 
gay marriage would fundamentally alter the “traditional” family structure. If 
respondents believe that legalizing gay marriage would harm the “American family” 
                                                 
21 The ideal question would ask how legalizing gay marriage would impact the respondent’s marriage; 
however, given that the sample consists of college students, this question is clearly inappropriate. 
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then their group (heterosexuals) faces potential harm, even if they themselves never 
marry or personally experience the consequences. The group threat question asks 
respondents whether they agree or disagree that “a llowing gay and lesbian couples to 
legally marry would undermine the traditional American family.” Responses are on a 
four point scale, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. A quarter of 
respondents believe that legalizing gay marriage will hurt the American family. The 
wording for this question is drawn from a survey conducted by the Pew Forum for 
Religion and Public Life (2003). This is one of the few existing questions that directly 
assess a group threat and builds on ideas expressed by religious conservatives about 
the negative consequences of legalizing gay marriage (Dobson 2004; Sprigg 2006). 
 The measures are coded so that higher values indicate a stronger negative 
reaction. There are moderate to strong correlations between feelings of threat and 
opinions about legalizing gay marriage (r = -.55 and r = -.69 for individual threat and 
group threat respectively). The correlations are weaker for the threats and providing 
same-sex couples with job benefits (r = -.48 and r = -.59 for individual threat and 
group threat respectively). Both threat measures are converted into dummy variables, 
for the analysis, with one dummy for each level of threat. 
 
 Background Controls. A wide variety of background and social controls were 
considered. Only those significant are included in the analysis. The measures included 
are: the respondent’s reaction to the brother’s announcement, gender, age, year in 
school, academic program, political conservatism, religious affiliation, religious 
attendance, and opinions of LGB persons (table 4.2). 
 To control for the possibility that the individual threat measure is gauging 
respondent’s initial reactions to Sam’s (the brother) announcement and not the impact 
it will have on the respondent’s relationship with Sam, a measure is included that 
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assesses reactions to Sam’s announcement that he is in love with a man. This question 
preceded the individual threat question in the questionnaire, so there is no concern that 
respondents incorrectly interpreted the individual threat question. The question asks: 
“How do you feel about Sam’s relationship? Do you … strongly support, support, 
neither support nor oppose, oppose, strongly oppose.” 
 Gender is controlled for to account for attitudinal differences (Hinrichs and 
Rosenberg 2002; Kite and Whitley 1996). Women are coded 1, men 0. Women 
comprise 62% of the sample. 
 Age is measured continuously from 18 to 24, with respondents older than 24 
coded as 24. Contrary to what one might guess, age is correlated with neither 
individual nor group threats. Age2 was considered but found to be not significant. 
 Political views are on a seven point scale from extremely liberal (1) to 
extremely conservative (7). The mean is 3.22, indicating that the respondents are 
somewhat more liberal than conservative. Political conservatism generally 
corresponds with negative views of sexual minorities and opposition to LGB civil 
rights (Sherrod and Nardi 1998; Strand 1998). Initial indications are that this also 
occurs here, as political conservatism is correlated with opinions about legalizing gay 
marriage (r = -.57). Political conservatism and the two threats are also correlated (r = 
.40 and r = .57 for individual threat and group threat, respectively).  
 Religious affiliation and religious attendance are often found to be associated 
with policy attitudes and negative views of LGB persons (Sherrod and Nardi 1998; 
Simon 1998; Thornton et al. 1983). Five religious categories are considered: Protestant 
(20%), Catholic (15%), Jewish (12%), other (15%), and none (37%). Unfortunately, 
there is not enough detail available to follow Steensland et al. (2000), and subdivide 
Protestants into mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants and Black Protestants. As 
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it is, religious affiliation only matters for people who are Jewish or who have no 
religion. 
 Religious attendance is how frequently the respondent attends religious 
services. Responses range from never attend (25%) to attend weekly (10%). People 
who attend often (a few times a month) are the only ones who differ significantly from 
those who never attend religious services. 
 We must also control for opinions about sexual minorities to ensure that the 
threat measures do not inadvertently capture the effects of antigay prejudice. A scale 
measure was created consisting of six questions about reactions towards sexual 
minorities. The six measures and their factor loadings are listed in Appendix C. All the 
measures are on a four point scale and were reverse coded as necessary to ensure that 
lower values indicate more positive views of LGB persons. The scale ranges from 11 
to 19 with a mean of 14.78 and a standard deviation of 1.76. The scale has an alpha of 
.85, indicating high internal consistency.  
 The final control is whether the respondent entered a valid code. This measure 
is included to ensure that differences based on motivation for study participation do 
not impact the results. 
 
 Controls Considered. A variety of additional controls were considered, but 
excluded from the analysis due to lack of significance. These measures include 
sexuality, the number of LGB students the respondent knows, membership in a 
fraternity or sorority, participation on an athletic team (inter- and intramural), race, 
parents’ education, region of residence, and if the respondent picked up the incentive. 
 Members of the Greek system are sometimes thought to be more heterosexist 
than non-Greeks, in part because of the group bonding that occurs in these 
organizations. However, Hinrichs and Rosenberg (2002) found that it was not 
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individual student’s Greek affiliation that mattered, but whether there were fraternities 
and sororities at the school. Since this study was conducted at a single institution, 
there is no way to assess the school-wide impact of having a Greek system on campus. 
Instead, individual membership is considered. Respondents are coded as one if they 
are a member or pledge of a fraternity or sorority, zero otherwise. About one fifth of 
respondents are members of the Greek system. 
 Participation on an athletic team may also influence attitudes on sexual 
minority related policies, as “organized sports are a highly homophobic institution” 
(Anderson 2002, p. 860). Two types of athletic involvement are considered: 
intercollegiate and intramural. About one fifth of these students compete in 
intercollegiate sports, while about 17% play on intramural teams. 
 Race also appears to be associated with attitudes towards LGB persons (Herek 
and Capitanio 1999; Sherrod and Nardi 1998). The sample is 63% white, 27% Asian, 
5% multiracial, 3% black, and 2% Latino. No racial differences in the analysis are 
statistically significant, although this may be due to small sample sizes. 
 Parents’ education is included as a proxy for socioeconomic status (Sewell, 
Haller, and Portes 2001). The respondents are students so it is inappropriate to use 
their income or education. Students were not asked about their parents’ income, 
because of difficulties in estimation and lack of knowledge. Education was measured 
categorically, with the categories recoded to represent years (e.g., less than high 
school is coded as 8, high school graduate is coded as 12, etc.). The average education 
for both parents is some graduate education. 
 Southerners are more likely than others to adhere to conservative viewpoints 
(Quillian 1996; Sears et al. 1997; Smith 1981; Stouffer 1955), but in some instances 
living in the Midwest may have an even greater impact (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). 
Region is divided into the five categories of South, Midwest, Northeast, other U.S., 
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and outside the U.S. Region of residence was examined at four time points: birth, age 
five, age ten, and age fifteen. It was not significant. 
 The final measure considered was if eligible respondents claimed their 
incentive (1 if they did, 0 otherwise). Of the 262 respondents who entered an eligible 
code (94%), only 50 (19%) picked up their incentive. Surprisingly, this had no impact 
on results. 
 
Method 
 The models are run with ordered logistic regressions, because of the 
categorical nature of the outcome measures. The analyses are restricted to respondents 
answering all of the relevant questions. The response rate is at least 98% or greater for 
the included measures and the sample size is 278. 
 
RESULTS 
Marriage 
 Table 4.4 presents order logits results for attitudes towards legalizing gay 
marriage. Model 1 is the baseline model with all control measures, but no threat 
measures; model 2 incorporates individual threat measures; model 3 is the same as 
model 2 except that the individual threat measures are replaced by group threat 
measures; and model 4 includes both individual and group threat measures. 
 Individual threat and group threat are each associated with attitudes towards 
legalizing gay marriage, when included in the models individually (models 2 and 3, 
respectively) and together (model 4). Someone who feels a strong group threat (the 
reference category) is more likely to oppose gay marriage than someone who feels less 
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Table 4.4. Odds from Ordered Logistic Regression of Opposition to Legalizing Gay 
Marriage (N = 278) 
 1 2 3 4 
Threats         
Individual 
Threat 
  
  
  
  
Unlikely 
(pos.) 
  
5.87** (3.15)   4.36** (2.40) 
No opinion   2.48* (0.97)   1.88 (0.76) 
Group Threat         
Strongly 
disagree 
  
  53.46*** (41.95) 45.33*** (36.35) 
Disagree     15.75*** (11.63) 13.99*** (10.56) 
Agree     8.65** (6.00) 7.20** (5.07) 
Controls         
Anti-LGB 0.67*** (0.06) 0.67*** (0.06) 0.76** (0.07) 0.75** (0.07) 
Brother support  19.59*** (7.82) 10.28*** (4.71) 11.61*** (4.96) 7.29*** (3.52) 
Brother no 
opinion  3.92** (1.75) 2.74* (1.30) 3.30* (1.53) 2.68* (1.30) 
Politically 
conservative 0.54*** (0.06) 0.57*** (0.06) 0.64*** (0.08) 0.68** (0.08) 
Female 1.72 (0.49) 1.74 (0.50) 1.90* (0.55) 1.88* (0.55) 
Jewish 4.14** (1.89) 4.17** (1.90) 4.40** (2.08) 4.49** (2.12) 
No religion 3.40*** (1.06) 3.81*** (1.22) 3.09*** (0.99) 3.40*** (1.11) 
Human 
Ecology 6.54** (4.71) 6.06* (4.39) 8.20** (6.30) 7.76** (6.01) 
Live alone 0.33** (0.12) 0.34** (0.12) 0.33** (0.12) 0.34** (0.13) 
Valid code 3.42* (1.80) 3.61* (1.89) 2.97* (1.57) 3.20* (1.71) 
Cuts†         
sa vs. a, n, d, sd -7.87 (1.47) -7.44 (1.49) -3.53 (1.68) -3.33 (1.70) 
sa a vs. n, d, sd -6.22 (1.45) -5.72 (1.47) -1.55 (1.71) -1.31 (1.72) 
sa, a, n, vs. d, 
sd -4.92 (1.44) -4.39 (1.45) -0.14 (1.70) 0.11 (1.72) 
sa, a, n vs. d, sd -2.65 (1.40) -2.06 (1.42) 2.27 (1.68) 2.59 (1.70) 
Log likelihood -265.33  -259.64  -248.28  -244.56  
Df 10  12  13  15  
Pseudo R2 0.32  0.34  0.37  0.38  
BIC -955  -955  -972  -968  
Notes: Values less than 1 indicate support for legalizing gay marriage, values greater than 1 indicate 
opposition. Comparison groups are other religion; attend religious services less than weekly; and live 
with someone other than parents, spouse, or partner.  
†sa = strongly agree, a = agree, n = neither, d = disagree, sd = strongly disagree 
* p < .05       
** p < .01       
*** p < .001       
 
of a threat. In fact, group threat is one of the strongest factors associated with 
opposition to legalizing gay marriage. People feeling personally threatened are also 
more likely to oppose legalizing gay marriage. When individual threat and group 
threat are included in the same model (model 4) almost all of the threat measures 
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retain the same significance as when they are alone in the models. This provides 
support for hypothesis 3 that both individual threat and group threat are associated 
with attitudes towards legalizing gay marriage. 
 After controlling for threat, political conservatism and negative views of LGB 
persons are associated with opposition to legalizing gay marriage, while holding 
positive views of a brother’s same-sex relationship is one of the strongest non-threat 
indicators of support for legalizing gay marriage. Being female, Jewish, no religion, or 
studying human ecology are all associated with greater support for legalizing gay 
marriage. Those who live alone are less supportive of legalizing gay marriage. 
 Comparison of BIC scores leads to a slightly different conclusion than that 
deduced from the coefficients. For hypothesis 3 to be supported, we would expect the 
smallest BIC to be the one for model 4. Instead, the smallest BIC is -972 (13 df) for 
model 3. This indicates that the model with group threat alone fits the data better than 
the other three models. Also, the baseline model is better than the individual threat 
model, since the BIC is equivalent and the baseline model has fewer degrees of 
freedom. Finally, although the model with both threats is an improvement over the 
baseline and individual threat models, it is not an improvement over the group threat 
model. This leads to the conclusion that group threat is the only threat associated with 
attitudes towards legalizing gay marriage.  
 The results do not provide a strong indication of a relationship between the 
threats. The threat odds decline slightly from the single threat model to the dual threat 
model. However, there is no concurrent decline in the significance of these measures, 
except for one level of individual threat significance going from weakly significant to 
not significant. There is also no significant interaction between the two threats. 
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Job Benefits 
 Table 4.5 presents results for attitudes towards providing same-sex couples 
with job benefits. The models are the same as for gay marriage, with model 1 the 
baseline model, model 2 the baseline model with individual threat, model 3 the 
baseline model with group threat, and model 4 the baseline model with both threats. 
 
Table 4.5. Logits from Ordered Logistic Regression of Opposition to Providing Job 
Benefits (N = 278)  
 1 2 3 4 
Threats         
Individual threat         
Unlikely    3.86* (2.25)   2.86 (1.69) 
No opinion   1.93 (0.84)   1.45 (0.65) 
Group threat         
Strongly 
disagree 
  
  16.53*** (12.61) 14.27** 
(11.0
4) 
Disagree     10.20** (7.30) 9.50** (6.90) 
Agree     7.56** (4.88) 6.8** (4.44) 
Controls         
Anti-LGB 0.67*** (0.06) 0.67*** (0.06) 0.70*** (0.06) 0.70*** (0.06) 
Brother support  13.60*** (6.04) 8.65*** (4.39) 7.87*** (3.74) 6.10** (3.20) 
Brother no 
opinion 3.39* (1.64) 2.64 (1.37) 2.33 (1.15) 2.07 (1.08) 
Politically 
conservative 0.57*** (0.06) 0.60*** (0.07) 0.65** (0.08) 0.68** (0.08) 
Age 0.80* (0.08) 0.78* (0.08) 0.78* (0.08) 0.77* (0.08) 
Attend often 0.23** (0.11) 0.23** (0.11) 0.24** (0.12) 0.24** (0.12) 
Attend rare 0.57 (0.21) 0.54 (0.21) 0.52 (0.20) 0.49 (0.19) 
Attend some 0.51 (0.21) 0.48 (0.20) 0.50 (0.21) 0.48 (0.20) 
Attend weekly 0.31* (0.16) 0.34* (0.18) 0.31* (0.16) 0.33* (0.17) 
Dual degree 0.01* (0.01) 0.01* (0.02) 0.00* (0.01) 0.00* (0.01) 
Cuts†         
sa vs. a, d, sd -15.77 (2.67) -15.74 (2.69) -13.41 (2.73) -13.59 (2.76) 
sa & a vs. d, sd -13.96 (2.64) -13.91 (2.66) -11.21 (2.72) -11.38 (2.75) 
sa, a, d, vs. sd -10.62 (2.56) -10.53 (2.59) -7.83 (2.66) -7.98 (2.68) 
Log likelihood -208.59  -205.81  -201.36  -199.55  
Df 10  12  13  15  
Pseudo R2 0.31  0.32  0.33  .34  
BIC -1074  -1068  -1071  -1064  
Notes: Values less than 1 indicate support for providing same-sex couples with job benefits, values 
greater than 1 indicate opposition. Comparison groups are male, attend religious services not more than 
sometimes, college is other than human ecology or dual degree program. 
†sa = strongly agree, a = agree, d = disagree, sd = strongly disagree 
* p < .05       
** p < .01       
*** p < .001       
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 The key result is that group threat alone is associated with support for 
providing job benefits when both threats are considered simultaneously (model 4), but 
individual threat is significant when it is the only threat in the model (model 2). These 
findings provide support for hypothesis 2 that group threat alone is associated with 
negative views of sexual minorities. 
 Comparison of fit statistics, however, suggests a somewhat different story. The 
baseline model has the smallest BIC of the four models. This indicates that while the 
threat measures are significant the model that best fits the data, and therefore provides 
the most explanatory power, is the model without either threat (model 1). In other 
words, this evidence supports hypothesis 4 that neither threat is associated with 
attitudes towards LGB persons. 
 As with the marriage analysis, there is some evidence of a relationship between 
individual threat and group threat. The significance of individual threat when it is 
alone (model 2) and its when coupled with group threat (model 4) suggest that 
individual threat might be acting as a proxy for group threat, when group threat is 
excluded from the analysis. However, as with the marriage analysis, there is no 
indication of an interaction between individual and group threat. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Results from the models and comparisons of the fits statistics provide 
conflicting information, as do the analyses themselves. The marriage analysis suggests 
that both individual and group threats are associated with opposition to legalizing gay 
marriage, while the job benefits analysis indicates that group threat alone is associated 
with opposition to providing same-sex couples with job benefits. The fit statistics, in 
contrast, suggest that group threat is relevant to opinions about gay marriage, while 
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neither threat is related to views on job benefits. Can this seemingly contradictory 
information be reconciled? The answer is yes. 
 Recall that the study sample does not represent the U.S. population. The 
sample is young, highly educated, politically liberal, predominantly from the 
Northeast, and of low religiosity. All of these factors are independently associated 
with greater tolerance and more accepting views of sexual minorities (Herek 2000; 
Sherrod and Nardi 1998; Simon 1998). With a sample more tolerant than the general 
population we expect our findings to be weaker than for the population as a whole; 
thus it is surprising that there is any statistically significant relationship between either 
threat and policy attitudes. It is even more startling that both threats show some 
association with policy attitudes. The incongruity of the fit statistics and the significant 
threat measures could be a consequence of sample composition. Because the sample 
consists of respondents more tolerant than the average American, the impact of threat 
on model fit might be weaker than for the popula tion at large. Thus, both threats could 
be associated with policy attitudes even though they are not strong enough to improve 
model fit. 
 The difference in fit statistics for the two policy issues is intriguing in its own 
right. As previously noted, the model with only group threat best fits the data for 
same-sex marriage, while the model without either threat provides the best fit for job 
benefits (even though threats are significant independently). This may suggest that the 
idea of gay marriage is more disturbing than the idea of providing same-sex couples 
with job benefits. If this is the case, then we would expect a stronger association 
between the threats and opposition to legalizing gay marriage than between the threats 
and opposition to providing job benefits. This is what we see with the fit statistics. The 
correlations between the threats and the policy measures provide further evidence for 
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this argument, as the correlations are greater for marriage than job benefits. However, 
since this analysis utilizes a convenience sample this conclusion requires verification. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The results demonstrate a relationship between students’ feelings of threat and 
their opposition to LGB civil rights. The relationship is stronger for gay marriage than 
job benefits. In other words, people who feel threatened are more likely to oppose 
legalizing gay marriage than they are to oppose providing same-sex couples with job 
benefits. This suggests that law makers striving for LGB equality will have greater 
success passing legislation providing same-sex couples with job benefits than in 
legalizing same-sex marriage. 
 The significance of both individual threat and group threat brings into question 
how the two threats could simultaneously relate to policy attitudes. Gender role and 
masculinity theories incorporate individual and group threats, but they do not provide 
a comprehensive argument explaining how the threats may relate to attitudes 
concurrently. 
 Although both threats are significant for the marriage analysis, it appears that 
group threat is the stronger of the two, as demonstrated by the fit statistics. At this 
point it is unclear how group threat functions, whether as described by hegemonic 
masculinity arguments, gender role perspectives, or according to some othe r paradigm. 
Further exploration is necessary to determine the specifics of the relationship between 
group threat and policy opposition. 
 The existence of a statistically significant relationship between individual 
threat, group threat, and policy attitudes is somewhat surprising since the sample is 
considerably less politically conservative, less religious, and younger than the general 
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U.S. population. This provides some evidence that the relationship does actually exist. 
However, this should be verified using a nationally representative sample. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This research attempts to address the question of how threat is related to biased 
attitudes. The issue is important for scholars, policy makers, and citizens alike. One of 
the goals of bias scholars is to understand the factors and mechanisms associated with 
biased attitudes. Policy makers, in contrast, can directly use information about threat 
and attitudes to design policies promoting equality that better address the concerns of 
their constituents and opponents. Moreover, legislators on the other side of the issue 
sometimes use threat to advance policies that exacerbate inequalities. For instance, 
following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 law makers latched onto public fears and passed 
legislation infringing on civil rights that has been used to target Muslims and people of 
Middle Eastern descent (CAIR 2005). These legislators recognized people’s worries 
and exploited them to successfully pass legislation. That this example involves the use 
of threats to move away from equality highlights the need for pro-equality legislators 
to draft bills that promote equality and address both individual and group threats. 
 The project considers the relationship between individual threat, group threat, 
and policy attitudes in the three domains of gender, race, and sexual orientation. The 
three sets of analyses utilized the same framework, which enables comparisons of the 
results. The analyses for gender, race, and sexual orientation all used two policy 
questions for outcome measures, individual threat and group threat, and the same basic 
set of controls. The specifics of which control measures are employed in each analysis 
depend on the models. For instance, insignificant background measures were excluded 
from the heterosexism models due to limitations imposed by small cell sizes. The 
analyses also differ by year and data source. The gender and race data are both drawn 
from the General Social Survey (1996 for the gender analysis and 1994 for the race 
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study). No available dataset included the measures needed for the sexual orientation 
analysis, so the necessary information was obtained through a survey of to college 
students administered in the winter of 2006-2007. 
 Comparison of the results from the three analyses reveals similar patterns in 
the relationships between the threats and policy attitudes. In all three cases both threats 
are associated with policy attitudes; although not with all policy measures. The results 
demonstrate that people who feel threatened are more likely than others to oppose 
policies aimed at helping the group posing the threat. This was expected, but had not 
been previously demonstrated for attitudes relating to women or sexual minorities. 
There also appears to be a relationship between individual threat and group threat. 
This result was not predicted by the theoretical models or previous research. It appears 
as though the relationship between the threats and attitudes may be stronger for group 
threat than for individual threat. These findings lead to two important questions. First, 
why might both threats be associated with policy opposition? And second, what 
implications do these results have for existing theoretical arguments? However, before 
addressing these questions, it is important to consider the limitations of this research. 
 
LIMITATIONS 
 Although the results from the three analyses show similar patterns, there are 
serious limitations to consider before drawing any conclusions. The first set of issues 
relate to the use of survey data. The second concern the extent to which the analyses 
are comparable. Questions of comparability arise because of methodological 
differences in the analyses and the different social positions of the groups.  
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Survey Data 
 The decision to use survey data was based on the precedent, particularly in the 
racial prejudice literature, of utilizing survey data to assess attitudes (Alwin et al. 
1992; Huber and Spitze 1981; Huddy et al. 2000; Lewis 2003; Schuman et al. 1985; 
Schuman et al. 1997; Spitze and Waite 1981; Steeh and Krysan 1996; Stouffer 1955; 
Thornton et al. 1983) and the availability of appropriate measures for two of the 
analyses. Although cross-sectional survey data offer many advantages, they do not 
permit assessment of causality. Consequently, it is impossible to conclude from this 
endeavor whether feelings of threat lead to policy opposition or vice versa.22  
 An additional problem is the use of a convenience sample for the sexual 
orientation analysis. This portion of the investigation was conducted using a survey to 
maintain methodological consistency across the three portions of the project. Unlike 
the gender and race studies, however, there was no existing data set that contained all 
of the necessary measures. Consequently, data were collected from a convenience 
sample of college students. Results from convenience samples are not generalizable, 
which is the greatest weakness of the sexual orientation analysis.  
 There are some further limitations imposed by the choice of employing survey 
data instead of data collected using other methodological approaches, which will be 
discussed in the next section.  
 
Group Comparability 
 The structure of the project, comparing attitudes towards three different 
groups, implies that the analyses and groups are comparable. Until now, there has 
been no discussion as to whether this assumption is valid. The point of similarity that 
motivated this research is that all three groups are at the bottom of their respective 
                                                 
22 A third possibility is that there is no causal relationship at all. 
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social hierarchies and the objects of bias. Beyond this similarity there are important 
analytic and substantive issues to consider. First is the extent to which the categories 
of gender, race, and sexual orientation are similar. In particular, what are the positions 
of the groups relative to one another and how salient are the respective group 
identities? Second, the use of surveys from different years and with different measures 
means that the samples are not identical and the analyses may address different 
questions. 
 
 Group Position. Women, blacks, and sexual minorities were selected for this 
study because they are each the lowest group in their respective category. However, it 
is unclear how the three groups are positioned relative to one another. (This is part of 
the reason why research on the intersection of categories is so important.) When the 
groups’ visibility and level of interaction are considered it becomes clear that the 
groups occupy very different positions in the social system (see figure 5.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Social position of women, blacks, and sexual minorities 
 
 Visibility and interaction are two dimensions that help elucidate the position of 
groups relative to one another. Visibility refers to the ease of visually identifying 
group members, while interaction is the level of interaction between members of the 
Interaction 
Visibility 
Blacks 
Women LGBs 
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in-group and the out-group. Blacks are often readily identifiable by their skin color, so 
they have high visibility; however many have minimal contact with nonblacks, and 
especially whites. For instance, a high number of blacks live in segregated 
communities, limiting their direct interaction with others (Blank 2001; Massey 2001; 
Massey and Denton 1993). (Alternatively, many whites live in neighborhoods with 
few blacks.) Also, racial intermarriage is still fairly rare (Qian 1997), so few white 
families knowingly contain black members. Women, in contrast, interact regularly 
with men because the majority of families are integrated with respect to gender, and 
like blacks, are generally easy to recognize, placing them high with respect to both 
visibility and interaction. Sexual minorities, like women, interact routinely with the 
sexual majority, in part because families are integrated. However, LGBs are not 
readily recognizable, meaning that they are high for interaction and low for visibility. 
Women, blacks, and sexual minorities have varying levels of visibility and interaction, 
suggesting that the three groups have different experiences relative to their respective 
out-groups. 
 
 Salience of Group Identity. A significant limitation of using survey data is the 
lack of information on the salience of each identity. The stronger an actor’s attachment 
to a group, the more likely she is to perceive and react to a threat to that group (Maass 
et al. 2003). The stronger the group identification the more likely it is that a threat will 
be associated with opposition to helping the out-group. However, if the group’s 
identity is not salient, then the link between threat and attitudes will be broken (i.e., 
actors may recognize a threat without reacting to it.) The surveys utilized for this 
project contain no measures of group identification, so it is impossible to determine if 
one category is more salient than another. Without this measure, we assume that all 
three groups are equally salient; however, we have no way to know if this is true. 
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 Data Issues. Although the data used was as consistent as possible across the 
three analyses, there were some differences that may impact comparability. First, the 
surveys were conducted in different years and consequently contain different samples. 
During the inter-survey period there could have been sociopolitical changes or events 
that altered opinions. As a result, members of the 1994 GSS sample may have 
answered the same questions very differently if they had been asked again in 1996. 
We do not and cannot know. The heterosexism segment makes the situation worse, 
because the survey was conducted after more than ten years elapsed and contains an 
entirely different set of respondents (college students versus the general population). 
 The studies may also address different questions, because the three segments 
do not use the same threat and policy attitude measures. The outcome measure for the 
race and gender studies both focus on employment, but the heterosexism questions 
pertain to family relations; two subjects that are substantively very different. 
Moreover, the threat measures differ for all three studies to ensure that they are salient 
to the subject of interest. As a result, however, the three studies may differ in ways we 
cannot ascertain. 
 
POSSIBLE DUAL RELEVANCE OF INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP THREATS 
 There is consistent evidence that both threats are often associated with policy 
opposition, but it is not clear why. A logical explanation is that there is a relationship 
between individual threat and group threat. The analyses considered two basic types of 
relationships: interaction and proxy. 
 All three analyses suggest the existence of a relationship between the two 
threats. This is seen by the coefficients’ declining magnitudes and significances when 
the models go from single threat to dual threat. As there is little to no evidence of an 
interaction between the two threats, this instead suggests the possibility of a proxy 
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relationship. Additionally, in one of the sexual orientation models individual threat 
was significant when it was alone in the model, but not significant once group threat 
was added. This also suggests that there might be a proxy relationship between the two 
threats. A proxy relationship would mean that threats in a single threat model 
spuriously capture the effect of the omitted threat, and consequently overstate the 
effect of the included threat. But why might the threats be related? 
 The most obvious answer is that people who feel threatened for one reason 
may be more likely to feel threatened for another reason. In other words, people who 
identify an individual threat would be more likely to identify a group threat than 
people who do not identifying an individual threat and similarly people discerning a 
group threat would be more likely to feel personally threatened than people not 
identifying a group threat. This explanation is consistent with the moderate 
correlations found between the two threats. 
 An alternative account is that one threat leads to the other. As Blumer (1958) 
argues, a strong group attachment may influence individual level views. If this is true, 
then people who identify a group threat may extrapolate and say “because group A is 
threatened and I’m a member of group A, I am therefore threatened.” This logic would 
also easily apply in the reverse direction – if someone feels personally threatened 
because they are a member of group A, that might increase her awareness of the issues 
surrounding group A, and consequently influence her perceptions of any danger facing 
the group. This argument relies on an actor’s recognition of personal threat caused by 
group membership. It is more difficult to conceive of a scenario where an actor’s 
feelings of personal threat (unaffected by group affiliation) lead to awareness of group 
threat. However this approach of one threat leading to the other would suggest an 
interaction between the two threats rather than a proxy relationship. 
  117 
 Determining whether there is a relationship between individual threat and 
group threat was one of the goals of this research. The results suggest the possibility of 
such a relationship, but they are inconclusive about the type of relationship. The 
inability to precisely confirm the existence and type of relationship between individual 
threat and group threat is largely due to limitations imposed by small sample sizes. A 
stronger test of the relationship will require larger samples and longitudinal data. 
 
RECONCILING EXISTING THEORIES WITH THE FINDINGS 
 The analyses demonstrate that individual threat and group threat are both 
associated with policy attitudes vis-à-vis women, blacks, and sexual minorities. This 
raises two questions. First, can existing theories accommodate both forms of threat? 
Second, can any of the theories cover all three types of bias? It is certainly possible 
that no theory can adequately encompass both threats and all forms of bias; however 
the similarities in results suggest that the idea of an encompassing theory is at least 
worth exploring. 
 Six theoretical approaches were presented in the three analyses: gender 
identity, gender norms, masculinity, split labor market, power threat, and group 
position. Table 5.1 describes how the models were used in the analyses, their original 
applications, and the threats they identify. The threat columns show that only the 
gender norms and masculinity arguments incorporate individual threat and group 
threat. The other models would all require expansion to incorporate the exc luded 
threat. The gender norms and masculinity perspectives are also the only two 
arguments that have previously been utilized for more than one type of bias (both have 
been applied to sexism and heterosexism). So can the single threat theories incorporate 
the second threat? And which models, if any, can encompass all three types of bias? 
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Table 5.1. Theoretical Models’ Threat Type, Analysis, and Original Application 
Model 
Individual 
Threat Group Threat Analysis  Original Application 
Gender identity x  Gender Gender 
Gender norms  x x Sexual orientation Gender, sexual orientation 
Masculinity x x Sexual orientation Gender, sexual orientation 
Split labor market x  Race Ethnicity 
Power threat  x Race Race 
Group position  x Race Race 
 
Gender Norms and Gender Identity Perspectives 
 The gender norms and gender identity arguments both focus on gender roles. 
The gender norms model contends that people who espouse traditional gender role 
beliefs oppose people who deviate from traditional gender roles. The threats posed by 
gender role “deviants” apply at both the individual and group levels: “deviants” may 
threaten the mental well-being and perceived social position of “traditionalists,” and 
they also pose a threat to the gender hierarchy. This argument applies equa lly well for 
attitudes towards feminist women and sexual minorities, especially those who display 
characteristics stereotypically associated with the other gender. 
 The gender identity perspective takes a slightly different approach, 
concentrating on how people view themselves. It asserts that actors are often hostile to 
people portraying a gender identity different from their own. This means that 
adherents of traditional gender roles are likely to be unfriendly towards feminists 
(regardless of gender) and sexual minorities, while those who adopt nontraditional 
gender role identities will tend to oppose people with traditional gender identities. 
Threat emerges when two people’s gender identities conflict. For instance, an assertive 
woman embodies masculine traits, which threatens a masculine man’s sense of 
masculinity and a feminine woman’s sense of femininity. There is no sense of group 
threat and it is difficult to incorporate it into the argument because identity is an 
individual level characteristic. 
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 Both of these approaches can apply to discussions of sexism and heterosexism; 
although I am unaware of any attempts to apply the gender identity argument to sexual 
minorities. Additional groups can be accommodated by the gender norms model if the 
idea of roles applies to the relevant groups in question. For instance, if whites have 
roles A, B, C and blacks have roles 1, 2, 3, then if blacks try to do A, B, or C they are 
adopting the roles of whites and there may be conflict. This argument does not seem to 
apply well for racial hostility as there are few race specific roles; however, it might do 
better for ethnic conflict as there is a tradition of occupational ethnic homogeneity (see 
the discussion of split labor markets for more on this subject). 
 Extension of the gender identity argument to race or ethnicity requires that 
individuals identify as part of the group, group affiliation is denoted through various 
group specific behaviors, and a group’s position is threatened if their group specific 
behavior is adopted by an out-group. The first factor is not problematic as many 
people readily identify with at least one racial or ethnic group. Second, are the various 
indicators that signal group membership. Many times these markers are physical 
attributes such as skin color, hair texture, or nose shape that are difficult to replicate 
without sophisticated make-up or surgery. These types of identifying symbols do not 
fit well within the identity model framework. Markers that are fairly easy to replicate 
such as vocal mannerisms and costumes are more in line with the model.  
 The final issue is whether racial or ethnic identity can be threatened as easily 
as gender identity. Are there behaviors characteristic of one group that members of 
another group might emulate? Part of what makes the gender identity argument 
convincing are the concepts of masculinity and femininity. A man’s status depends not 
only on his biological attributes, but also on his masculinity. The highest status men 
are generally both masculine and male. Racial and ethnic identification do not 
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generally require this duel approach at least from the perspective of the out-group. 23 
Consequently, even if someone adopts behavior identified with a different racial or 
ethnic group, she retains her own racial/ethnic status. For example, the hip hop style 
associated with inner city black ghettos has been widely embraced by youth from 
other socio-economic and racial backgrounds. These youths may have adopted the 
fashions of the black inner city, but few people believe they are trying to “become” 
black.24 
 
Masculinity Arguments 
 Masculinity arguments are one of the two theoretical approaches, along with 
the gender norms perspective, that includes both individual threat and group threat. 
These models also apply equally well to sexism and heterosexism. Masculinity 
arguments contend that there is a distinction between men and women. The genders 
are currently situated with women subordinate to men. Moreover, the dominance 
structure requires that the superordinate group be not just biologically male, but also 
masculine. Men who are not appropriately masculine are not considered “real men.” 
According to these strictures, men who have sex with other men are not masculine, 
and are therefore subordinate to “real men.” The desire to preserve this hierarchical 
system and one’s place in it, leads to both personal and group threats. 
 By design, the arguments address sexism and heterosexism, but it is less clear 
that they can be extended to incorporate racism. At the most basic level, masculinity 
arguments are about defending a social hierarchy. The U.S. has a racial hierarchy with 
                                                 
23 There are some reports of in -groups rejecting members who do not satisfactorily demonstrate group 
affiliation. One example is Chicano children being labeled “white” for being too successful 
academically (Portes and Zhou 2001). 
24 The phenomenon of “wiggers” may prove a contradiction; however I am not convinced that these 
individuals truly want to become black, rather than simply adopting those characteristics that they think 
are desirable. My thanks to David Harris for mentioning this possibility. 
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whites at the top and blacks on the bottom (Charles 2001, p. 248), so that component 
of masculinity arguments applies. A second aspect of masculinity arguments is the 
importance of dominant group members embodying the ideal characteristics of the 
dominant group. This leads some men to actively prove their masculinity. There does 
not appear to be a parallel for race relations, because there are not behaviors that 
distinguish whites from blacks. Whites cannot “lose” their whiteness, nor do whites 
need to prove their whiteness to ensure that they retain their status. This issue makes it 
difficult to extend masculinity arguments to race relations. 
 
Split Labor Market 
 The split labor market argument contends that conflict emerges between 
people in various employment classes, when a cheaper labor force enters the market 
(Bonacich 1972). Individual outcomes are paramount; group membership matters only 
so far as it impacts individuals. Incorporation of group threat into the model would 
imply that although individuals want to project their jobs, they also want to preserve 
their group’s position. This is certainly reasonable. 
 The model does not extend as well to other forms of bias. The model works for 
ethnic conflict, because there is a history of members of ethnic groups collectively 
entering certain markets, such as Jews in the garment industry (Portes and Manning 
1986) and Irish in law enforcement (Lieberson 2001). As women’s labor market 
participation increased, employers in certain fields began to displace male employees 
with female workers who could be paid less, and various occupations became 
increasing feminized (Jackson 1998; Reskin 2001). Although sexual minorities 
stereotypically gravitate towards select professions, I am unaware of any evidence 
indicating that they displaced or undercut workers already in those jobs. So the 
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argument may apply to gender, but it does not appear to accommodate sexual 
orientation. 
 A further limitation of the split labor market argument is that it is inherently an 
economic model. Since economic competition is only one source of threat, this model 
cannot be used to explain other forms of threat. For instance, the split labor market 
cannot account for threats of pollution caused by intergroup marriages or fears of 
neighborhood decline. 
 
Power Threat Hypothesis 
 Blalock (1967) conceived of the power threat hypothesis as a way to explain 
whites’ hostility towards blacks. He asserts that as the population of a subordinate 
group grows relative to the dominant group, members of the dominant group will fear 
a threat to their political power. The model focuses on group threat and race relations, 
and considers neither individual threat nor relations between non-racial groups. 
 The inclusion of individual threat would be somewhat problematic for 
Blalock’s argument, because individual actors are not considered. To incorporate 
individual level threat the model would first have to recognize individuals. Then the 
model could propose that increases in the relative size of the in-group increase the 
probability that individuals will interact with members of the out-group and 
consequently face a greater chance of being harmed by a member of the out-group.25 
This would require either a complete overhaul of the model or the recognition that the 
model in its original form accounts for only one aspect of racial prejudice. 
 Extending the model to other types of bias is also not straightforward, because 
the argument asserts that changes in relative population proportions lead to increased 
                                                 
25 This is an inversion of the contact hypothesis (Allport 1958; Charles 2001; Kane and Sanchez 1994; 
Quillian and Campbell 2003) which argues that contact between members of difference groups will lead 
to greater tolerance. 
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threat. To extend the argument to nonracial groups two things must occur. First, there 
must be a change in population proportions; second, the change in relative group sizes 
must result in a potential threat to the dominant group. The proportion of women in 
the population has not changed substantially; however women’s rate of employment 
has risen. This suggests that while the power threat hypothesis canno t extend to 
sexism generally, it could be used to explain attitudes towards women in the 
workplace. With respect to sexual minorities, it is unclear how we could chart changes 
in the actual LGB population, because we do not have accurate estimates of current or 
past populations (Berrill 1992; Green et al. 2001). However, we could probably safely 
argue that sexual minorities are more public now than at almost any time in U.S. 
history, so they have a stronger presence now than previously. This increase in 
visibility could be equated with a perceived increase in population proportion. In other 
words, because sexual minorities are more visible, it appears as though there are more 
of them. 
 The model was designed to explain political and economic threats. This may 
seem to be particularly problematic for heterosexism, as sexual minorities do not pose 
an economic threat. They could, however, pose a political threat. If sexual minorities 
and their supporters gain enough political power, then they can implement policies 
that “threaten the moral foundation of American society.” 
 
Group Position Model 
 Blumer’s group position model, like Blalock’s power threat hypothesis, 
focuses on racial group threat. However, the group position model is more flexible and 
better able to accommodate individual threat and nonracial forms of bias. Individual 
threat can be incorporated into Blumer’s argument with only a modest weakening of 
group threat as the primary source of prejudice. The group position model contends 
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that four factors are associated with racial prejudice: the perception that the out-group 
poses a threat to the in-group, the conviction that the in-group is superior to the out-
group, the feeling that the out-group is fundamentally different or alien, and the belief 
that the in-group is entitled to certain privileges (Blumer 1958). These four factors are 
necessary for the emergence of prejudice, which is fundamentally a group level 
phenomenon. The addition of individual threat has no direct impact on the four 
original components, assuming that the threat involves awareness of group affiliation. 
(For example, when an actor feels she is in danger because she is a member of a 
certain group.) Furthermore, the three non-threat factors might help explain why an 
individual threat could lead to group prejudice, instead of anger directed solely at the 
specific source of the threat. If the actor believes that her group affiliation is the reason 
she is under threat, then her conviction in the in-group’s superiority and entitlements, 
along with her belief that as a member of her group she is fundamentally different 
from the out-group could lead her to hold negative views of the out-group as a whole. 
One strength of this argument is that it shows how there could be a relationship 
between individual threat and group threat. Furthermore, Blumer himself argues that a 
strong sense of group affiliation may influence individual level views (1958). This 
supports the contention of a relationship between the threats. The argument does not 
appear to apply if the actor believes she is threatened for her own sake and not because 
of her group membership. 
 Blumer’s discussion is ostensibly about race prejudice, but there is no reason 
that it cannot be extended to gender prejudice or sexuality prejudice. The four feelings 
that Blumer associates with racial prejudice apply equally well to sexism and 
heterosexism. First, as described in the gender and sexual orientation analyses, women 
and sexual minorities may pose a threat to men and non-LGB persons. Dominant 
group members also often believe that members of subordinate groups are 
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fundamentally different or alien. This is amply demonstrated for gender by the well 
know book title “Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus” (Gray 1992). Sexual 
minorities are considered different because they are outside the “naturally” 
“dichotomized sexual world” (Connell 1987, p. 248). Furthermore, adherents to 
gender hierarchies dictate that men are superior to women and heterosexuals superior 
to nonheterosexuals; they also contend that those atop the hierarchies are entitled to 
certain privileges. These are the third and fourth of Blumer’s four preconditions for 
prejudice. Thus, both sexism and heterosexism can fit into Blumer’s group position 
model. 
 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 The question of how feelings of threat relate to policy attitudes is an important 
one and it deserves further attention. The first thing to do to expand this research is to 
run the heterosexism analysis with a nationally representative sample. This will 
provide a more accurate assessment of how threat relates to anti-LGB policy attitudes.  
 Next, the models should be examined in additional contexts to determine how 
well they apply. Two contexts worthy of study are immigration and religion. 
Xenophobia and religious bias are two of the most universally relevant forms of bias. 
Religion and religious difference have incited (or at been presented as motivating) 
such historic conflicts as the Crusades and the Holocaust, and the conflicts in Sudan, 
Northern Ireland, and India/Pakistan, to name a few (See 1986; Wellman and Tokuno 
2004). Xenophobia probably has an even longer history, but its current relevance is 
primarily due to migration. The debate over illegal immigration in the U.S. is one 
reason for studying xenophobia as is the intense scrutiny it receives in Europe. (This is 
partly due to a difference in semantics—what we in the U.S. study as racism, 
Europeans often study as xenophobia. It does, however, go beyond language, as the 
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European approach to xenophobia generally incorporates ethnicity, language, and 
potentially religion (e.g., Aronowitz 1994; Krueger and Pischke 1997; Semyonov et al. 
2004). 
 Prejudice on the basis of age and disability are two other areas worth 
exploration. Ageism is becoming increasingly important with longer life expectancies 
and the growing population of older individuals. Treatment of people with disabilities 
is different. Here it is less an issue of a population and more an issue of increased 
awareness that people with disabilities are as worthy of respect and deserve to be 
treated equally. (Of course, it could also be that lobbies for people with disabilities 
have become more powerful.)  
 These two areas may yield fundamentally different results than those for the 
gender, race, and sexual orientation analyses presented here. Any disparity may be due 
to the nonascriptive nature of age and disability status. If we live long enough we will 
all be old and if we are unlucky we could end up in a wheelchair. This suggests that 
ageism and bias against people with disabilities may be less associated with threat and 
more contingent on feelings of pity or revulsion. However, threat could also be 
relevant if people somehow believe that these “conditions” are contagious. 
 Another area that requires more work is the opinions of subordinate groups 
towards dominant groups and other subordinate groups. This matters not only because 
as social scientists we should study subordinate groups as well as dominant ones, but 
also because these relationships are important to the groups involved, shape their 
interactions, and can potentially have a national impact. For instance, we need more 
papers like Lee’s (2002) to help understand why Korean and Jewish merchants are 
targets of racial conflict. There is also little work done that explores how sexual 
minorities view other sexual minorities and the sexual majority. 
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APPENDIX A 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR HETEROSEXISM ANALYSIS 
 
Note: Because the questions are not numbered in the questionnaire, there is no way to 
show skip patterns. 
 
  
  Study of Student Life, Experiences, and Attitudes Exit this survey >>
 
  Consent Form  
 
Student Life, Experiences, and Attitudes Survey 
You are invited to take part in a research study designed to assess the 
experiences and attitudes of Cornell students. Please read this form 
carefully and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to take 
part in the study. 
 
What the study is about: The purpose of the study is to learn about 
the life, experiences, and attitudes of Cornell students. You must be an 
undergraduate 18 or older to participate in the study. 
 
What we will ask you to do: If you agree to be in this study, we will 
ask you to take a survey. The survey includes questions about what you 
have experienced since coming to college and what you think about 
certain subjects. The survey will take approximately 10 minutes to 
complete. 
 
Risk and benefits: There is the risk that you will find some of the 
questions to be sensitive. While there is no personal benefit to you, the 
results of the study may help improve the condition of life for you fellow 
students. 
 
Compensation: Upon completion of the survey you will receive a 
number that you will take to the sociology office in Uris Hall to receive a 
coupon for a drink at Collegetown Bagels.  
 
Taking part is voluntary: Taking part in this study is completely 
voluntary. You may skip any questions in the survey that you do not 
wish to answer. If you decide not to take part or to skip some of the 
questions, it will not affect your current or future relationship with 
Cornell University. If you decide to take part, you are free to withdraw at 
any time. 
 
Your answer will be kept private: The records of this study will be 
kept private. In any sort of report we make, we will not include any 
information that will make it possible to identify you. Research records 
will be kept in a locked file; only the researchers will have access to the 
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records. However, your answers are not being submitted over a secure 
server, so it is possible that they will be intercepted. 
 
If you have questions: The researcher on the study is Judy 
Rosenstein. Please ask any questions you have before you take the 
survey by contacting Judy Rosenstein at jer33@cornell.edu. If you have 
any questions later, you may contact Judy at the above e-mail address. 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a subject 
in this study, you may contact the University Committee on Human 
Subjects (UCHS) at 607-255-5138 or access their website at 
http://www.osp.cornell.edu/Compliance/UCHS/homepageUCHS.htm  
 
You may print a copy of this form for your records or request a copy 
from Judy Rosenstein at jer33@cornell.edu.  
 
This consent form will be kept by the researcher for at least three years 
beyond the end of the study and was approved by the UCHS on 
September 10, 2006. 
 
Statement of Consent: I have read the above information and have 
received answers to any questions that I have asked. I am 18 years old 
and consent to participate in the study.  
 
 
 *  
I consent 
 
I do not consent 
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  Introduction  
 
Thank you for participating in a study of student life, experiences, and 
attitudes. Your participation is voluntary. I will endeavor to keep your 
responses confidential, so do not write your name anywhere in the survey. 
Please be aware, however, that your answers are not being submitted 
over a secure server. You may skip any questions you do not feel 
comfortable answering. 
 
Instructions: For each question, please mark the appropriate box or write 
in your answer, as indicated.  
 
 
* Are you a Cornell student? 
 
Yes 
 
No 
  
 
* Are you an undergraduate?
 
Yes 
 
No 
  
 
* Are you 18 years old or older? 
 
Yes 
 
No 
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Student Life and Activities 
 
  What is your classification (year in school)? 
 
 First year 
 
 Second year 
 
 Third year 
 
 Fourth year 
 
 Other (please specify) 
     
 
 
  What is your college? 
 
Agriculture and Life Sciences 
 
 Architecture, Art and Planning 
 
Arts and Sciences 
 
Engineering 
 
 Hotel Administration 
 
Human Ecology 
 
Industrial and Labor Relations 
 
 Other (please specify) 
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  Which of the following best describes your current living 
arrangements while at school? 
 
 Residence hall 
 
 Off-campus house/apartment 
 
 Fraternity or sorority house 
 
University cooperative 
 
Parents’ house 
 
 Other (please specify) 
      
 
 
  With whom do you live while attending Cornell? (Please check 
all that apply.) 
 
 Alone 
 
Parent(s) 
 
Spouse 
 
 Boyfriend/Girlfriend 
 
 Children 
 
 Roommate(s) -- if not included in one of the above categories 
 
Other (please specify) 
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  Are you a member of an intercollegiate or club athletic team?
 
No 
 
Yes, an intercollegiate team 
 
Yes, a club team 
  
 
  Are you a member of an intramural athletic team?
 
 No 
 
Yes 
  
 
Are you a member or pledge of a fraternity or sorority?
 
No 
 
Yes 
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 Attitudes  
Now we are going to switch gears and ask about your attitudes towards 
two groups of people who have both been in the news a lot in the past few 
months: people who are lesbian, gay, or bisexual and people who are 
Muslim. We believe it is important to hear what you think about these 
groups and the often sensitive issues surrounding them. 
 
  Thinking about sexual relations between two adults of the same 
sex, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, 
sometimes wrong, or not wrong at all? 
 
Always wrong 
 
Almost always wrong 
 
Sometimes wrong 
 
Not wrong at all 
  
 
  Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the 
statement “people of the same sex should have the right to 
marry.”  
 
Strongly agree 
 
 Agree 
 
 Neither disagree nor agree 
 
Disagree 
 
 Strongly disagree 
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 Do you favor or oppose same-sex couples getting the same job 
benefits as are now given to married couples, such as insurance 
and pension benefits? 
 
 Strongly favor 
 
Favor 
 
 Oppose 
 
Strongly oppose 
  
 
  Do you think being homosexual is something people choose to 
be or do you think it is something they cannot change?  
 
Something people choose to be 
 
 Something they cannot change 
  
 
 
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following 
statements: 
 
  If I saw two men holding hands in public, I would be more 
disgusted than if I saw a man and a woman holding hands. 
 
 
Strongly agree 
 
Agree 
 
 Disagree 
 
 Strongly disagree 
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  Gay men are not a threat to the safety of children. 
 
Strongly agree 
 
Agree 
 
 Disagree 
 
 Strongly disagree 
  
 
 If a member of my sex made an advance toward me, I would 
be flattered.  
 
Strongly agree 
 
 Agree 
 
 Disagree 
 
Strongly disagree 
  
 
  Gay men tend to act like women. 
 
Strongly agree 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Strongly disagree 
  
 
  Lesbians tend to act like men.  
 
 Strongly agree 
 
 Agree 
 
 Disagree 
 
Strongly disagree 
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  If a member of my sex made an advance toward me, I would 
feel angry.  
 
Strongly agree 
 
 Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Strongly disagree 
   
 
  Gay men and lesbians should be allowed to teach in elementary 
schools. 
 
Strongly agree 
 
 Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Strongly disagree 
  
 
  Allowing gay and lesbian couples to legally marry would 
undermine the traditional American family.  
 
Strongly agree 
 
Agree 
 
 Disagree 
 
 Strongly disagree 
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  Gay and lesbian couples can be as good parents as heterosexual 
couples.  
 
 Strongly agree 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Strongly disagree   
 
 
Now we are going to present you with a scenario that we would like to get 
your opinions on: 
 
It is the end of November and you gather with the rest of your family for 
Thanksgiving dinner. Your older brother Sam, with whom you are very 
close, has brought home a male friend Mike. While everyone is seated 
around the table, Sam announces that he and Mike are in love and plan to 
spend their lives together and raise a family. 
 
  How do you feel about Sam’s relationship? Do you … 
 
 Strongly support 
 
Support 
 
Neither support nor oppose 
 
 Oppose 
 
Strongly oppose 
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  When you think of Sam’s announcement, what impact do you 
think it would have on your relationship with him?  
 
Very positive impact 
 
Positive impact 
 
 No impact  
 
 Negative impact 
 
Very negative impact 
  
 
 
  Now please think about if Sam and Mike had children 
together. Do you think you would feel the same or differently 
about these children as compared to children that came from 
Sam partnering with a woman? 
 
Same 
 
 Differently 
 
Don’t know 
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We are now going to switch gears and ask your thoughts on Muslims. 
 
  Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, 
somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of Muslims? 
 
Very favorable 
 
Somewhat favorable 
 
Somewhat unfavorable 
 
Very unfavorable 
 
No opinion 
  
 
  Some people have expressed concern about the rise of Islamic 
extremism in this country. What about you, are you at all 
concerned about a possible rise of Islamic extremism in our 
country these days?  
 
 Very concerned 
 
 Somewhat concerned 
 
 Not too concerned 
 
Not at all concerned 
  
 
Which statement comes closer to your own views, even if 
neither is exactly right: “The Islamic religion is more likely 
than other religions to encourage violence among its 
believers,” or “The Islamic religion does not encourage more 
violence than other religions.”  
 
 
The Islamic religion is more likely than others to encourage 
violence among its believers 
 
The Islamic religion does not encourage more violence than 
others 
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Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. 
 
  All Muslims should not be required to register their 
whereabouts with the federal government.  
 
Strongly agree 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
 
Strongly disagree 
  
 
 
 
  Muslim places of worship, such as mosques, should be closely 
monitored and surveilled by U.S. law enforcement agencies.  
 
Strongly agree 
 
Agree 
 
 Disagree 
 
 Strongly disagree 
  
 
  U.S. government agencies should not profile citizens as 
potential threats based on being Muslim or having Middle 
Eastern heritage.  
 
 Strongly agree 
 
 Agree 
 
 Disagree 
 
Strongly disagree   
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  Muslim civic and volunteer associations should be infiltrated 
by undercover law enforcement agents to keep watch on their 
activities and fundraising.  
 
Strongly agree 
 
 Agree 
 
 Disagree 
 
Strongly disagree 
  
 
 
  There will be another terrorist attack in the United States within 
the next 12 months.  
 
Strongly agree 
 
Agree 
 
 Disagree 
 
Strongly disagree 
  
 
  I am not personally in danger of being a victim of a terrorist 
attack.  
 
Strongly agree 
 
Agree 
 
 Disagree 
 
 Strongly disagree 
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  Background  
  Your sex:
 
Male 
 
Female 
  
 
  Your age: 
  
 
 
Your race or ethnic group (mark all that apply): 
 
American Indian or Alaska Native 
 
Asian 
 
 Black or African American 
 
 Hispanic or Latino 
 
 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
 
 White 
 
 
Your citizenship status: 
 
United States citizen 
 
 
U.S. permanent resident (green card holder) and citizen of another 
country 
 
Citizen of another country with a student visa or other non-
immigrant visa 
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In contemporary times, some people move around a lot. Please indicate 
the state or country in which you lived at various points in your life. If you 
lived outside the U.S. please select "other". 
 
  Where were you born? 
 
   
 
 
 Please specify where you were born. 
  
 
 
 
 Where did you live when you were 5 years old? 
 
 
   
 
 Please specify where you lived when you were 5 years old. 
  
 
 
  Where did you live when you were 10 years old?
 
   
 
 
  Please specify where you lived when you were 10 years old. 
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Where did you live when you were 15 years old?
 
  
 
 
  Please specify where you lived when you were 15 years old. 
 
   
 
 
 
People’s identities are shaped by many different things. Sometimes 
experiences influence how a person views him or herself, sometimes they 
don’t. We would like to know about both your experiences and your 
identity. We’ll start with your experiences. 
 
  Are you currently involved in a romantic relationship? 
 
Yes 
 
 No 
  
 
  Since the age of 16, have you ever been sexually active (with 
opposite or same sex partner)? By sexually active we mean not 
only intercourse, but any form of genital contact. 
 
Yes 
 
No   
 
If yes… 
  Have you been sexual active within the past year?
 
Yes 
 
 No 
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  If you have been sexually active, has it been with…? 
 
 Opposite sex partner(s) only 
 
Sometimes have sex with people of the same sex, but primarily 
have sex with people of the opposite sex 
 
Sometimes have sex with people of the opposite sex, but primarily 
have sex with people of the same sex 
 
 Same sex partner(s) only 
  
 
 
Now we would like to know about how you identify yourself. 
 
  On a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 is heterosexual or straight and 10 
is gay or lesbian, where would you put yourself? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
            
 
 
  How many Cornell undergraduates do you know who are 
lesbian, gay, or bisexual? 
 
 None 
 
 1-2 
 
 3-4 
 
 5-9 
 
10 or more 
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We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and 
conservatives. Where would you place yourself on a scale 
ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative? 
 
Extremely liberal 
 
Liberal 
 
 Slightly liberal 
 
 Moderate, middle of the road 
 
Slightly conservative 
 
Conservative 
 
Extremely conservative  
 
  Do you belong to a political party? If so, which one?
 
No, belong to no political party 
 
Yes, Democrat 
 
Yes, Republican 
 
Yes, Independent 
 
 Other (please specify) 
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  What is your religious preference? 
 
 Protestant 
 
Catholic 
 
Jewish 
 
None 
 
Buddhist 
 
 Hindu 
 
Muslim  
 
 Orthodox Christian 
 
 Native American 
 
Inter-nondenominational 
 
Other 
 
No religious affiliation 
   
 
If Protestant: 
  What is your denomination? 
 
   
 
 
If other: 
  What is your religious affiliation?
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  How often do you attend religious services? 
 
Never 
 
 Less than once a year  
 
About once or twice a year 
 
Several times a year 
 
About once a month 
 
2-3 times a month 
 
Nearly every week 
 
Every week 
 
 Several times a week 
  
 
  What is the highest level of education achieved by each of 
your parents? 
 
Mother   
Father      
 
 
 
  Personal Code  
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete the questionnaire. 
 
Below you are going to be asked to create a code that is unique to you. 
You will use this code to receive certificate for a free drink. You cannot 
receive the certificate without the code. Your identity cannot be 
determined from the code. 
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* To generate your unique code please enter the following in the 
space below in the order given and as it appears on your 
student id (when appropriate): 
 
-The first letter of your first name 
-The last letter of your last name 
-Your day (not date) of birth (use 2 digits) 
-The first letter of the place you were born 
-The last 3 digits of your student id number 
 
For instance, John W. Smith who was born on June 8, 1986 in 
Albany, NY with student id number 123456 would be: 
 
JH08A456 
 
   
 
 
 
  IMPORTANT: Record this code.  
 
To obtain your Collegetown Bagels gift card take the code and 
your student id to the SOCIOLOGY office on the 3rd floor of Uris 
Hall. Go in Monday through Friday from 10:30 - 12:30 or 1:30 - 
3:30. Please wait at least one full business day before going to 
the sociology office to ensure that your gift card is available. 
You CANNOT take the code directly to Collegetown Bagels. You 
MUST receive a coupon from the sociology office first.   
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APPENDIX B 
RECRUITMENT POSTER 
 
         
 
Want a free drink from Collegetown 
Bagels? 
 
Just take a quick soc. survey! 
 
Go to: 
www.people.cornell.edu/pages/jer33/survey.html 
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APPENDIX C 
QUESTIONS USED FOR ATTITUDE SCALE AND THEIR FACTOR LOADINGS 
 
Question Factor Loading 
Thinking about sexua l relations between two adults of the same sex, 
do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, sometimes 
wrong, or not wrong at all? 
-.64 
If I saw two men holding hands in public, I would be more 
disgusted than if I saw a man and a woman holding hands. 
.77 
Gay men and lesbians should be allowed to teach in elementary 
schools. 
.63 
Gay and lesbian couples can be as good parents as heterosexual 
couples. 
.68 
If a member of my sex made an advance toward me, I would be 
flattered. 
.65 
If a member of my sex made an advance toward me, I would feel 
angry. 
-.72 
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